

THE
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

FOUNDED BY
ERNEST JONES

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY
JAMES STRACHEY

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

MARJORIE BRIERLEY
LONDON

SYLVIA PAYNE
LONDON

C. P. OBERNDORF
NEW YORK

JOHN RICKMAN
LONDON

IN COLLABORATION WITH

LEO H. BARTEMEIER
DETROIT

A. A. BRILL
NEW YORK

J. W. KANNABICH
MOSCOW

GERALD H. J. PEARSON
PHILADELPHIA

EDITH WEIGERT
WASHINGTON—BALTIMORE

SARA A. BONNETT
NEW YORK

MARGARET W. GERARD
CHICAGO

ERICH LINDEMANN
BOSTON

PHILIPP SARASIN
BASLE

EMANUEL WINDHOLZ
SAN FRANCISCO

G. BOSE
CALCUTTA

ERNEST JONES
LONDON

KARL A. MENNINGER
TOPEKA

ALFHILD TAMM
STOCKHOLM

M. WOOLF
TEL-AVIV



PUBLISHED FOR
THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
BY

BAILLIÈRE, TINDALL & COX, 7 & 8 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN,
LONDON, W.C.2

THE
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
is issued half-yearly. Besides Original Papers, Abstracts and Reviews, it
contains the Bulletin of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, of
which it is the Official Organ.

NOTICES

EDITORIAL

1. All manuscripts and editorial communications, as well as review copies of books and exchange numbers of periodicals, should be sent to the Editor, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 96 Gloucester Place, London, W.1.

2. Editorial communications from America should be sent to Dr. C. P. Oberndorf, 112 West 59th Street, New York.

3. Manuscripts should be typewritten, with *wide* spacing throughout (including especially the footnotes); a copy should always be retained by the author.

4. Authors will understand that translations of their papers may be published in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago* or the *Revue Française de Psychanalyse* if thought suitable.

5. Authors of original papers will be sent free of charge three copies of the Journal by the Publishers *on application*. If they require reprints at their own cost, application should be made to the Publishers (not to the Editor) stating how many are required.

6. All matter appearing in this Journal is copyright.

ADMINISTRATIVE

1. The Annual Subscription is 30s. per Volume of Two Double-Parts.

2. The Journal is obtainable *by subscription only*, the parts not being sold separately.

3. Subscriptions and Correspondence relative to advertising and administrative matters in general should be addressed to the Publishers, Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 7 & 8 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C.2.

4. Bound and unbound copies of most of the back volumes are available. Prices on application to the Publishers.

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

All editorial communications should in future be addressed to the Editor, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 96 Gloucester Place, London, W.1.

* * The JOURNAL will for the time being be issued in two double numbers yearly.

ORIGINAL PAPERS

DOSTOEVSKY AND PARRICIDE (1928) ¹

By SIGMUND FREUD

Four facets may be distinguished in the rich personality of Dostoevsky: the creative artist, the neurotic, the moralist and the sinner. How is one to find one's way in this bewildering complexity?

The creative artist is the least doubtful: Dostoevsky's place is not far behind Shakespeare. *The Brothers Karamazov* is the most magnificent novel ever written; the episode of the Grand Inquisitor, one of the peaks in the literature of the world, can hardly be overestimated. Before the problem of the creative artist analysis must, alas, lay down its arms.

The moralist in Dostoevsky is the most readily assailable. If we seek to rank him high as a moralist on the plea that only a man who has gone through the depths of sin can reach the highest summit of morality, we are neglecting a doubt that arises. A moral man is one who reacts to temptation as soon as he feels it in his heart, without yielding to it. A man who alternately sins and then in his remorse erects high moral standards lays himself open to the reproach that he has made things too easy for himself. He has not achieved the essence of morality, renunciation, for the moral conduct of life is a practical human interest. He reminds one of the barbarians of the great migrations, who murdered and did penance for it, till penance became an actual technique for enabling murder to be done. Ivan the Terrible behaved in exactly this way; indeed, this compromise with morality is a characteristic Russian trait. Nor was the final outcome of Dostoevsky's moral strivings anything very glorious. After the most violent struggles to reconcile the instinctual demands of the individual with the claims of the community, he landed in the retrograde position of submission both to temporal and spiritual authority, of veneration both for the Tsar and for

the God of the Christians and of a narrow Russian nationalism—a position which lesser minds have reached with smaller effort. This is the weak point of the great personality. Dostoevsky threw away the chance of becoming a teacher and liberator of humanity and made himself one with their gaolers. The future of human civilization will have little to thank him for. It seems probable that he was condemned to this failure by his neurosis. The greatness of his intelligence and the strength of his love for humanity should have opened to him another, an apostolic, way of life.

To consider Dostoevsky as a sinner or a criminal rouses violent opposition, which need not be based upon a philistine assessment of crime. The real motive for this opposition soon becomes apparent. Two traits are essential in the criminal: boundless egoism and a strong destructive impulse. Common to both of these, and a necessary condition for their expression, is the absence of love, the lack of an emotional valuation of (human) objects. One at once recalls the contrast to this presented by Dostoevsky—his great need of love and his enormous capacity for love, which is to be seen in manifestations of exaggerated kindness and caused him to love and to help where he had a right to hatred and revenge, as, for example, in his relations with his first wife and her lover. That being so, it must be asked why there is any temptation to reckon Dostoevsky among the criminals. The answer is that it comes from his choice of material, which singles out from all others violent, murderous and egoistic characters, thus pointing to the existence of similar tendencies in his own soul, and also from certain facts in his life, like his passion for gambling and his possible admission of a sexual assault upon a young girl.² The contradiction is resolved by the realization that Dostoevsky's very

¹ [This essay first appeared in English, many years ago, in *The Realist*, a London monthly periodical which has long ceased publication. In view of its interest, from the standpoint both of clinical and of applied psychology, it seems desirable to make it more accessible to students of psycho-analysis. The original German was published under the title 'Dostojewski und die Vätertötung' as a preface to *Die Urgestalt der Brüder Karamasoff* (1928), edited by Fülöp-Miller and Eckstein as one of the supplementary volumes to the complete German edition of Dostoevsky's works. It is reprinted in Freud's *Gesammelte Schriften*, XII, 7–26. The present translation is by D. F. Tait and was published in *The Realist* (London, Macmillan), 1 (1929), No. 4, 18–33. It is here reprinted by the kind permission of the Editor, Major Archibald Church. The translation has been considerably revised and the ter-

minology brought into line with the prevailing usage.—Ed.]

² See the discussion on this point in *Der unbekannte Dostojewski* (edited by Fülöp-Miller and Eckstein, 1928). Stefan Zweig writes: 'He was not halted by the barriers of bourgeois morality; and no one can say exactly how far he transgressed the bounds of law in his own life or how much of the criminal instincts of his heroes was realized in himself.' (*Drei Meister*, 1920 [English translation: *Three Masters*, New York and London, 1938].) For the intimate connection between Dostoevsky's characters and his own experiences, see René Fülöp-Miller's remarks in the introductory section of *Dostojewski am Roulette* (edited by Fülöp-Miller and Eckstein, 1925), which are based upon Nikolai Strakhov.

strong destructive instinct, which might easily have made him a criminal, was in his actual life directed mainly against his own person (inward instead of outward) and thus found expression as masochism and a sense of guilt. Nevertheless, his personality retained sadistic traits in plenty, which show themselves in his irritability, his love of tormenting and his intolerance even towards people he loved, and which appear also in the way in which, as an author, he treats his readers. Thus in little things he was a sadist towards others, and in bigger things a sadist towards himself, in fact a masochist, that is to say the mildest, kindest, most helpful person possible.

We have selected three factors from Dostoevsky's complex personality, one quantitative and two qualitative: the extraordinary intensity of his emotional life, his perverse instinctual predisposition, which inevitably marked him out to be a sado-masochist or a criminal, and his unanalysable artistic endowment. This combination might very well exist without neurosis; there are people who are complete masochists without being neurotic. Nevertheless, the balance of forces between his instinctual demands and the inhibitions opposing them (plus the available methods of sublimation) would even so make it necessary to classify Dostoevsky as what is known as an 'instinctual character'. But the position is obscured by the simultaneous presence of neurosis, which, as we have said, was not in the circumstances inevitable, but which comes into being the more readily, the richer the complication which has to be mastered by the ego. For neurosis is after all only a sign that the ego has not succeeded in making a synthesis, that in attempting to do so it has forfeited its unity.

How then, strictly speaking, does his neurosis show itself? Dostoevsky called himself an epileptic, and was regarded as such by other people, on account of his severe seizures, which were accompanied by loss of consciousness, muscular convulsions and subsequent depression. Now it is highly probable that this so-called epilepsy was only a symptom of his neurosis and must accordingly be classified as hystero-epilepsy, that is, as severe hysteria. We cannot be completely certain on this point for two reasons, first, because the anamnestic data on Dostoevsky's alleged epilepsy are defective and untrustworthy, and secondly, because our understanding of pathological states combined with epileptiform seizures is imperfect.

To take the second point first. It is unnecessary here to reproduce the whole pathology of epilepsy, for it would throw no decisive light on the problem. But this may be said. The old *morbus sacer* is still in evidence as an ostensible clinical entity, the uncanny disease with its incalculable, apparently unprovoked convulsive seizures, its changing of the character into irritability and aggressiveness and

its progressive lowering of all the mental faculties. But the outlines of this picture are quite lacking in precision. The seizures, so savage in their onset, accompanied by biting of the tongue and incontinence of urine and working up to the dangerous *status epilepticus* with its risk of severe self-injuries may, nevertheless, be reduced to brief periods of absence, or rapidly passing attacks of vertigo or may be replaced by short spaces of time during which the patient does something out of character, as though he were under the control of his unconscious. These seizures, though as a rule determined, in a way we do not understand, by purely physical causes, may nevertheless owe their first appearance to some purely mental cause (a fright, for instance) or may react in other respects to mental excitations. However characteristic intellectual impairment may be in the overwhelming majority of cases, at least *one* case is known to us (that of Helmholtz) in which the affliction did not interfere with the highest intellectual achievement. (Other cases of which the same assertion has been made are either disputable or open to the same doubts as that of Dostoevsky himself.) People who are victims of epilepsy may give an impression of dullness and arrested development, just as the disease often accompanies the most palpable idiocy and the grossest cerebral defects, even though not as a necessary component of the clinical picture. But these seizures, with all their variations, also occur in other people who display complete mental development and, if anything, an excessive and as a rule insufficiently controlled emotional life. It is no wonder in these circumstances that it has been found impossible to maintain that 'epilepsy' is a single clinical entity. The similarity that we find in the manifest symptoms seems to call for a functional view of them. It is as though a mechanism for abnormal instinctual discharge had been laid down organically, which could be made use of in quite different circumstances, both in the case of disturbances of cerebral activity due to severe histolytic or toxic affections, and also in the case of inadequate control over the mental economy and at times when the activity of the energy operating in the mind reaches crisis-pitch. Behind this dichotomy we have a glimpse of the identity of the underlying mechanism of instinctual discharge. Nor can that mechanism stand remote from the sexual processes, which are fundamentally of toxic origin: the earliest physicians described copulation as a little epilepsy, and thus recognized in the sexual act a mitigation and adaptation of the epileptic method of discharging stimuli.

The 'epileptic reaction', as this common element may be called, is also undoubtedly at the disposal of the neurosis whose essence it is to get rid, by somatic means, of quantities of excitation which it cannot deal with psychically. Thus the epileptic seizure becomes a symptom of hysteria

and is adapted and modified by it just as it is by the normal sexual process of discharge. It is therefore quite right to distinguish between an organic and an 'affective' epilepsy. The practical significance of this is that a person who suffers from the first kind has a disease of the brain, while a person who suffers from the second kind is a neurotic. In the first case his mental life is subjected to an alien disturbance from without, in the second case the disturbance is an expression of his mental life itself.

It is extremely probable that Dostoevsky's epilepsy was of the second kind. This cannot, strictly speaking, be proved. To do so we should have to be in a position to insert the first appearance of the seizures and their subsequent fluctuations into the thread of his mental life; and for that we know too little. The descriptions of the seizures themselves teach us nothing and our information about the relations between the seizures and Dostoevsky's experiences is defective and often contradictory. The most probable assumption is that the seizures went back far into his childhood, that their place was taken to begin with by milder symptoms and that they did not assume an epileptic form until after the shocking experience of his eighteenth year—the murder of his father.³ It would be very much to the point if it could be established that they ceased completely during his exile in Siberia, but other accounts contradict this.⁴

The unmistakable connection between the murder of the father in *The Brothers Karamazov* and the fate of Dostoevsky's own father has struck more than one of his biographers, and has led them to refer to 'a certain modern school of psychology'. From the standpoint of psycho-analysis (for that is what is meant), we are tempted to see in that event the severest trauma and to regard Dostoevsky's reaction to it as the turning-point of his neurosis. But if I undertake to substantiate this view psycho-analytically, I am bound to risk the danger of being unintelligible to all those readers who are unfamiliar with the language and theories of psycho-analysis.

We have one certain starting-point. We know the meaning of the first attacks from which Dostoevsky suffered in his early years, long before the incidence of the 'epilepsy'. These attacks

had the significance of death: they were heralded by a fear of death and consisted of lethargic, somnolent states. The illness first came over him, while he was still a boy, in the form of a sudden, groundless melancholy, a feeling, as he later told his friend Soloviev, as though he were going to die on the spot. And there in fact followed a state exactly similar to real death. His brother Andrei tells us that even when he was quite young Feodor used to leave little notes about before he went to sleep, saying that he was afraid he might fall into this death-like sleep during the night and therefore begged that his burial should be postponed for five days. (*Dostojewski am Roulette*, Introduction, p. lx.)

We know the meaning and intention of such death-like seizures. They signify an identification with a dead person, either with someone who is really dead or with someone who is still alive and whom the subject wishes dead. The latter case is the more significant. The attack then has the value of a punishment. One has wished another person dead, and now one is this other person and is dead oneself. At this point psycho-analytical theory brings in the assertion that for a boy this other person is usually his father and that the attack (which is termed hysterical) is thus a self-punishment for a death-wish against a hated father.

Paricide, according to a well-known view, is the principal and primal crime of humanity as well as of the individual. (See the author's *Totem und Tabu*.) It is in any case the main source of the sense of guilt, though we do not know if it is the only one: researches have not yet been able to establish with certainty the mental origin of guilt and the need for expiation. But it is not necessary for it to be the only one. The psychological situation is complicated and requires elucidation. The relation of the boy to his father is, as we say, an 'ambivalent' one. In addition to the hate which seeks to get rid of the father as a rival, a measure of tenderness for him is also habitually present. The two attitudes of mind combine to produce identification with the father: the boy wants to be in his father's place because he admires him and wants to be like him, and also because he wants to put him out of the way. This whole development now comes up against a powerful

³ See René Fülöp-Miller's article 'Dostojewskis Heilige Krankheit', *Wissen und Leben*, Heft 19-20 (Zurich, 1924). Of especial interest is the information that in the novelist's childhood 'something terrible, unforgettable and agonizing' happened, to which the first signs of his illness were to be traced (from an article by Suvorin in the newspaper *Novoe Vremya*, 1881, quoted in the introduction to *Dostojewski am Roulette*, p. xlv). Further, Orest Miller writes in *Dostojewskis autobiographische Schriften*, p. 140: 'There is, however, another special piece of evidence about Feodor Mikhailovich's illness, which relates to his earliest youth and brings the illness into connection with a tragic event in the family life of his parents. But, although this piece of evidence was given to me orally by one who was a close friend of Feodor Mikhailovich, I

cannot bring myself to reproduce it fully and precisely, since I have had no confirmation of this rumour from any other quarter.' Biographers and scientific research workers cannot feel grateful for this discretion.

⁴ Most of the accounts, including Dostoevsky's own, assert on the contrary that the illness only assumed its final, epileptic character during the Siberian exile. Unfortunately there is reason to distrust the autobiographical statements of neurotics. Experience shows that their memories introduce falsifications, which are designed to interrupt disagreeable causal connections. Nevertheless, it appears certain that Dostoevsky's detention in the Siberian prison markedly altered his pathological condition. Cf. 'Dostojewskis Heilige Krankheit' (p. 1186).

obstacle. At a certain moment the child comes to understand that an attempt to remove his father as a rival would be punished by him with castration. So from fear of castration, that is, in the interests of preserving his masculinity, he gives up his wish to possess his mother and get rid of his father. In so far as this wish remains in the unconscious it forms the basis of the sense of guilt. We believe that what we have here been describing are the normal processes, the normal fate of the so-called 'Oedipus complex'; nevertheless it requires an important amplification.

A further complication arises when the constitutional factor we call bisexuality is comparatively strongly developed in the child. For then, under the threat to the boy's masculinity by castration, his inclination becomes strengthened to deflect in the direction of femininity, to put himself instead in his mother's place and take over her rôle as object of his father's love. But the fear of castration makes *this* solution impossible as well. The boy understands that he must also submit to castration if he wants to be loved by his father as a woman. Thus both impulses, hatred of the father and being in love with the father, undergo repression. There is a certain psychological difference in the fact that the hatred of the father is given up on account of fear of an external danger (castration), while the being in love with the father is treated as an internal instinctual danger, though fundamentally it goes back to the same external danger.

What makes hatred for the father unacceptable is fear of the father; castration is terrible, whether as a punishment or as the price of love. Of the two factors which repress hatred of the father, the first, the direct fear of punishment and castration, may be called the normal one; its pathogenic intensification seems to come only with the addition of the second factor, the fear of the feminine attitude. Thus a strong bisexual predisposition becomes one of the pre-conditions or re-inforcements of neurosis. Such a predisposition must certainly be assumed in Dostoevsky, and it shows itself in a viable form (as latent homosexuality) in the important part played by male friendships in his life, in his strangely tender attitude towards rivals in love and in his remarkable understanding of situations which are explicable only by repressed homosexuality, as many examples from his novels show.

I am sorry, though I cannot alter the facts, if this exposition of the attitudes of hatred and love towards the father and their transformations under the influence of the threat of castration seems to readers unfamiliar with psycho-analysis unsavoury and incredible. I should myself expect that it is precisely the castration complex that would be bound to arouse the most universal repugnance. But I can only insist that psycho-analytic experience has put these relations in particular beyond the reach of doubt and has taught us to recognize

in them the key to every neurosis. This key, then, we must apply to our author's so-called epilepsy. So strange to our consciousness are the things by which our unconscious mental life is governed!

But what has been said so far does not exhaust the consequences of the repression of the hatred of the father in the Oedipus complex. There is something fresh to be added: namely that in spite of everything the identification with the father finally makes a permanent place for itself in the ego. It is received into the ego, but establishes itself there as a separate institution in contrast to the rest of the content of the ego. We then give it the name of super-ego and ascribe to it, the inheritor of the parental influence, the most important functions. If the father was hard, violent and cruel, the super-ego takes over those attributes from him and, in the relations between the ego and it, the passivity which was supposed to have been repressed is re-established. The super-ego has become sadistic, and the ego becomes masochistic, that is to say, at bottom passive in a feminine way. A great need for punishment develops in the ego, which in part offers itself as a victim to fate and in part finds satisfaction in ill-treatment by the super-ego (that is, in the sense of guilt). For every punishment is ultimately castration and, as such, a fulfilment of the old passive attitude towards the father. Even fate is, in the last resort, only a later father-projection.

The normal processes in the formation of conscience must be similar to the abnormal ones described here. We have not yet succeeded in fixing the boundary line between them. It will be observed that here the largest share in the event is ascribed to the passive component of repressed femininity. Moreover, it must be of importance as an accidental factor whether the father, who is feared in any case, is also especially violent in reality. This was true in Dostoevsky's case, and we can trace back the fact of his extraordinary sense of guilt and of his masochistic conduct of life to a specially strong feminine component. Thus the formula for Dostoevsky is as follows: a person of specially strong bisexual predisposition, who can defend himself with special intensity against dependence on a specially severe father. This characteristic of bisexuality comes as an addition to the components of his nature that we have already recognized. His early symptom of death-like seizures can thus be understood as a father-identification on the part of his ego, permitted by his super-ego as a punishment. 'You wanted to kill your father in order to be your father yourself. Now you *are* your father, but a dead father'—the regular mechanism of hysterical symptoms. And further: 'Now your father is killing *you*.' For the ego the death symptom is a satisfaction in phantasy of the masculine wish and at the same time a masochistic satisfaction; for the super-ego it is a punishment satisfaction, that is, a sadistic

satisfaction. Both of them, the ego and the super-ego, carry on the rôle of father.

To sum up, the relation between the subject and his father-object, while retaining its content, has been transformed into a relation between the ego and the super-ego, a new setting on a fresh stage. Infantile reactions from the Oedipus complex such as these may disappear if reality gives them no further nourishment. But the characteristics of the father remain the same, or rather, they deteriorate with the years, and so too Dostoevsky's hatred for his father and his death-wish against that wicked father were maintained. Now it is a dangerous thing if reality fulfils such repressed wishes. The phantasy has become reality and all defensive measures are thereupon reinforced. Dostoevsky's attacks now assumed an epileptic character; they still undoubtedly signified an identification with his father as a punishment, but they had become terrible, like his father's frightful death itself. What further content they had absorbed, particularly what sexual content, escapes conjecture.

One thing is remarkable: in the aura of the epileptic attack, one moment of supreme bliss is experienced. This may very well be a record of the triumph and sense of liberation felt on hearing the news of the death, to be followed immediately by an all the more cruel punishment. We have divined just such a sequence of triumph and mourning, of festive joy and mourning, in the brothers of the primal horde who murdered their father, and we find it repeated in the ceremony of the totem-feast. If it proved to be the case that Dostoevsky was free from his seizures in Siberia, that would merely substantiate the view that his seizures were his punishment. He did not need them any longer when he was being punished in another way. But that cannot be proved. Rather does this necessity for punishment on the part of Dostoevsky's mental economy explain the fact that he passed unbroken through these years of misery and humiliation. Dostoevsky's condemnation as a political prisoner was unjust and he must have known it, but he accepted the undeserved punishment at the hands of the Little Father, the Tsar, as a substitute for the punishment he deserved for his sin against his real father. Instead of punishing himself, he got himself punished by his father's deputy. Here we have a glimpse of the psychological justification of the punishments inflicted by society. It is a fact that large groups of criminals long for punishment. Their super-ego demands it and so saves itself the need of inflicting the punishment itself.

Everyone who is familiar with the complicated

transformation of meaning undergone by hysterical symptoms will understand that no attempt can be made here to follow out the meaning of Dostoevsky's attacks beyond this beginning.⁵ It is enough to say that we may assume that their original meaning remained unchanged behind all later accretions. One can say that Dostoevsky never got free from the feelings of guilt arising from his intention of murdering his father. They also determined his attitude in the two other spheres in which the father-relation is the decisive factor, his attitude towards the authority of the State and towards belief in God. In the first of these he ended up with complete submission to his Little Father the Tsar, who had once carried out with him in reality the comedy of killing which his seizures had so long been in the habit of depicting for him. Here penitence gained the upper hand. In the religious sphere he retained more freedom: according to apparently trustworthy reports he wavered, up to the last moment of his life, between faith and atheism. His great intellect made it impossible for him to overlook any of the intellectual difficulties to which faith leads. By an individual recapitulation of a development in world-history he hoped to find a way out and a liberation from guilt in the Christ ideal, and even to make use of his sufferings as a claim to playing a Christ-like rôle. If on the whole he did not achieve freedom and became a reactionary, that was because the universally human filial guilt, on which religious feeling is built, had in him attained a super-individual intensity and remained insuperable even to his great intelligence. In writing this we are laying ourselves open to the charge of having abandoned the impartiality of analysis and of subjecting Dostoevsky to judgements that can only be justified from the partisan standpoint of a particular philosophy of life. A conservative would take the side of the Grand Inquisitor and would judge Dostoevsky differently. The objection is just; and one can only say in extenuation that Dostoevsky's decision appears to have been determined by an intellectual inhibition due to his neurosis.

It can scarcely be owing to chance that three of the masterpieces of the literature of all time—the *Oedipus Rex* of Sophocles, Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*—should all deal with the same subject, parricide. In all three, moreover, the motive for the deed, sexual rivalry for a woman, is laid bare.

The most straightforward is certainly the representation in the drama derived from the Greek legend. In this it is still the hero himself who commits the crime. But poetic treatment is

⁵ See *Totem und Tabu*. The best account of the meaning and content of his seizures was given by Dostoevsky himself, when he told his friend Strakhov that his irritability and depression after an epileptic attack were due to the fact that he seemed to himself a criminal and could not get rid of the feeling that he had a burden of unknown

guilt upon him, that he had committed some great misdeed, which oppressed him. ('Dostojewskis Heilige Krankheit', p. 1188.) In such self-accusations psycho-analysis sees signs of a recognition of 'psychical reality', and it endeavours to make the unknown guilt known to consciousness.

impossible without softening and disguise. The naked admission of an intention to commit parricide, as we arrive at it in analysis, seems intolerable without analytical preparation. The Greek drama, while retaining the crime, introduces the indispensable toning-down in a masterly fashion by projecting the hero's unconscious motive into reality in the form of a compulsion of destiny alien to him. The hero commits the deed unintentionally and apparently uninfluenced by the woman; this latter element is however taken into account in the circumstance that the hero can only obtain possession of the queen mother after he has repeated his deed upon the monster who symbolizes the father. After his guilt has been revealed and made conscious, the hero makes no attempt to exculpate himself by appealing to the artificial expedient of the compulsion of destiny. His crime is acknowledged and punished as though it were fully conscious—which is bound to appear unjust to our reason, but which psychologically is perfectly correct.

In the English play the presentation is more indirect; the hero does not commit the crime himself; it is carried out by someone else, for whom it is not parricide. The forbidden motive of sexual rivalry for the woman does not need, therefore, to be disguised. Moreover, we see the hero's Œdipus complex, as it were, in a reflected light, by learning the effect upon him of the other's crime. He ought to avenge the crime, but finds himself, strangely enough, incapable of doing so. We know that it is his sense of guilt that is paralysing him; but, in a manner entirely in keeping with neurotic processes, the sense of guilt is displaced on to the perception of his inadequacy for fulfilling his task. There are signs that the hero feels this guilt as a super-individual one. He despises others no less than himself: 'Use every man after his desert, and who should 'scape whipping?'

The Russian novel goes a step further in the same direction. There also the murder is committed by someone else. This other person, however, stands to the murdered man in the same filial relation as the hero, Dmitri; in this other person's case the motive of sexual rivalry is openly admitted; he is a brother of the hero's, and it is a remarkable fact that Dostoevsky has attributed to him his own illness, the alleged epilepsy, as though he were seeking to confess that the epileptic, the neurotic, in himself was a parricide. Then, again, in the speech for the defence at the trial, there is the famous joke at the expense of psychology—to show that it is 'a knife that cuts both ways'. It is a splendid piece of disguise, for we have only to reverse it in order to discover the deepest meaning of Dostoevsky's view of things. It is not psychology that deserves to be laughed at, but the procedure of judicial enquiry. It is a matter of indifference who actually committed the crime; psychology is

only concerned to know who desired it emotionally and who welcomed it when it was done. And for that reason all of the brothers, except the contrasted figure of Alyosha, are equally guilty, the impulsive sensualist, the sceptical cynic and the epileptic criminal. In *The Brothers Karamazov* there is one particularly revealing scene. In the course of his talk with Dmitri, Father Zossima recognizes that Dmitri is prepared to commit parricide, and he bows down at his feet. It is impossible that this can be meant as an expression of admiration; it must mean that the holy man is rejecting the temptation to despise or detest the murderer and for that reason humbles himself before him. Dostoevsky's sympathy for the criminal is, in fact, boundless; it goes far beyond the pity which the unhappy wretch might claim, and reminds us of the 'holy awe' with which epileptics and lunatics were regarded in the past. A criminal is to him almost a Redeemer, who has taken on himself the guilt which must else have been borne by others. There is no longer any need for one to murder, since he has already murdered; but one must be grateful to him, for, except for him, one would have been obliged oneself to murder. That is not just kindly pity, it is identification on the basis of a similar murderous impulse—in fact, a slightly displaced narcissism. (In saying this, we are not disputing the ethical value of this kindness.) This may perhaps be quite generally the mechanism of kindly sympathy with other people, a mechanism which one can discern with especial ease in the extreme case of the guilt-ridden novelist. There is no doubt that this sympathy by identification was a decisive factor in determining Dostoevsky's choice of material. He dealt first with the common criminal, the criminal from egoism, the political and religious criminal; and not until the end of his life did he come back to the primal criminal, the parricide, and used him, in a work of art, for making his confession.

The publication of Dostoevsky's posthumous papers and of his wife's diaries has thrown a glaring light on one episode in his life, namely the period in Germany when he was obsessed with a mania for gambling (cf. *Dostojewski am Roulette*), which no one could regard as anything but an unmistakable fit of pathological passion. There was no lack of rationalizations for this remarkable and unworthy behaviour. As often happens with neurotics, Dostoevsky's burden of guilt had taken a tangible shape as a burden of debt, and he was able to take refuge behind the pretext that he was trying by his winnings at the tables to make it possible for him to return to Russia without being arrested by his creditors. But this was no more than a pretext; and Dostoevsky was acute enough to recognize the fact and honest enough to admit it. He knew that the chief thing was gambling for

its own sake—*le jeu pour le jeu*.⁶ All the details of his impulsively irrational conduct show this and something more besides. He never rested until he had lost everything. For him gambling was another method of self-punishment. Time after time he gave his young wife his promise or his word of honour not to play any more or not to play any more on that particular day; and, as she says, he almost always broke it. When his losses had reduced himself and her to the direst need, he derived a second pathological satisfaction from that. He could then scold and humiliate himself before her, invite her to despise him and to feel sorry that she had married such an old sinner; and when he had thus unburdened his conscience, the whole business would begin again next day. His young wife accustomed herself to this cycle, for she had noticed that the one thing which offered any real hope of salvation—his literary production—never went better than when they had lost everything and pawned their last possessions. Naturally she did not understand the connection. When his sense of guilt was satisfied by the punishments he had inflicted on himself, the inhibitions upon his work became less severe and he allowed himself to take a few steps along the way to success.⁷

What part of the gambler's long-buried childhood is it that forces its way to repetition in his obsession for play? The answer may be divined without difficulty from a story by one of our younger writers. Stefan Zweig, who has incidentally devoted a study to Dostoevsky himself (*Drei Meister [Three Masters]*), has included in his collection of three stories *Die Verwirrung der Gefühle* (1927) [English translation: *Conflicts*, New York and London, 1939] one which he calls 'Vierundzwanzig Stunden aus dem Leben einer Frau' ['Four-and-Twenty Hours in a Woman's Life']. This little masterpiece ostensibly sets out only to show what an irresponsible creature woman is, and to what excesses, surprising even to herself, an unexpected experience may drive her. But the story tells far more than this. If it is subjected to an analytical interpretation, it will be found to represent (without any apologetic intent) something quite different, something universally human, or rather something masculine. And such an interpretation is so extremely obvious that it cannot be resisted. It is characteristic of the nature of artistic creation that the author, who is a personal friend of mine, was able to assure me when I asked him that the interpretation which I put to him had been completely strange to his knowledge and intention, although some of the details woven into the narrative seemed expressly designed to give a clue to the hidden secret. In the story, an elderly lady of distinction tells the author of an

experience she has had more than twenty years earlier. She has been left a widow when still young and is the mother of two sons, who no longer need her. In her forty-second year, expecting nothing further of life, she happens, on one of her aimless journeyings, to visit the Rooms at Monte Carlo. There, among all the remarkable impressions which the place produces, she is soon fascinated by the sight of a pair of hands which seem to betray all the feelings of the unlucky gambler with terrifying sincerity and intensity. These hands belong to a handsome young man—the author, as though unintentionally, makes him of the same age as the narrator's elder son—who, after losing everything, leaves the Rooms in the depth of despair, with the evident intention of ending his hopeless life in the Casino gardens. An inexplicable feeling of sympathy compels her to follow him and make every effort to save him. He takes her for one of the importunate women so common there and tries to shake her off; but she stays with him and finds herself obliged, in the most natural way possible, to join him in his apartment at the hotel, and finally to share his bed. After this improvised night of love, she exacts a most solemn vow from the young man, who has now apparently calmed down, that he will never play again, provides him with money for his journey home and promises to meet him at the station before the departure of his train. Now, however, she begins to feel a great tenderness for him, is ready to sacrifice all she has in order to keep him and makes up her mind to go with him instead of saying good-bye. Various mischances delay her, so that she misses the train. In her longing for the lost one she returns once more to the Rooms and there, to her horror, sees once more the hands which had first excited her sympathy: the faithless youth had gone back to his play. She reminds him of his promise, but, obsessed by his passion, he calls her a spoil-sport, tells her to go and flings back the money with which she has tried to rescue him. She hurries away in deep mortification and learns later that she has not succeeded in saving him from suicide.

This brilliantly told, faultlessly motivated story is of course sufficient in itself and is certain to make a deep effect upon the reader. But analysis shows us that its invention is based fundamentally upon a wish-phantasy belonging to the period of puberty, which a number of people actually remember consciously. The phantasy embodies a wish that the mother should herself initiate the boy into sexual life in order to save him from the dreaded injuries caused by masturbation. (The numerous creative works that deal with the theme of redemption have the same origin.) The 'vice'

⁶ 'The main thing is the play itself', he writes in one of his letters. 'I swear that greed for money has nothing to do with it, although Heaven knows I am sorely in need of money.'

⁷ 'He always remained at the gaming tables till he had

lost everything and was totally ruined. It was only when the damage was quite complete that the demon at last retired from his soul and made way for the creative genius.' (René Fülöp-Miller, *Dostojewski am Roulette*, p. lxxxvi.)

of masturbation is replaced by the mania for gambling; and the emphasis laid upon the passionate activity of the hands betrays this derivation. The passion for play is an equivalent of the old compulsion to masturbate; 'playing' is the actual word used in the nursery to describe the activity of the hands upon the genitals. The irresistible nature of the temptation, the solemn resolutions, which are nevertheless invariably broken, never to do it again, the numbing pleasure and the bad conscience which tells the subject that he is ruining himself (committing suicide)—all these elements remain unaltered in the process of substitution. It is true that Zweig's story is told by the mother, not by the son. It must flatter the son to think: 'if my mother only knew what dangers masturbation involves me in, she would certainly save me from them by allowing me to lavish all my tenderness on her own body.' The equation of the mother with a prostitute, which is made by the young man in the story, is linked up with the same phantasy. It brings the unattainable within easy reach. The bad conscience which accompanies the phantasy brings about the unhappy ending of the story. It is also interesting

to notice how the *façade* given to the story by its author seeks to disguise its analytic meaning. For it is extremely questionable whether the love life of women is dominated by sudden and mysterious impulses. On the contrary, analysis reveals an adequate motivation for the surprising behaviour of this woman who had hitherto turned away from love. Faithful to the memory of her dead husband, she had armed herself against all similar claims; but—and here the son's phantasy is right—she did not, as a mother, escape her quite unconscious transference of love on to her son, and fate was able to catch her at this undefended spot.

If the mania for gambling, with the unsuccessful struggles to break the habit and the opportunities it affords for self-punishment, is a repetition of the compulsion to masturbate, we shall not be surprised to find that it occupied such a large space in Dostoevsky's life. After all, we find no cases of severe neurosis in which the autoerotic satisfaction of the early years and of puberty has not played a part; and the relations between the efforts to suppress it and the fear of the father are too well known to need more than a mention.⁸

REMINISCENT NOTES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES

By ERNEST JONES, LONDON

The Editor of the JOURNAL has asked me to record some memories of the introduction of psycho-analysis into English-speaking countries. The occasion of the request was the publication of a preface by the late Professor Freud to the M. D. Eder Memorial volume in which he remarks that Dr. Eder was the first doctor to practise psycho-analysis in England, a statement which is quite incorrect. Reflecting that if even Professor Freud's unusual powers of recollection could err on such a simple point it could not be easy to establish the true facts, the Editor suggested that it would be of interest to have on record an outline of these early events before the memory of them pass away and the history of them be either defective or actually falsified. The choice of those qualified to undertake this task is evidently extremely restricted, so, after some reluctance, I agreed to undertake it.

The name of Freud had been known in this country in the last twenty years of the past century as that of a neurologist. His neurological work had been regularly reviewed in *Brain*, and he had indeed contributed a technical paper to that periodical. The first indication in this country of his psychological interests was an account of the first Breuer and Freud paper (published in Vienna in January, 1893) that was given some three months

later by F. W. H. Myers at a general meeting of the Society for Psychical Research and printed in their *Proceedings* for June of that year. So we note the remarkable fact that the first new discoveries in what became psycho-analysis were accessible to English readers fifty-two years ago, within six months of their being announced. Four years later (March, 1897) Myers delivered an address before the same society on 'Hysteria and Genius' in which he gave an account of the *Studien über Hysterie*. This was summarized at the time in the society's *Journal* and published at much greater length in the author's *Human Personality* which appeared in 1903 two years after his death. I think we may be sure that Myers was the first writer in English to give an account of the work by Breuer and Freud. At least two later analysts, Dr. Mitchell and Mr. Strachey, derive their interest in the subject from Myers' writings.

The year after Myers' review of the *Studien* Dr. Mitchell Clarke published one in *Brain*, 1898. Most neurologists no doubt passed it by, but two readers made a mental note of the strange discoveries there announced. They were Havelock Ellis and Wilfred Trotter. In 1904 the former writer, in the first volume of his *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, devoted several pages to what he called Freud's 'fascinating and really important'

⁸ Most of the views which are here expressed are also contained in an excellent book by Jolan Neufeld, *Dostoevski: Skizze zu seiner Psychoanalyse* (Vienna, 1923).

researches. He also alluded, in this and the next volume (1906), though without giving a bibliographical reference to them, to Freud's papers on neurasthenia and anxiety states. Havelock Ellis in later life often dealt with Freud's work, to which he adopted an increasingly negative attitude, but this no longer concerns us here; as is well known, he had no personal experience with patients.

Wilfred Trotter, the author of the famous herd instinct book (which was actually written in 1904), communicated his recollection of the Mitchell Clarke review to me in 1903 when I was beginning to specialize in psychopathology, and in the same year I read Myers' *Human Personality* which had just appeared and which contained a fuller account of the *Studien*; Havelock Ellis' valuable discussion of the new findings appeared in the year following (1904). There were, therefore, by that time three sources of information available to me in English, but Trotter and I decided to learn German for the purpose of going into the matter further. A choice, most unsuitable for beginners in German, of *Die Traumdeutung* was made as an accompaniment to our linguistic progress! I well remember the first patient with whom I practised the new therapy, surely the first person to be analysed outside of German-speaking countries (1905-6). She was the sister of a surgical colleague, and suffered from a conversion hysteria. One upshot of the analysis was that she decided to divorce her husband, a well-known New York neurologist, on grounds of cruelty. Presently, when I lived in America, he formed the habit of following me from one congress to another in order to exercise his very considerable powers of vituperation, and on one particular occasion Dr. Putnam of Harvard, already a good friend, magnanimously travelled a thousand miles to support me; between us we got on very well.

My first meeting with another analyst was with the gifted but erratic Otto Gross in Munich in 1906, and in September, 1907 I met Jung at the International Neurological Congress in Amsterdam. He invited me to visit him in Burghölzli, where I found Drs. Brill and Frederick Petersen from New York. From here we may turn to consider the situation in America. There were two, almost contemporaneous, foci there, in Boston and New York. The former was at first represented almost entirely by Dr. Putnam, the Professor of Neurology at Harvard. In the preface Professor Freud wrote to the Memorial volume I edited of Dr. Putnam's writings he writes: 'Professor Putnam, who died in 1918 at the age of seventy-two, was not only the first American to interest himself in psycho-analysis but soon became its most decided supporter and its most influential representative in America. In consequence of the established reputation which he had gained through his activities as a teacher as well as through his important work in the domain of organic nervous disease, and thanks to the

universal respect which his personality enjoyed, he was able to do perhaps more than anyone for the spread of psycho-analysis in his own country.' In matters of personality, however, Freud's judgement was not always objective: as a matter of opinion, for instance, I should have applied most of his statement to Dr. Brill. It is true that Putnam had the advantage of rank and reputation, but Brill's support of psycho-analysis was both more completely whole-hearted and based on a much better understanding of it. It was Dr. Putnam who published, in the first number of the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* (February, 1906), the first paper in English specifically on psycho-analysis, and the first adequate account of it in that tongue. His summing-up was, however, on the whole adverse. In December, 1908 I had many talks with him in Boston and induced him to revise his judgement, which a man of his singularly open mind found possible. We corresponded regularly then and I also saw him from time to time at various meetings, e.g. during Professor Freud's famous visit to Worcester, Massachusetts, in August, 1909. By that time he was a firm adherent of psycho-analysis, and in his 'Personal Impressions of Freud's Work', published in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, December, 1909 and February, 1910, he expressed his convictions openly. Dr. Isador Coriat's adherence was the only other fruit of my labours in Boston, where Morton Prince, Boris Sidis, Waterman and others remained aloof from the new ideas.

In New York the situation was more complex and I cannot speak of it with the same authority. Drs. August Hoch and Adolf Meyer, both Swiss immigrants, were presumably aware of Freud's work as early as 1905 or 1906, but for a time nothing came of this. Dr. Frederick Petersen, who, if I remember rightly, was Professor of Psychiatry at Columbia University, was interested in Jung's association experiments, published in 1906, and in the following year went to Zurich to study them. Dr. Brill, a young psychiatrist, followed him there shortly afterwards, I think encouraged by him to do so, but at the moment his own interest was rather in Professor Bleuler's promising work in psychiatry. Jung, who was, of course, Bleuler's assistant there, interested the Americans in Freud's work, with which he was by then well acquainted, but Petersen, who had little psychological talent, did not get far into it. With Brill it was otherwise. Specially gifted with psychological insight and understanding, he made rapid progress, and when I met him at the end of 1907 we knew we should be future colleagues. In April, 1908 we travelled together from the Salzburg Congress, where I had read a paper—the first one in English by a psycho-analyst—to see more of Freud in Vienna and Ferenczi in Budapest. He then returned to America, where I followed him later in the year. The advances in psychiatry with which the names of Adolf Meyer and August Hoch

are honourably associated rendered New York a fertile ground for the new ideas, and Dr. Brill, through his practice, his lectures and his translations, made rapid progress in extending knowledge of them. Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe, who had paid a more perfunctory visit to Jung, was one of his earliest colleagues. In February, 1911, Brill founded the New York Psychoanalytic Society, and simultaneously I founded the American Psychoanalytic Association—the first meeting of which took place in May of the same year—to supply the need of analysts scattered throughout America. New York was at the time the only centre that could support a fully-fledged society. Dr. Brill was the first President of the New York Society and Dr. H. W. Frink the first Secretary, while Dr. Putnam was the first President of the American Association and I acted as Secretary for the first three years.

The later developments in America are fairly well known and are for the most part documented in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, the first periodical to throw its pages open to the new work, the *Psychoanalytic Review* and the official periodicals in German. The American Therapeutic Congress, before which I read a paper in May, 1909, was, I think, the first medical body in any country to be addressed on the subject of psycho-analysis, and the first paper in an English-speaking country actively to support psycho-analysis. It was followed by another paper, read in January, 1910 before the American Psychological Association, that evoked the classic remark from a lady psychologist that Austrians might have egocentric dreams but she was sure no Americans did! Shortly after this I had the idea of founding the American Psychopathological Association, and, with the help of Brill, Hoch, Morton Prince and Putnam, the first meeting was held in May, 1910. It was a body akin to the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society and, like that, was designed to provide opportunity for discussion among various schools of thought. It may, therefore, be said that before the last war what was rather unfortunately termed the psycho-analytical movement was well under way in America, and psycho-analytic practice well and widely established.

In the meantime things had progressed far more slowly in England. After practising psycho-analysis there for three years I left for Canada in 1908 where I spent the greater part of five years. Nevertheless, there were long holidays every year that were passed in England (or on the Continent), so that both by personal contact and by regular correspondence it was possible to do a great deal in stimulating interest among one's friends. Trotter had attended the first International Congress in April, 1908, but he was a surgeon and had no direct experience of the work. The earliest of others interested were Colonel Berkeley Hill, Dr. Forsyth (whom, like Berkeley Hill, I had known

from student days), Dr. Maurice Wright and others. Dr. Eder, who had been an old pupil of mine in other spheres, was the most promising of these, and made a beginning in 1910 in the application of his knowledge. In the same year (August, 1910) Dr. T. W. Mitchell, whom I had not yet met, published, in the *Proceedings* of the Society for Psychical Research, the first paper in England mainly devoted to psycho-analysis; actually it largely consisted of a long abstract from an address I had delivered the year before at a Congress in New Haven. A year later (August, 1911) Dr. Eder followed by giving the first account in England of analytic experiences in this country. It was a paper before the Neurological Section of the British Medical Association—a most unpropitious venue. The occasion was historical rather than historic, for the audience of eight vacated the room almost visibly wondering who had got among them. A more definite turning-point in securing the attention of the medical world was, in my opinion, the lively discussion on suggestion at the Psycho-Medical Society, January 30, 1913, with Dr. Mitchell in the chair, when I strongly supported Ferenczi's recent work on the subject. Eder, however, had great pertinacity, and adverse experiences never deterred him. He had a strong footing in socialistic and child welfare circles (he was joint editor of *School Hygiene* from 1910 to 1915), and so found ample scope for expounding his views outside the medical profession. Dr. Hart in his *Psychology of Insanity* made an admirable attempt to provide a philosophical basis for the various modern psychopathological theories, but he never progressed further. On my return to England in 1913, encouraged by successful experiences in America, I founded the British (then called London) Psycho-Analytical Society, a hardy venture. The statement that psycho-analysis owed its vogue to the 'shell-shock' experiences of the world war was only very partially true, truer no doubt of England than of America. But before then the nucleus was there: a society had been started, the first book on psycho-analysis written in English had been published there (in the summer of 1912, though the publishers insisted on post-dating it by a year), and the ground was being prepared for the rapid advance that took place after the war.

To sum up. Knowledge of Breuer and Freud's work was available in English periodicals in the nineties of the last century. The earliest publicists in England were F. W. H. Myers, Mitchell Clarke and Havelock Ellis—in that order. The first paper on psycho-analysis itself in English, an adverse one, was published by Dr. Putnam in Boston in 1906, the first one supporting it was by myself in 1909, the first one in England—more favourable than Dr. Putnam's—was by Dr. Mitchell, in 1910. Psycho-analysis was first practised in London in 1905, in New York in 1908 and in Boston in 1910.

By MELANIE KLEIN, LONDON

INTRODUCTION

I have two main objectives in presenting this paper. I intend to single out some typical early anxiety situations and show their connection with the Oedipus complex. Since these anxieties and defences are part of the infantile depressive position as I see it, I hope to throw some light on the relation between the depressive position and libidinal development. My second purpose is to compare my conclusions about the Oedipus complex with Freud's views on that subject.

I shall exemplify my argument by short extracts from two case histories. Many more details could be adduced about both analyses, about the patients' family relationships and about the technique used. I shall, however, confine myself to those details of the material which are most essential from the point of view of my subject-matter.

The children whose case histories I shall use to illustrate my argument were both suffering from severe emotional difficulties. In making use of such material as a basis for my conclusions about the normal course of the Oedipus development, I am following a method well tried in psycho-analysis. Freud justified this angle of approach in many of his writings. For instance (1932; 155), he says: 'Pathology, as you know, has always assisted us, by isolation and exaggeration, in making recognizable things which would normally remain hidden.'

EXTRACTS FROM CASE HISTORY ILLUSTRATING THE BOY'S OEDIPUS DEVELOPMENT

The material on which I shall draw to illustrate my views about the boy's Oedipus development is taken from the analysis of a boy of ten. His parents felt impelled to seek help for him since some of his symptoms had developed to such an extent that it became impossible for him to attend school. He was very much afraid of children and because of this fear he more and more avoided going out by himself. Moreover, for some years a progressive inhibition of his faculties and interests caused great concern to his parents. In addition to these symptoms, which prevented him from attending school, he was excessively preoccupied with his health and was frequently subject to depressed moods. These difficulties showed themselves in his appearance, for he looked very worried and unhappy. At times, however—and this became striking during analytic sessions—his depression lifted and then sudden life and sparkle came into his eyes and transformed his face completely.

Richard was in many ways a precocious and gifted child. He was very musical and showed this already at an early age. He had a pronounced love of nature, but only of nature in its pleasant aspects.

His artistic gifts showed, for instance, in the ways in which he chose his words and in a feeling for the dramatic which enlivened his conversation. He could not get on with children and was at his best in adult company, particularly in the company of women. He tried to impress them by his conversational gifts and to ingratiate himself with them in a rather precocious way.

Richard's suckling period had been short and unsatisfactory. He had been a delicate infant and had suffered from colds and illnesses from infancy onwards. He had undergone two operations (circumcision and tonsillectomy) between his third and sixth year. The family lived in modest but not uncomfortable circumstances. The atmosphere in the home was not altogether happy. There was a certain lack of warmth and of common interests between his parents, though no open trouble. Richard was the second of two children, his brother being a few years his senior. His mother, though not ill in a clinical sense, was a depressive type. She was very worried about any illness in Richard, and there was no doubt that her attitude had contributed to his hypochondriacal fears. Her relation to Richard was in some ways not satisfactory; while his elder brother was a great success at school and absorbed most of the mother's capacity for love, Richard was rather a disappointment to her. Though he was devoted to her, he was an extremely difficult child to deal with. He had no interests and hobbies to occupy him. He was over-anxious and over-affectionate towards his mother and clung to her in a persistent and exhausting way.

His mother lavished much care on him and in some ways pampered him, but she had no real appreciation of the less obvious sides of his character, such as a great inherent capacity for love and kindness. She failed to understand that the child loved her very much, and she had little confidence in his future development. At the same time she was on the whole patient in dealing with him; for instance she did not attempt to force the company of other children on him or to force him to attend school.

Richard's father was fond of him and very kind to him, but he seemed to leave the responsibility for the boy's upbringing predominantly to his mother. As the analysis showed, Richard felt that his father was too forbearing with him and exerted his authority in the family circle too little. His elder brother was on the whole friendly and patient with Richard, but the two boys had little in common.

The outbreak of the War had greatly increased Richard's difficulties. He was evacuated with his mother, and moved with her for the purpose of his analysis to the small town where I was staying at the time, while his brother was sent away with his

¹ Read in two parts before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, March 7 and 21, 1945.

school. Parting from his home upset Richard a good deal. Moreover the War stirred all his anxieties, and he was particularly frightened of air-raids and bombs. He followed the news closely and took a great interest in the changes in the War situation, and this preoccupation came up again and again during the course of the analysis.

Though there were difficulties in the family situation—as well as serious difficulties in Richard's early history—in my view the severity of his illness could not be explained by those circumstances alone. As in every case, we have to take into consideration the internal processes resulting from, and interacting with, constitutional as well as environmental factors; but I am unable to deal here in detail with the interaction of all these factors. I shall restrict myself to showing the influence of certain early anxieties on genital development.

The analysis took place in a small town some distance from London, in a house whose owners were away at the time. It was not the kind of playroom I should have chosen, since I was unable to remove a number of books, pictures, maps, etc. Richard had a particular, almost personal relation to this room and to the house, which he identified with me. For instance, he often spoke affectionately about it and to it, said goodbye to it before leaving at the end of an hour, and sometimes took great care in arranging the furniture in a way which he felt would make the room 'happy'.

In the course of the analysis Richard produced a series of drawings.² One of the first things he drew was a starfish hovering near a plant under water, and he explained to me that it was a hungry baby which wanted to eat the plant. An octopus, much bigger than the starfish and with a human face, entered into his drawings a day or two later. This octopus represented his father and his father's genital in their dangerous aspects and was later unconsciously equated with the 'monster' which we shall encounter in the material presently. The starfish shape soon led to a pattern drawing made up of different coloured sections. The four main colours in this type of drawing—black, blue, purple and red—symbolized his father, mother, brother and himself respectively. In one of the first drawings in which these four colours were used he introduced black and red by marching the pencils towards the drawing with accompanying noises. He explained that black was his father, and accompanied the movement of the pencil by imitating the sound of marching soldiers. Red came next, and Richard said it was himself and sang a cheerful tune as he moved up the pencil. When colouring the blue sections he said this was his mother, and when filling in the purple sections

he said his brother was nice and was helping him.

The pattern represented an empire, the different sections standing for different countries. It is significant that his interest in the events of the War played an important part in his associations. He often looked up the countries which Hitler had subjugated on the map, and the connection between the countries on the map and his own empire drawings was evident. The empire drawings represented his mother, who was being invaded and attacked. His father usually appeared as the enemy; Richard and his brother figured in the drawings in various rôles, sometimes as allies of his mother, sometimes as allies of his father.

These pattern drawings, though superficially similar, varied greatly in detail—in fact we never had two exactly alike. The way he made these drawings, or for that matter most of his drawings, was significant. He did not start out with any deliberate plan and was often surprised to see the finished picture.

He used various sorts of play material; for instance the pencils and crayons with which he made his drawings also figured in his play as people. In addition he brought his own set of toy ships, two of which always stood for his parents, while the other ships appeared in varying rôles.

For purposes of exposition I have restricted my selection of material to a few instances, mainly drawn from six analytic hours. In these hours—partly owing to external circumstances which I shall discuss later—certain anxieties had temporarily come more strongly to the fore. They were diminished by interpretation, and the resulting changes threw light on the influence of early anxieties on genital development. These changes, which were only a step towards fuller genitality and stability, had already been foreshadowed earlier on in Richard's analysis.

With regard to the interpretations adduced in this paper, it goes without saying that I have selected those which were most relevant to my subject matter. I shall make clear which interpretations were given by the patient himself. In addition to interpretations which I gave to the patient, the paper contains a number of conclusions drawn from the material, and I shall not at every point make a clear distinction between these two categories. A consistent demarcation of such a kind would involve a good deal of repetition and blur the main issues.

Early Anxieties Impeding Oedipus Development

I take as my starting point the resumption of the analysis after a break of ten days. The analysis had by then lasted six weeks. During this break I was in London, and Richard went away on

² The accompanying plates are reproductions of tracings made from the originals, the colours being replaced by various kinds of shading. The key to these, at the bottom of *Drawing I*, has of course been added. In the

originals each drawing was on a separate sheet of paper, with the exception of *Drawings V* and *VI*, which were made on the same sheet.

holiday. He had never been in an air-raid, and his fears of air-raids centred on London as the place most in danger. Hence to him my going to London meant going to destruction and death. This added to the anxiety which was stirred up in him by the interruption of the analysis.

On my return I found Richard very worried and depressed. During the whole first hour he hardly looked at me, and alternated between sitting rigidly on his chair without lifting his eyes and wandering out restlessly into the adjoining kitchen and into the garden. In spite of his marked resistance he did, however, put a few questions to me: Had I seen much of 'battered' London? Had there been an air-raid while I was there? Had there been a thunderstorm in London?

One of the first things he told me was that he hated returning to the town where the analysis took place, and called the town a 'pig-sty' and a 'nightmare'. He soon went out into the garden, where he seemed more free to look round. He caught sight of some toadstools which he showed to me, shuddering and saying they were poisonous. Back in the room, he picked up a book from the shelf and particularly pointed out to me a picture of a little man fighting against an 'awful monster'.

On the second day after my return Richard told me with great resistance about a conversation he had had with his mother while I was away. He had told his mother that he was very worried about his having babies later on and had asked her whether it would hurt very much. In reply she had, not for the first time, explained the part played by the man in reproduction, whereupon he had said he would not like to put his genital into somebody else's genital: that would frighten him, and the whole thing was a great worry to him.

In my interpretation I linked this fear with the 'pig-sty' town; it stood in his mind for my 'inside' and his mother's 'inside', which had turned bad because of thunderstorms and Hitler's bombs. These represented his 'bad' father's penis entering his mother's body and turning it into an endangered and dangerous place. The 'bad' penis inside his mother was also symbolized by the poisonous toadstools which had grown in the garden in my absence, as well as by the monster against which the little man (representing himself) was fighting. The phantasy that his mother contained the destructive genital of his father accounted in part for his fears of sexual intercourse. This anxiety had been stirred up and intensified by my going to London. His own aggressive wishes relating to his parents' sexual intercourse greatly added to his anxieties and feelings of guilt.

There was a close connection between Richard's fear of his 'bad' father's penis inside his mother and his phobia of children. Both these fears were closely bound up with his phantasies about his mother's 'inside' as a place of danger. For he

felt he had attacked and injured the imaginary babies inside his mother's body and they had become his enemies. A good deal of this anxiety was transferred on to children in the external world.

The first thing Richard did with his fleet during these hours was to make a destroyer, which he named 'Vampire', bump into the battleship 'Rodney', which always represented his mother. Resistance set in at once and he quickly rearranged the fleet. However, he did reply—though reluctantly—when I asked him who the 'Vampire' stood for, and said it was himself. The sudden resistance, which had made him interrupt his play, threw some light on the repression of his genital desires towards his mother. The bumping of one ship against another had repeatedly in his analysis turned out to symbolize sexual intercourse. One of the main causes of the repression of his genital desires was his fear of the destructiveness of sexual intercourse because—as the name 'Vampire' suggests—he attributed to it an oral-sadistic character.

I shall now interpret *Drawing I*, which further illustrates Richard's anxiety situations at this stage of the analysis. In the pattern drawings, as we already know, red always stood for Richard, black for his father, purple for his brother and light blue for his mother. While colouring the red sections Richard said: 'these are the Russians.' Though the Russians had become our allies, he was very suspicious of them. Therefore, in referring to red (himself) as the suspect Russians, he was showing me that he was afraid of his own aggression. It was this fear which had made him stop the fleet game at the moment when he realized that he was being the 'Vampire' in his sexual approach to his mother. *Drawing I* expressed his anxieties about his mother's body, attacked by the bad Hitler-father (bombs, thunderstorms, poisonous toadstools). As we shall see when we discuss his associations to *Drawing II*, the whole empire represented his mother's body and was pierced by his own 'bad' genital. In *Drawing I*, however, the piercing was done by three genitals, representing the three men in the family: father, brother and himself. We know that during this hour Richard had expressed his horror of sexual intercourse. To the phantasy of destruction threatening his mother from his 'bad' father was added the danger to her from Richard's aggression, for he identified himself with his 'bad' father. His brother too appeared as an attacker. In this drawing his mother (light blue) contains the bad men, or ultimately their bad genitals, and her body is therefore endangered and a place of danger.

Some Early Defences

Richard's anxiety about his aggression, and particularly about his oral-sadistic tendencies, was very great and led to a sharp struggle in him against

his aggression. This struggle could at times be plainly seen. It is significant that in moments of anger he ground his teeth and moved his jaws as if he were biting. Owing to the strength of his oral-sadistic impulses he felt in great danger of harming his mother. He often asked, even after quite innocent remarks to his mother or to myself: 'Have I hurt your feelings?' The fear and guilt relating to his destructive phantasies moulded his whole emotional life. In order to retain his love for his mother, he again and again attempted to restrain his jealousy and grievances, denying even obvious causes for them.

However, Richard's attempts to restrain his hatred and aggressiveness and to deny his grievances were not successful. The repressed anger about frustrations in the past and present came out clearly in the transference situation—for instance, in his response to the frustration imposed on him by the interruption of the analysis. We know that by going to London I had become in his mind an injured object. I was not, however, injured only through being exposed to the danger of bombs, but also because by frustrating him I had aroused his hatred; in consequence he felt unconsciously that he had attacked me. In repetition of earlier situations of frustration, he had become—in his phantasied attacks on me—identified with the bombing and dangerous Hitler-father, and he feared retaliation. I therefore turned into a hostile and revengeful figure.

The early splitting of the mother figure into a 'good' and 'bad' breast mother as a way of dealing with ambivalence had been very marked in Richard. This division developed further into a division between the 'breast mother' who was 'good' and the 'genital mother' who was 'bad'. At this stage of the analysis, his actual mother stood for the 'good breast mother', while I had become the 'bad genital mother', and I therefore aroused in him the aggression and fears connected with that figure. I had become the mother who is injured by the father in sexual intercourse, or is united with the 'bad' Hitler-father.

That Richard's genital interests had been active at that time was shown, for instance, by his conversation with his mother about sexual intercourse, though at the time he predominantly expressed horror. But it was this horror which made him turn away from me as the 'genital' mother and drove him to his actual mother as the 'good' object. This he achieved by a regression to the oral stage. While I was in London, Richard was more than ever inseparable from his mother. As he put it to me, he was 'Mum's chick' and 'chicks do run after their Mums'. This flight to the breast mother, as a defence against anxiety about the genital mother, was not successful. For Richard added: 'But then chicks have to do without them, because the hens don't look after them any more and don't care for them.'

The frustration experienced in the transference situation through the interruption of the analysis had revived earlier frustrations and grievances, and fundamentally the earliest deprivation suffered in relation to his mother's breast. Therefore the belief in the 'good' mother could not be maintained.

Immediately after the collision between 'Vampire' (himself) and 'Rodney' (his mother), which I have described in the previous section, Richard put the battleships 'Rodney' and 'Nelson' (his mother and father) side by side, and then, in a row lengthwise, some ships representing his brother, himself and his dog, arranged—as he said—in order of age. Here the fleet game was expressing his wish to restore harmony and peace in the family, by allowing his parents to come together and by giving way to his father's and brother's authority. This implied the need to restrain jealousy and hatred, for only then, he felt, could he avoid the fight with his father for the possession of his mother. In that way he warded off his castration fear and moreover preserved the 'good' father and the 'good' brother. Above all, he also saved his mother from being injured in the fight between his father and himself.

Thus Richard was not only dominated by the need to defend himself against the fear of being attacked by his rivals, his father and brother, but also by concern for his 'good' objects. Feelings of love and the urge to repair damage done in phantasy—damage which would be repeated if he gave way to his hatred and jealousy—came out in greater strength.

Peace and harmony in the family, however, could only be achieved, jealousy and hatred could only be restrained and the loved objects could only be preserved, if Richard repressed his Oedipus wishes. The repression of his Oedipus wishes implied a partial regression to babyhood, but this regression was bound up with the idealization of the mother and baby relationship. For he wished to turn himself into an infant free from aggression, and in particular free from oral-sadistic impulses. The idealization of the baby presupposed a corresponding idealization of the mother, in the first place of her breasts: an ideal breast which never frustrates, a mother and child in a purely loving relation to each other. The 'bad' breast, the 'bad' mother, was kept widely apart in his mind from the 'ideal' mother.

Drawing II illustrates some of Richard's methods of dealing with ambivalence, anxiety and guilt. He pointed out to me the red section 'which goes all through Mum's empire', but quickly corrected himself, saying: 'it's not Mum's empire, it's just an empire where all of us have some countries.' I interpreted that he was afraid to realize that he meant it to be his mother's empire because then the red section would be piercing his mother's 'inside'. Thereupon Richard, looking at the

drawing once more, suggested that this red section looked 'like a genital', and he pointed out that it divided the empire into two: in the West there were countries belonging to everybody, while the part in the East did not contain anything of his mother—but only himself, his father and his brother.

The left hand side of the drawing represented the 'good' mother in close association with Richard, for there was little of his father and relatively little of his brother on that side of the drawing. In contrast, on the right side (the 'dangerous East' which I had encountered before in his analysis) only the fighting men or rather their bad genitals appeared. His mother had disappeared from this side of the drawing because, as he felt it, she had been overwhelmed by the bad men. This drawing expressed the division into the endangered 'bad' mother (the genital mother) and the loved and safe mother (the breast mother).

In the first drawing, which I have used to illustrate certain anxiety situations, we can already see something of the defence mechanisms which are more clearly shown in *Drawing II*. Though in *Drawing I* the light blue mother is spread all over the picture, and the division into 'genital' mother and 'breast' mother has not come about as clearly as in *Drawing II*, an attempt at a division of this kind can be seen if we isolate the section on the extreme right.

It is illuminating that in *Drawing II* the division is effected by a particularly sharp and elongated section which Richard interpreted as a genital. In this way he expressed his belief that the male genital was piercing and dangerous. This section looks like a long sharp tooth or like a dagger, and in my view expresses both these meanings: the former symbolizing the danger to the loved object from the oral-sadistic impulses, the latter the danger pertaining, as he felt, to the genital function as such because of its penetrating nature.

These fears contributed again and again to his flight to the 'breast' mother. He could achieve relative stability only on a predominantly pre-genital level. The forward movement of the libido was impeded, because anxiety and guilt were too great and the ego was unable to evolve adequate defences. Thus the genital organization could not be sufficiently stabilized,³ which implied a strong tendency to regression. The inter-play between the phenomena of fixation and regression could be seen at every step of his development.

Diminished Repression of Oedipus Desires

The analysis of the various anxiety situations

which I have described had the effect of bringing Richard's Oedipus desires and anxieties more fully to the fore. But his ego could only maintain those desires by the strengthened use of certain defences (which I shall deal with in this section). These defences, however, could only become effective because some anxiety had been lessened by analysis, and this also implied a lessening of fixations.

When the repression of Richard's genital desires was to some extent lifted, his castration fear came more fully under analysis and found expression in various ways, with a corresponding modification in his methods of defence. In the third hour after my return Richard went out into the garden and spoke of his wish to climb mountains, particularly Snowdon, which he had mentioned earlier in the course of his analysis. While he was talking he noticed clouds in the sky and suggested that a dangerous storm was gathering. On such days, he said, he felt sorry for mountains which have a bad time when a storm breaks over them. This expressed his fear of the 'bad' father, represented by bombs and thunderstorms in the earlier material. The wish to climb Snowdon, symbolizing his desire for sexual intercourse with his mother, at once called up the fear of castration by the 'bad' father, and the storm which was breaking thus meant a danger to his mother as well as to himself.

During the same hour Richard told me that he was going to make five drawings. He mentioned that he had seen a swan with four 'sweet' cygnets. In playing with the fleet, Richard allocated one ship to me and one to himself; I was going on a pleasure trip in my ship and so was he in his. At first he moved his ship away, but soon brought it round and put it quite close to mine. This touching of ships had in former material—particularly in relation to his parents—repeatedly symbolized sexual intercourse. In this play, therefore, Richard was expressing his genital desires as well as his hope for potency. The five drawings he said he was going to give me represented himself (the swan) giving me—or rather his mother—four children (the cygnets).

A few days earlier, as we have seen, there had been a similar incident in the fleet game: 'Vampire' (Richard) touching 'Rodney' (his mother). At that time it had led to an abrupt change of play caused by Richard's fear lest his genital desires should be dominated by his oral-sadistic impulses. During the following few days, however, anxiety was in some measure relieved, aggression was lessened, and concurrently some methods of defence became strengthened. Hence a similar play incident (his ship touching mine on the

³ Here a question of terminology arises. Freud (1923 b) decided to describe the infantile genital organization as a 'phallic phase'. One of his main reasons for introducing this term was his view that during the infantile genital phase the female genital is not yet discovered or acknowledged, and that the whole interest centres on the penis. My experience does not confirm this point of view; and

I do not think that the use of the term 'phallic' would cover the material under discussion in this paper. I am therefore keeping to Freud's original term 'genital phase' (or 'genital organization'). I shall give my reasons for this choice of term more fully in the general theoretical summary later in this paper.

pleasure trip) could now take place without giving rise to anxiety and to the repression of his genital desires.

Richard's growing belief that he would achieve potency was bound up with a greater hope that his mother could be preserved. He was now able to allow himself the phantasy that she would love him as a man and permit him to take his father's place. This led to the hope that she would become his ally and protect him against all his rivals. For instance, Richard took the blue crayon and the red crayon (his mother and himself) and stood them up side by side on the table. Then the black crayon (his father) was marched towards them and was driven off by the red crayon, while the blue crayon drove off the purple one (his brother). This play expressed Richard's wish that his mother, in unison with himself, should drive off his dangerous father and brother. His mother as a strong figure, fighting against the bad men and their dangerous genitals, also appeared in an association to *Drawing II*, for he said that the blue mother in the West was preparing to fight the East and regain her countries there. As we know, on the right-hand side of *Drawing II* she had been overwhelmed by the genital attacks of the three men, his father, his brother and himself. In *Drawing IV*, which I shall describe a little later, Richard, by extending the blue over most of the drawing, expressed his hope that his mother would regain her lost territory. Then—restored and revived—she would be able to help and protect him. Because of this hope of restoring and reviving his good object, which implied his belief that he could cope more successfully with his aggression, Richard was able to experience his genital desires more strongly. Also, since his anxiety was lessened, he could turn his aggression outwards and take up in phantasy the fight with his father and brother for the possession of his mother. In his play with the fleet he arranged his ships to form one long row, with the smallest ship in front. The meaning of this game was that he had annexed his father's and brother's genitals and added them to his own. He felt that by this phantasied victory over his rivals he had achieved potency.

Drawing III is one of a series of drawings in which plants, starfishes, ships and fishes figured in various combinations, and which appeared frequently during the analysis. Just as in the type of drawing representing the empire, there was a great variation in details, but certain elements always represented the same object and situation. The plants underneath the water stood for his mother's genitals; there were usually two plants with a space in between. The plants also stood for his mother's breasts, and when one of the starfishes was in between the plants, this invariably meant that the child was in possession of his mother's breasts or having sexual intercourse with her. The jagged points in the shape of the starfish repre-

sented teeth and symbolized the baby's oral-sadistic impulses.

In starting *Drawing III* Richard first drew the two ships, then the large fish and some of the little ones around it. While drawing these, he became more and more eager and alive and filled in the space with baby fishes. Then he drew my attention to one of the baby fishes being covered by a fin of the 'Mum-fish' and said: 'This is the youngest baby.' The drawing suggests that the baby fish was being fed by the mother. I asked Richard whether he was among the little fishes, but he said he was not. He also told me that the starfish between the plants was a grown-up person and that the smaller starfish was a half-grown person, and explained that this was his brother; he also pointed out that the 'Sunfish' periscope was 'sticking into Rodney'. I suggested to him that the 'Sunfish' represented himself (the sun standing for the son) and that the periscope sticking into 'Rodney' (the mother) meant his sexual intercourse with his mother.

Richard's statement that the starfish between the plants was a grown-up person implied that it stood for his father, while Richard was represented by the 'Sunfish', the ship which was even bigger than 'Rodney' (his mother). In this way he expressed the reversal of the father-son relation. At the same time he indicated his love for his father, and his wish to make reparation, by putting the starfish-father between the plants and thus allotting him the position of a gratified child.

The material presented in this section shows that the positive Oedipus situation and genital position had come more fully to the fore. Richard had, as we have seen, achieved this by various methods. One of them was to make his father into the baby—a baby which was not deprived of gratification and therefore would be 'good'—while he himself annexed his father's penis.

Until then Richard, who appeared in various rôles in this type of drawing, had always recognized himself in the rôle of the child as well. For under the stress of anxiety he retreated to the idealized rôle of the gratified and loving infant. Now he stated for the first time that he was not among the babies in the picture. This seemed to me another indication of the strengthening of his genital position. He now felt that he could grow up and become sexually potent. In phantasy he could therefore produce children with his mother and no longer needed to put himself into the part of the baby.

These genital desires and phantasies, however, gave rise to various anxieties, and the attempt to solve his Oedipus conflicts by taking his father's place without having to fight him was only partially successful. Side by side with this relatively peaceful solution we find evidence in the drawing of Richard's fears that his father suspected his genital desires towards his mother, kept close watch over

Richard and would castrate him. For when I had interpreted to Richard his reversal of the father-son situation, he told me that the plane on top was British and was patrolling. It will be remembered that the periscope of the submarine sticking into 'Rodney' represented Richard's wish for sexual intercourse with his mother. This implied that he was trying to oust his father and therefore expected his father to be suspicious of him. I then interpreted to him that he meant that his father was not only changed into a child, but was present as well in the rôle of the paternal super-ego; the father who watched him, tried to prevent him from having sexual intercourse with his mother and threatened him with punishment. (The patrolling plane.)

I furthermore interpreted that Richard himself had been 'patrolling' his parents, for he was not only inquisitive about their sexual life but unconsciously strongly desired to interfere with it and to separate his parents.

Drawing IV illustrates the same material in a different way. While colouring the blue sections Richard had been singing the National Anthem, and he explained that his mother was the Queen and he was the King. Richard had become the father and had acquired the potent father genital. When he had finished the drawing and looked at it, he told me that there was 'plenty of Mum' and of himself in it and that they 'could really beat Dad'. He showed me that there was little of the 'bad' father there (black). Since the father had been made into a harmless infant, there seemed to be no need to beat him. However, Richard had not much confidence in this omnipotent solution, as was shown by his saying that together with his mother he could beat his father if necessary. The lessening of anxiety had enabled him to face the rivalry with his father and even the fight with him.

While colouring the purple sections, Richard sang the Norwegian and Belgian anthems and said 'he's all right'. The smallness of the purple sections (in comparison with the blue and red) indicates that his brother too had been changed into a baby. The singing of the two anthems of small allied countries showed me that the 'he's all right' referred to both his father and brother, who had become harmless children. The repressed love for his father had at this juncture of the analysis come more into the open.⁴ However, Richard felt he could not eliminate his father in his dangerous aspects. Moreover, his own faeces—in so far as they were unconsciously equated with the black father—appeared to him as a source of danger and could also not be eliminated. This acknowledgement of his psychic reality is shown in the fact that black was not left out of the picture, though

Richard comforted himself by saying that there was only a little of the Hitler-father in it.

In the various ways which helped to strengthen Richard's genital position we see some of the compromises which the ego attempts to bring about between the demands of the super-ego and the id. While Richard's id-impulses were gratified by his phantasy of sexual intercourse with his mother, the impulse to murder his father was circumvented and the reproaches of the super-ego were therefore diminished. The demands of the super-ego were, however, only partially satisfied, because though the father was spared, he was ousted from his position with his mother.

Such compromises are an essential part of every stage in the child's normal development. Whenever great fluctuations between libidinal positions occur, the defences are disturbed and new compromises have to be found. For instance, in the preceding section I have shown that, when Richard's oral anxieties were diminished, he attempted to cope with the conflict between his fears and desires by putting himself in phantasy into the rôle of an ideal baby who would not disturb the family peace. When the genital position was strengthened, however, and Richard could face his castration fear to a greater extent, a different compromise came about. Richard maintained his genital desires but avoided guilt by changing his father and brother into babies whom he would produce with his mother. Compromises of this kind at any stage of development can only bring about relative stability if the quantity of anxiety and guilt is not excessive in relation to the strength of the ego.

I have dealt in such detail with the influence of anxiety and defences on genital development because it does not seem to me possible fully to understand sexual development without taking into account the fluctuations between the different stages of libidinal organization and the particular anxieties and defences which characterize those stages.

Anxieties Relating to the Internalized Parents

Drawings V and *VI* need some introduction. Richard had developed a sore throat and a slight temperature the evening before, but nevertheless came to analysis, since it was warm summer weather. As I pointed out earlier, sore throats and colds were among his symptoms and, even when they were slight, gave rise in him to great hypochondriacal anxiety. At the beginning of the hour during which he made *Drawings V* and *VI* he was extremely anxious and worried. He told me that his throat felt very hot and that he had some poison behind his nose. His next association, produced with great resistance, was his fear that

⁴ It is significant that at the same time the libidinal desire for his father's penis, which had been strongly repressed, also came up, and in its most primary form. When looking again at the picture of the monster against

which the little man was fighting, Richard said: 'The monster's awful to look at, but its meat might be delicious to eat.'

his food might be poisoned—a fear of which he had been conscious for years, though it was only with difficulty that, on this occasion as well as on former ones, he could bring it up in the analysis.

During this hour Richard frequently looked out of the window in a suspicious way. When he saw two men talking to each other, he said that they were spying on him. This was one of the repeated indications of his paranoid fears which related to his watching and persecuting father and brother, but above all centred on his parents in a secret and hostile alliance against him. In my interpretation I linked this suspicion with the fear of internal persecutors spying on him and plotting against him—an anxiety which had come up earlier in his analysis. A little later Richard suddenly put his finger as far down as he could into his throat and seemed very worried. He explained to me that he was looking for germs. I interpreted to him that the germs also stood for Germans (the black Hitler father in unison with myself) and were in his mind connected with the two spying men, ultimately his parents. Thus the fear of germs was closely connected with his fear of being poisoned which unconsciously referred to his parents, though he did not consciously suspect them. The cold had stirred up these paranoid fears.

During this hour Richard had been making *Drawings V* and *VI*, and the only association I could get on that day was that *VI* was the same empire as *V*. In fact these two drawings were made on the same piece of paper.

On the following day Richard had completely recovered from his sore throat and appeared in a very different mood. He described vividly how much he had enjoyed his breakfast, particularly the shredded wheat, and showed me how he had munched it up. (He had eaten very little during the previous two days.) His stomach, he said, had been quite small, thin and drawn in, and 'the big bones in it' had been 'sticking out' until he had his breakfast. These 'big bones' stood for his father, or rather his father's genital, represented in the earlier material at times by the monster, at times by the octopus. They expressed the bad aspect of his father's genital, while the 'delicious meat' of the monster expressed the desirable aspect of his father's penis. I interpreted the shredded wheat as standing for the 'good' mother (the good breast and milk) since he had compared it on an earlier occasion to a bird's nest. Because his belief in the 'good' internalized mother had increased, he felt less afraid of internal persecutors (the bones and the monster).

The analysis of the unconscious meaning of the sore throat had led to a diminution of anxieties with a corresponding change in the methods of defence. Richard's mood and associations during this hour clearly expressed this change. The world had suddenly become beautiful to him: he admired

the countryside, my frock, my shoes, and said that I looked beautiful. He also spoke of his mother with great love and admiration. Thus, with the lessening of fears of internal persecutors, the external world appeared improved and more trustworthy to him and his capacity to enjoy it had increased. At the same time it was noticeable that his depression had given way to a hypomanic mood in which he denied his fears of persecution. In fact it was the lessening of anxiety which had allowed the manic defence against depression to come up. Richard's hypomanic mood did not, of course, last, and in the further course of his analysis depression and anxiety appeared again and again.

I have so far mainly referred to Richard's relation to his mother as an 'external' object. It had, however, become evident earlier in his analysis that the part she played as an external object was constantly interlinked with the part she played as an internal object. For the sake of clarity I have reserved this point to be illustrated by *Drawings V* and *VI*, which bring out vividly the rôle of the internalized parents in Richard's mental life.

In this hour Richard picked up *Drawings V* and *VI*, which he had made the day before, and freely associated to them. Now that his depression and hypochondriacal anxieties had diminished, he was able to face the anxieties which had been underlying his depression. He pointed out to me that *V* looked like a bird and a 'very horrid' one. The light blue on top was a crown, the purple bit was the eye, and the beak was 'wide open'. This beak, as can be seen, was formed by the red and purple sections on the right, that is to say by the colours which always stood for himself and his brother.

I interpreted to him that the light blue crown showed that the bird was his mother—the Queen, the ideal mother of former material—who now appeared as greedy and destructive. The fact that her beak was formed by red and purple sections expressed Richard's projection on to his mother of his own (as well as his brother's) oral-sadistic impulses.

It appears from this material that Richard had taken an important step in the direction of facing his psychic reality, for he had become able to express the projection of his oral-sadistic and cannibalistic impulses on to his mother. Furthermore, as shown in *Drawing V*, he had allowed the 'good' and 'bad' aspects of the mother to come together more closely. The prototypes of these two aspects, usually kept more widely apart from each other, were the 'good', loved breast and the 'bad', hated breast. In fact, the defences by means of splitting and isolating can also be seen in this drawing, for the left-hand side of the picture is completely blue. On the right-hand side of *Drawing V*, however, the mother appears simultaneously as the 'horrid' bird (open beak) and as the queen (light blue crown). With the lessening

of denial of his psychic reality, Richard had also become more able to face external reality, for this made it possible for him to recognize the fact that his mother had actually frustrated him and had therefore aroused his hatred.

Following my interpretations of *Drawing V*, Richard repeated emphatically that the bird looked 'horrid' and gave some associations about *Drawing VI*. It, too, looked like a bird, he said, but without a head; and the black at the bottom of it was 'big job' dropping out from it. He said it was all 'very horrid'.

In my interpretation of *Drawing VI* I reminded him that he had told me the day before that the two empires were the same. I suggested that *VI* represented himself, and that by internalizing the 'horrid bird' (*Drawing V*) he felt he had become like it. The open beak stood for his mother's greedy mouth, but also expressed his own desires to devour her, for the colours by which the beak was formed stood for himself and his brother (the greedy babies). In his mind he had devoured his mother as a destructive and devouring object. When in eating the breakfast food he had internalized the 'good' mother, he felt that she was protecting him against the internalized 'bad' father, the 'bones in his stomach'. When he internalized the 'horrid' bird mother he felt that she had become linked up with the monster father, and in his mind this terrifying combined parent figure was attacking him from within and eating him up as well as attacking him from without and castrating him.⁵

Thus Richard felt mutilated and castrated by the 'bad' internal and external parents who retaliated for his attacks on them, and he expressed these fears in *Drawing VI*, for the bird appears there without a head. As a result of his oral-sadistic impulses towards his parents in the process of internalizing them, they had in his mind turned into correspondingly greedy and destructive enemies. Moreover, because he felt that by devouring his parents he had changed them into monster and bird, he experienced not only fear of these internalized persecutors but also guilt, all the more because he feared that he had exposed the 'good' internal mother to the attacks of the internal monster. His guilt also related to his anal attacks on the external and internal parents which he had expressed by the 'horrid big job' dropping out of the bird.⁶

In the preceding hour, when Richard made these drawings, he had been so much under the sway of anxiety that he could not associate to them; now

some relief of anxiety had made it possible for him to give associations.

An earlier drawing (*VII*) which expresses the internalization of his objects even more clearly than *Drawings V* and *VI* is of interest in this connection. When Richard finished this pattern drawing, he made a line round it and filled in the background with red. I found that this represented his 'inside', containing his father, mother, brother and himself in relation to each other. In his associations to this drawing he expressed his satisfaction about the increase of the light blue sections, i.e. his mother. He also spoke of his hope that his brother would be his ally. His jealousy of his brother often made him suspicious and frightened of his brother as a rival. But at this moment he stressed the alliance with his brother. Furthermore he pointed out that one of the black sections was completely surrounded by his mother, brother and himself. The implication was that he was trying to protect the loved internal mother from the dangerous internal father.⁷

In the light of the material presented in this section, it appears that the part which the 'good' mother, so often idealized, played in Richard's emotional life referred to the internal mother as well as to the external mother. For instance, when he expressed the hope that the blue mother in the West would extend her territory (cf. *Drawing II*), this hope applied to his inner world as well as to the outer world. The belief in the 'good' internal mother was his greatest support. Whenever this belief was strengthened, hope and confidence and a greater feeling of security set in. When this feeling of confidence was shaken—either by illness or other causes—then depression and hypochondriacal anxieties increased.⁸ Moreover, when Richard's fears of persecutors, of the 'bad' mother and the 'bad' father, increased, he also felt that he could not protect his loved internal objects from the danger of destruction and death; and their death inevitably meant the end of his own life. Here we touch upon the fundamental anxiety of the depressive individual, which in my experience derives from the infantile depressive position.

A significant detail from his analysis illustrates Richard's fear of the death of his external and internal objects. As I said earlier, his almost personal relation to the playroom was one of the characteristic features in the transference situation. After my journey to London, which had strongly stirred up Richard's fear of air-raids and death, for some analytic sessions he could not bear having

⁵ It is relevant to recall here that he had been circumcised at the age of three and that ever since he had had a strong conscious fear of doctors and operations.

⁶ Urethral impulses and anxieties were no less important in his phantasies, but do not specifically enter into this material.

⁷ This drawing also represented his mother's 'inside', where the same struggle was going on. Richard and his

brother appeared in the rôle of her protective inner objects and his father as her dangerous inner object.

⁸ There is little doubt that such anxieties are apt in turn to produce colds or other physical illnesses, or at least to lower the resistance to them. This means that we are here confronted with a vicious circle, because these illnesses in turn reinforced all his fears.

the electric stove turned off until the very moment when we left the house. In one of the hours which I have described in connection with the analysis of *Drawings III* and *IV* this obsession disappeared. In these hours, together with the strengthening of his genital desires and the diminution of anxiety and depression, the phantasy that he would be able to give 'good' babies to me and to his mother, and his love for the baby, played a growing part in his associations. His obsessional insistence on keeping alight the stove in the room as long as possible was a measure of his depression.⁹

Summary of the Boy's Case History

Richard's failure to establish the genital position securely was largely caused by his incapacity to deal with anxiety in the early stages of his development. The great part which the 'bad' breast played in Richard's emotional life was connected with his unsatisfactory feeding period and the strong oral-, urethral- and anal-sadistic impulses and phantasies which it stimulated. Richard's fears of the 'bad' breast were to a certain extent counteracted by the idealization of the 'good' breast, and in this way some of his love for his mother could be maintained. The bad qualities of the breast and his oral-sadistic impulses towards it were largely transferred to his father's penis. In addition, he experienced strong oral-sadistic impulses towards his father's penis, derived from jealousy and hatred in the early positive Oedipus situation. His father's genital therefore turned in his phantasy into a dangerous, biting and poisonous object. The fear of the penis as an external and internal persecutor was so strong that trust in the good and productive qualities of the penis could not develop. In this way Richard's early feminine position was disturbed at the root by fears of persecution. These difficulties, experienced in the inverted Oedipus situation, interacted with the castration fear stimulated by his genital desires towards his mother. The hatred of his father which accompanied these desires, and expressed itself in the impulse to bite off his father's penis, led to the fear of being castrated in the same way, and therefore increased the repression of his genital desires.

One of the features of Richard's illness was a growing inhibition of all his activities and interests. This was linked with the severe repression of his aggressive tendencies, which was particularly marked in relation to his mother. In relation to his father and other men aggression was less repressed, though very much restrained by fear. Richard's predominant attitude to men was to pacify potential attackers and persecutors.

Richard's aggressiveness was least inhibited in relation to other children, though he was much too frightened to express it directly. His hatred of

children, as well as his fear of them, was partly derived from the attitude towards his father's penis. The destructive penis and the destructive and greedy child who would exhaust the mother and ultimately destroy her were closely linked up with each other in his mind. For he unconsciously strongly maintained the equation 'penis = child'. He felt, too, that the 'bad' penis could only produce 'bad' children.

Another determining factor in his phobia of children was his jealousy of his brother and of any children his mother might have in the future. His unconscious sadistic attacks on the babies inside his mother's body were linked up with his hatred of his father's penis inside his mother. In one connection only could his love towards children show itself at times, and that was in a friendly attitude towards babies.

We know already that it was only by idealizing the mother-baby relationship that he could maintain his capacity for love. Because of his unconscious fear and guilt about his own oral-sadistic impulses, however, infants predominantly represented to him oral-sadistic beings. This was one of the reasons why he could not in phantasy fulfil his longing to give children to his mother. More fundamental still, oral anxiety had in his early development increased the fear connected with the aggressive aspects of the genital function and of his own penis. Richard's fear that his oral-sadistic impulses would dominate his genital desires and that his penis was a destructive organ was one of the main causes of his repression of his genital desires. Hence one essential means of making his mother happy and making reparation for the babies which he felt he had destroyed was barred to him. In all these various ways his oral-sadistic impulses, phantasies and fears interfered again and again with his genital development.

In the preceding sections I have referred repeatedly to the regression to the oral stage as a defence against the additional anxieties arising in the genital position; it is, however, important not to overlook the part played by fixation in these processes. Because his oral-, urethral- and anal-sadistic anxieties were excessive, fixation to these levels was very strong; in consequence, the genital organization was weak and the tendency to repression marked. However, in spite of his inhibitions, he had developed some sublimated genital trends. Moreover, in so far as his desires were predominantly directed towards his mother, and his feelings of jealousy and hatred towards his father, he had achieved several essential features of the Oedipus situation and of heterosexual development. This picture was, however, in some ways deceptive since his love for his mother could only be maintained by reinforcing the oral elements in his relation to her and by idealizing the 'breast'

⁹ Keeping the stove alight also had the unconscious meaning of proving to himself that he was not castrated, and also that his father was not castrated.

mother. We have seen that in his drawings the blue sections always stood for his mother; this choice of colour was connected with his love of the cloudless blue sky and expressed his longing for an ideal bountiful breast which would never frustrate him.

The fact that Richard was thus enabled in some ways to keep alive his love for his mother had given him what little measure of stability he possessed, and had also allowed him to develop his heterosexual tendencies to a certain extent. It was obvious that anxiety and feelings of guilt entered largely into his fixation to his mother. Richard was very devoted to her, but in a rather infantile way. He could hardly bear to leave her out of sight and showed few signs of developing an independent and manly relation to her. His attitude towards other women—though far from being truly manly and independent—was in striking contrast to his great love and even blind admiration for his mother. His behaviour with women was very precocious, in some ways like that of a grown-up Don Juan. He tried to ingratiate himself in various ways, even by blatant flattery. At the same time he was often critical and contemptuous of women and amused if they were taken in by his flattery.

Here we see two contrasting attitudes to women which bring to mind Freud's (1912; 207-9) description. Speaking of the 'disunion between the tender and sensual currents of erotic feeling' in some men who suffer, as Freud describes it, from 'psychical impotence', i.e. who can only be potent under certain circumstances, he says: 'The erotic life of such people remains dissociated, divided between two channels, the same two that are personified in art as heavenly and earthly (or animal) love. Where such men love they have no desire and where they desire they cannot love.'

There is an analogy between Freud's description and Richard's attitude to his mother. It was the 'genital' mother whom he feared and hated, while he turned his love and tenderness towards the 'breast' mother. This division between the two currents became apparent in the contrast between his attitude to his mother and to other women. While his genital desires towards his mother were strongly repressed and she therefore remained an object of love and admiration, these desires could become to some extent active towards women other than his mother. But those women were then objects of criticism and contempt to him. They stood for the 'genital' mother, and it appeared that his horror of genitality and his urge to repress it were reflected in his attitude of contempt towards objects who aroused his genital desires.

Among the anxieties which accounted for his fixation and regression to the 'breast' mother, Richard's fear of his mother's 'inside' as a place full of persecutors played a predominant part. For the 'genital' mother, who was to him the mother

in sexual intercourse with the father, also contained the 'bad' father's genital—or rather a multitude of his genitals—thus forming a dangerous alliance with the father against the son; she also contained the hostile babies. In addition, there was the anxiety about his own penis as a dangerous organ which would injure and damage his loved mother.

The anxieties which disturbed Richard's genital development were closely linked with his relation to his parents as internalized figures. To the picture of his mother's 'inside' as a place of danger corresponded the feelings he had about his own 'inside'. In previous sections we have seen that the 'good' mother (e.g. the good breakfast food) was protecting him internally against the father, 'the long bones sticking out' in his stomach. This picture of the mother protecting him against the internalized father corresponded to the mother-figure whom Richard felt urged to protect against the 'bad' father—a mother endangered by the oral and genital attacks of the internal monster. Ultimately, however, he felt her to be endangered by his own oral-sadistic attacks on her. *Drawing II* showed the bad men (his father, brother and himself) overwhelming and swallowing up his mother. This fear derived from Richard's fundamental feeling of guilt about having destroyed (devoured) his mother and her breasts by his oral-sadistic attacks in the process of internalizing her. In addition, he expressed his guilt about his anal-sadistic attacks in *Drawing VI*, for he pointed out the 'horrid big job' dropping out from the bird. The equation between his own faeces and the black Hitler-father became apparent earlier on in his analysis when he began to make the empire drawings; for in the earliest drawing Richard had introduced the black as standing for himself, but soon decided that red stood for himself and black for his father; he afterwards maintained this arrangement throughout the drawings. This equation was further illustrated by some of the associations to *Drawings V* and *VI*. In *Drawing V* the black section represented the 'bad' father. In *Drawing VI* it represented the 'horrid big job' dropping out of the mutilated bird.

To Richard's fear of his own destructiveness corresponded the fear of his mother as a dangerous and retaliating object. The 'horrid bird' with the open beak was a projection on to his mother of his oral-sadistic impulses. Richard's actual experiences of being frustrated by his mother could not by themselves account for his having built up in his mind a terrifying picture of an internal devouring mother. It becomes clear in *Drawing VI* how very dangerous he felt the 'horrid' bird mother to be. For the bird without a head represented himself and corresponded to his fear of castration by this dangerous mother united with the monster father as external enemies. Moreover, in internal situations he felt threatened by the alliance of the

internalized 'horrid' bird mother and the monster father. These internal danger situations were the main cause of his hypochondriacal and persecutory fears.

When Richard had become able during his analysis to face the psychological fact that his loved object was also his hated object and that the light blue mother, the queen with the crown, was linked in his mind with the horrid bird with the beak, he could establish his love for his mother more securely. His feelings of love had become more closely linked with his feelings of hatred, and his happy experiences with his mother were no longer kept so widely apart from his experiences of frustration. He was therefore no longer driven on the one hand to idealize the 'good' mother so strongly and on the other hand to form such a terrifying picture of the 'bad' mother. Whenever he could allow himself to bring the two aspects of the mother together, this implied that the bad aspect was mitigated by the good one. This more secure 'good' mother could then protect him against the 'monster' father. This again implied that at such times she was not felt to be so fatally injured by his oral greed and by the 'bad' father, which in turn meant that he felt that both he and his father had become less dangerous. The good mother could come to life once more, and Richard's depression therefore lifted.

His increased hope of keeping the analyst and his mother alive as internal and external objects was bound up with the strengthening of his genital position and with a greater capacity to experience his Oedipus desires. Reproduction, the creation of 'good' babies, which he unconsciously felt to be the most important means of combating death and the fear of death, had now become more possible to him in phantasy. Because he was less afraid of being carried away by his sadistic impulses, Richard believed that he would be able to produce 'good' babies; for the creative and productive aspect of the male genital (his father's as well as his own) had come more strongly to the fore. The trust in his own constructive and reparative tendencies, as well as in his internal and external objects, had increased. His belief not only in the 'good' mother but also in the 'good' father had become strengthened. His father was no longer such a dangerous enemy that Richard could not face the fight with him as a hated rival. Thus he made an important step towards the strengthening of his genital position and towards facing the conflicts and fears bound up with his genital desires.

EXTRACTS FROM CASE HISTORY ILLUSTRATING THE GIRL'S OEDIPUS DEVELOPMENT

I have discussed some of the anxieties which disturb genital development in the boy and I shall now put forward some material from the case history of a little girl—one which I have already

described from various angles in earlier publications. (1932; 23-5, 26-8, 47, 61, 161-2 and 1936; 41-3. Cf. also 1929.) This material has certain advantages for purposes of presentation, for it is simple and straightforward. Most of this case material has been published previously; I shall however add a few details so far unpublished as well as some new interpretations which I could not have made at the time but which, in retrospect, seem to be fully borne out by the material.


My patient Rita, who was two years and nine months old at the beginning of her analysis, was a very difficult child to bring up. She suffered from anxieties of various kinds, from inability to tolerate frustration, and from frequent states of unhappiness. She showed marked obsessional features which had been increasing for some time, and she insisted on elaborate obsessional ceremonials. She alternated between an exaggerated 'goodness', accompanied by feelings of remorse, and states of 'naughtiness' when she attempted to dominate everybody around her. She also had difficulties over eating, was 'faddy' and frequently suffered from loss of appetite. Though she was a very intelligent child, the development and integration of her personality were held back by the strength of her neurosis.

She often cried, apparently without cause, and when asked by her mother why she was crying answered: 'Because I'm so sad.' To the question: 'Why are you so sad?' she replied: 'Because I'm crying.' Her feelings of guilt and unhappiness expressed themselves in constant questions to her mother: 'Am I good?' 'Do you love me?' and so on. She could not bear any reproach and, if reprimanded, either burst into tears or became defiant. Her feeling of insecurity in relation to her parents showed itself for instance in the following incident from her second year. Once, so I was told, she burst into tears because her father uttered a playful threat against a bear in her picture book with whom she had obviously identified herself.


Rita suffered from a marked inhibition in play. The only thing she could do with her dolls, for instance, was to wash them and change their clothes in a compulsive way. As soon as she introduced any imaginative element, she had an outbreak of anxiety and stopped playing.





The following are some relevant facts from her history. Rita was breast-fed for a few months; then she had been given the bottle, which she had at first been unwilling to accept. Weaning from the bottle to solid food was again troublesome, and she was still suffering from difficulties over eating when I began her analysis. Moreover, at that time she was still being given a bottle at night. Her mother told me that she had given up trying to wean Rita from this last bottle because every such attempt caused the child great distress. With regard to Rita's habit training, which was achieved early in her second year, I have reason to assume

I




II





-  Red (Richard)
 Blue (Mother)
 Black (Father)
 Purple (Brother)


III




IV




V



VI



VII



that her mother had been rather too anxious over it. Rita's obsessional neurosis proved to be closely connected with her early habit training.

Rita shared her parents' bedroom until she was nearly two, and she repeatedly witnessed sexual intercourse between her parents. When she was two years old, her brother was born, and at that time her neurosis broke out in full force. Another contributory circumstance was the fact that her mother was herself neurotic and obviously ambivalent towards Rita.

Her parents told me that Rita was much more fond of her mother than of her father until the end of her first year. At the beginning of her second year she developed a marked preference for her father, together with pronounced jealousy of her mother. At fifteen months Rita repeatedly and unmistakably expressed the wish, when she sat on her father's knee, to be left alone with him in the room. She could already put this into words. At the age of about eighteen months there was a striking change, which showed itself in an altered relation to both her parents, as well as in various symptoms such as night terrors and animal phobias (particularly of dogs). Her mother once again became the favourite, yet the child's relation to her showed strong ambivalence. She clung to her mother so much that she could hardly let her out of her sight. This went together with attempts to dominate her and with an often unconcealed hatred of her. Concurrently Rita developed an outspoken dislike of her father.

These facts were clearly observed at the time and reported to me by her parents. In the case of older children, parents' reports about the earlier years are often unreliable, since, as time goes on, the facts are apt to be increasingly falsified in their memory. In Rita's case the details were still fresh in her parents' minds, and the analysis fully confirmed all the essentials of their report.

Early Relations to the Parents

At the beginning of Rita's second year some important elements of her Oedipus situation were plainly observable, such as her preference for her father and jealousy of her mother, and even the wish to take her mother's place with her father. In assessing Rita's Oedipus development in her second year we have to consider some outstanding external factors. The child shared her parents' bedroom and had ample opportunity for witnessing sexual intercourse between them; there was therefore a constant stimulus for libidinal desires and for jealousy, hatred and anxiety. When she was fifteen months old, her mother became pregnant, and the child unconsciously understood her mother's condition; thus Rita's desire to receive a baby from her father, as well as her rivalry with her mother, was strongly reinforced. As a consequence, her aggressiveness, and the ensuing anxiety and feelings of guilt, increased to

such an extent that her Oedipus desires could not be maintained.

The difficulties in Rita's development cannot be explained, however, by these external stimuli alone. Many children are exposed to similar, and even to much more unfavourable, experiences without becoming seriously ill in consequence. We have therefore to consider the internal factors which, in interaction with the influences from without, led to Rita's illness and to the disturbance of her sexual development.

As the analysis revealed, Rita's oral-sadistic impulses were exceedingly strong and her capacity to tolerate tension of any kind was unusually low. These were some of the constitutional characteristics which determined her reactions to the early frustrations she suffered and from the beginning strongly affected her relation to her mother. When Rita's positive Oedipus desires came to the fore at the end of her first year, this new relation to both parents reinforced Rita's feelings of frustration, hatred and aggressiveness, with their concomitants of anxiety and guilt. She was unable to cope with these manifold conflicts and therefore could not maintain her genital desires.

Rita's relation to her mother was dominated by two great sources of anxiety: persecutory fear and depressive anxiety. In one aspect her mother represented a terrifying and retaliating figure. In another aspect she was Rita's indispensable loved and good object, and Rita felt her own aggression as a danger to this loved mother. She was therefore overwhelmed by the fear of losing her. It was the strength of these early anxieties and feelings of guilt which largely determined Rita's incapacity to tolerate the additional anxiety and guilt arising from the Oedipus feelings—rivalry and hatred against her mother. In defence she repressed her hatred and over-compensated for it by excessive love, and this necessarily implied a regression to earlier stages of the libido. Rita's relation to her father was also fundamentally influenced by these factors. Some of the resentment she felt towards her mother was deflected on to her father and reinforced the hatred of him which derived from the frustration of her Oedipus desires and which, towards the beginning of her second year, strikingly superseded her former love for her father. The failure to establish a satisfactory relation to her mother was repeated in her oral and genital relation to her father. Strong desires to castrate him (partly derived from frustration in the feminine position, partly from penis envy in the male position) became clear in the analysis.

Rita's sadistic phantasies were thus closely bound up with grievances derived from frustration in various libidinal positions and experienced in the inverted as well as in the positive Oedipus situation. The sexual intercourse between her parents played an important part in her sadistic phantasies and

became in the child's mind a dangerous and frightening event, in which her mother appeared as the victim of her father's extreme cruelty. In consequence, not only did her father turn in her mind into someone dangerous to her mother but—in so far as Rita's Oedipus desires were maintained in identification with her mother—into a person dangerous towards herself. Rita's phobia of dogs went back to the fear of the dangerous penis of her father which would bite her in retaliation for her own impulses to castrate him. Her whole relation to her father was profoundly disturbed because he had turned into a 'bad man'. He was all the more hated because he became the embodiment of her own sadistic desires towards her mother.

The following episode, reported to me by her mother, illustrates this last point. At the beginning of her third year Rita was out for a walk with her mother and saw a cabman beating his horses cruelly. Her mother was extremely indignant, and the little girl also expressed strong indignation. Later on in the day she surprised her mother by saying: 'When are we going out again to see the bad man beating the horses?', thus revealing the fact that she had derived sadistic pleasure from the experience and wished for its repetition. In her unconscious the cabman represented her father and the horses her mother, and her father was carrying out in sexual intercourse the child's sadistic phantasies directed against her mother. The fear of her father's 'bad' genital, together with the phantasy of her mother injured and destroyed by Rita's hatred and by the 'bad' father—the cabman—interfered both with her positive and with her inverted Oedipus desires. Rita could neither identify herself with such a destroyed mother, nor allow herself to play in the homosexual position the rôle of the father. Thus in these early stages neither position could be satisfactorily established.

Some Instances from the Analytic Material

The anxieties Rita experienced when she witnessed the primal scene are shown in the following material.

On one occasion during the analysis she put a triangular brick on one side and said: 'That's a little woman.' She then took a 'little hammer', as she called a long shaped brick, and hit the brick-box with it saying: 'When the hammer hit hard, the little woman was so frightened.' The triangular brick stood for herself, the 'hammer' for her father's penis, the box for her mother, and the whole situation represented her witnessing the primal scene. It is significant that she hit the box exactly in a place where it happened to be stuck together only with paper, so that she made a hole in it. This was one of the instances when Rita showed me symbolically her unconscious knowledge of the vagina and the part it played in her sexual theories.

The next two instances relate to her castration

complex and penis envy. Rita was playing that she was travelling with her Teddy bear to the house of a 'good' woman where she was to be given 'a marvellous treat'. This journey, however, did not go smoothly. Rita got rid of the engine driver and took his place. But he came back again and again and threatened her, causing her great anxiety. An object of contention between her and him was her Teddy bear whom she felt to be essential for the success of the journey. Here the bear represented her father's penis, and her rivalry with her father was expressed by this fight over the penis. She had robbed her father of it, partly from feelings of envy, hatred and revenge, partly in order to take his place with her mother and—by means of her father's potent penis—to make reparation for the injuries done to her mother in phantasy.

The next instance is linked with her bed-time ritual, which had become more and more elaborate and compulsive as time went on and involved a corresponding ceremonial with her doll. The main point of it was that she (and her doll as well) had to be tightly tucked up in the bed clothes, otherwise—as she said—a mouse or a 'Butzen' (a word of her own) would get in through the window and bite off her own 'Butzen'. The 'Butzen' represented both her father's genital and her own: her father's penis would bite off her own imaginary penis just as *she* desired to castrate *him*. As I see it now, the fear of her mother attacking the 'inside' of her body also contributed to her fear of someone coming through the window. The room also represented her body and the assailant was her mother retaliating for the child's attacks on her. The obsessional need to be tucked in with such elaborate care was a defence against all these fears.

Super-Ego Development

The anxieties and feelings of guilt described in the last two sections were bound up with Rita's super-ego development. I found in her a cruel and unrelenting super-ego, such as underlies severe obsessional neurosis in adults. This development I could in the analysis trace back definitely to the beginning of her second year. In the light of my later experience I am bound to conclude that the beginnings of Rita's super-ego reached back to the first few months of life.

In the travelling game I have described, the engine driver represented her super-ego as well as her actual father. We also see her super-ego at work in Rita's obsessional play with her doll, when she went through a ritual similar to her own bed-time ceremonial, putting the doll to sleep and tucking her up very elaborately. Once during the analysis Rita placed an elephant by the doll's bedside. As she explained, the elephant was to prevent the 'child' (doll) from getting up, because otherwise the 'child' would steal into its parents' bedroom and either 'do them some harm or take

something away from them'. The elephant represented her super-ego (her father and mother), and the attacks on her parents which it was to prevent were the expression of Rita's own sadistic impulses centring on her parents' sexual intercourse and her mother's pregnancy. The super-ego was to make it impossible for the child to rob her mother of the baby inside her, to injure or destroy her mother's body, as well as to castrate the father.

A significant detail from her history was that early in her third year Rita repeatedly declared, when she was playing with dolls, that she *was not the doll's mother*. In the context of the analysis it appeared that she could not allow herself to be the doll's mother because the doll stood for her baby brother whom she wanted and feared to take away from her mother. Her guilt also related to her aggressive phantasies during her mother's pregnancy. When Rita could not play at being her doll's mother, this inhibition derived from her feelings of guilt as well as from her fear of a cruel mother-figure, infinitely more severe than her actual mother had ever been. Not only did Rita see her *real* mother in this distorted light, but she felt in constant danger from a terrifying *internal* mother-figure. I have referred to Rita's phantasied attacks on her mother's body and the corresponding anxiety that her mother would attack her and rob her of her imaginary babies, as well as to her fear of being attacked and castrated by her father. I would now go further in my interpretations. To the phantasied attacks on her body by her parents as external figures corresponded fear of inner attacks by the internalized persecuting parent-figures who formed the cruel part of her super-ego.¹⁰

The harshness of Rita's super-ego often showed in her play during the analysis. For instance, she used to punish her doll cruelly; then would follow an outbreak of rage and fear. She was identified both with the harsh parents who inflict severe punishment and with the child who is being cruelly punished and bursts into a rage. This was not only noticeable in her play but in her whole behaviour in general. At times she seemed to be the mouthpiece of a severe and unrelenting mother, at other times of an uncontrollable, greedy and destructive infant. There seemed to be very little of her own ego to bridge these two extremes and to modify the intensity of the conflict. The gradual process of integration of her super-ego was severely interfered with, and she could not develop an individuality of her own.

Persecutory and Depressive Anxieties Disturbing the Oedipus Development

Rita's depressive feelings were a marked feature

in her neurosis. Her states of sadness and crying without cause, her constant questions whether her mother loved her—all these were indications of her depressive anxieties. These anxieties were rooted in her relation to her mother's breasts. In consequence of her sadistic phantasies, in which she had attacked the breast and her mother as a whole, Rita was dominated by fears which profoundly influenced her relation to her mother. In one aspect she loved her mother as a good and indispensable object and felt guilty because she had endangered her by her aggressive phantasies; in another aspect she hated and feared her as the 'bad' persecutory mother (in the first place the 'bad' breast). These fears and complex feelings, which related to her mother both as an external and internal object, constituted her infantile depressive position. Rita was incapable of dealing with these acute anxieties and could not overcome her depressive position.

In this connection some material from the early part of her analysis is significant.¹¹ She scribbled on a piece of paper and blackened it with great vigour. Then she tore it up and threw the scraps into a glass of water which she put to her mouth as if to drink from it. At that moment she stopped and said under her breath: 'Dead woman.' This material, with the same words, was repeated on another occasion.

The piece of paper blackened, torn up and thrown into the water represented her mother destroyed by oral, anal and urethral means, and this picture of a dead mother related not only to the external mother when she was out of sight but also to the *internal* mother. Rita had to give up the rivalry with her mother in the Oedipus situation because her unconscious fear of loss of the internal and external object acted as a barrier to every desire which would increase her hatred of her mother and therefore cause her mother's death. These anxieties, derived from the oral position, underlay the marked depression which Rita developed at her mother's attempt to wean her of the last bottle. Rita would not drink the milk from a cup. She fell into a state of despair; she lost her appetite in general, refused food, clung more than ever to her mother, asking her again and again whether she loved her, if she had been naughty, and so on. Her analysis revealed that the weaning represented a cruel punishment for her aggressive desires and death wishes against her mother. Since the loss of the bottle stood for the final loss of the breast, Rita felt when the bottle was taken away that she had actually destroyed her mother. Even the presence of her mother

¹⁰ In my General Theoretical Summary below I deal with the girl's super-ego development and the essential part the good internalized father plays in it. With Rita this aspect of her super-ego formation had not appeared in her analysis. A development in this direction, however, was indicated by the improved relation to her father towards the end of her analysis. As I see it now, the

anxiety and guilt relating to her mother so much dominated her emotional life that both the relation to the external father and to the internalized father-figure were interfered with.

¹¹ This piece of material has not appeared in former publications.

could do no more than temporarily alleviate these fears. The inference suggests itself that while the lost bottle represented the lost good breast, the cup of milk which Rita refused in her state of depression following the weaning represented the destroyed and dead mother, just as the glass of water with the torn paper had represented the 'dead woman'.

As I have suggested, Rita's depressive anxieties about the death of her mother were bound up with persecutory fears relating to attacks on her own body by a retaliating mother. In fact such attacks always appear to a girl not only as a danger to her body, but as a danger to everything precious which in her mind her 'inside' contains: her potential children, the 'good' mother and the 'good' father.

The incapacity to protect these loved objects against external and internal persecutors is part of the most fundamental anxiety situation of girls.¹²

Rita's relation to her father was largely determined by the anxiety situations centring on her mother. Much of her hatred and fear of the 'bad' breast had been transferred to her father's penis. Excessive guilt and fear of loss relating to her mother had also been transferred to her father. All this—together with the frustration suffered directly from her father—had interfered with the development of her positive Oedipus complex.

Her hatred of her father was reinforced by penis envy and by rivalry with him in the inverted Oedipus situation. Her attempts to cope with her penis envy led to a reinforced belief in her imaginary penis. However, she felt this penis to be endangered by a bad father who would castrate her in retaliation for her own desires to castrate him. When Rita was afraid of her father's 'Butzen' coming into the room and biting off her own 'Butzen', that was an instance of her castration fear.

Her desires to annex her father's penis and to play his part with her mother were clear indications of her penis envy. This was illustrated by the play material I have quoted: she travelled with her Teddy bear, representing the penis, to the 'good woman' who was to give them a 'marvellous treat'. The wish to possess a penis of her own, however, was—as her analysis showed me—strongly reinforced by anxieties and guilt relating to the death of her loved mother. These anxieties, which early on had undermined her relation to her mother, largely contributed to the failure of the positive Oedipus development. They also had the effect of reinforcing Rita's desires to possess a penis, for she felt that she could only repair the damage done to her mother, and make up for the babies which in phantasy she had taken from her, if she possessed a penis of her own with which to gratify her mother and give her children.

Rita's excessive difficulties in dealing with her

inverted and positive Oedipus complex were thus rooted in her depressive position. Along with the lessening of these anxieties, she became able to tolerate her Oedipus desires and to achieve increasingly a feminine and maternal attitude. Towards the end of her analysis, which was cut short owing to external circumstances, Rita's relation to both parents, as well as to her brother, improved. Her aversion to her father, which had until then been very marked, gave place to affection for him; the ambivalence towards her mother decreased, and a more friendly and stable relationship developed.

Rita's changed attitude towards her Teddy bear and her doll reflected the extent to which her libidinal development had progressed and her neurotic difficulties and the severity of her super-ego had been reduced. Once, near the end of the analysis, while she was kissing the bear and hugging it and calling it pet names, she said: 'I'm not a bit unhappy any more because now I've got such a dear little baby.' She could now allow herself to be the mother of her imaginary child. This change was not an altogether new development, but in some measure a return to an earlier libidinal position. In her second year Rita's desires to receive her father's penis and to have a child from him had been disturbed by anxiety and guilt relating to her mother; her positive Oedipus development broke down and there was a marked aggravation of her neurosis. When Rita said emphatically that she was not the mother of her doll, she clearly indicated the struggle against her desires to have a baby. Under the stress of her anxiety and guilt she could not maintain the feminine position and was driven to reinforce the male position. The bear thus came to stand predominantly for her desired penis. Rita could not allow herself the wish for a child from her father and the identification with her mother in the Oedipus situation could not be established, until her anxieties and guilt in relation to both parents had lessened.

GENERAL THEORETICAL SUMMARY

(a) *Early Stages of the Oedipus Complex in Both Sexes*

The clinical pictures of the two cases I have presented in this paper differed in many ways. However, the two cases had some important features in common, such as strong oral-sadistic impulses, excessive anxiety and guilt, and a low capacity of the ego to tolerate tension of any kind. In my experience, these are some of the factors which, in interaction with external circumstances, prevent the ego from gradually building up adequate defences against anxiety. As a result,

¹² This anxiety situation entered to some extent into Rita's analysis, but at that time I did not realize fully the importance of such anxieties and their close connection

with depression. This became clearer to me in the light of later experience.

the working through of early anxiety situations is impaired and the child's emotional, libidinal and ego-development suffers. Owing to the dominance of anxiety and guilt there is an over-strong fixation to the early stages of libidinal organization and, in interaction with this, an excessive tendency to regress to those early stages. In consequence, the Oedipus development is interfered with and the genital organization cannot be securely established. In the two cases referred to in this paper, as well as in others, the Oedipus complex began to develop on normal lines when these early anxieties were diminished.

The effect of anxiety and guilt on the course of the Oedipus development is to some extent illustrated by the two brief case histories I have given. The following survey of my theoretical conclusions on certain aspects of the Oedipus development is, however, based on the whole of my analytic work with child and adult cases, ranging from normality to severe illness.

A full description of the Oedipus development would have to include a discussion of external influences and experiences at every stage, and of their effect throughout childhood. I have deliberately sacrificed the exhaustive description of external factors to the need to clarify the most important issues.¹³

My experience has led me to believe that from the very beginning of life libido is fused with aggressiveness, and that the development of the libido is at every stage vitally affected by anxiety derived from aggressiveness. Anxiety, guilt and depressive feelings at times drive the libido forward to new sources of gratification, at times they check the development of the libido by reinforcing the fixation to an earlier object and aim.

In comparison with the later phases of the Oedipus complex, the picture of its earliest stages is necessarily more obscure, as the infant's ego is immature and under the full sway of unconscious phantasy; also his instinctual life is in its most polymorphous phase. These early stages are characterized by swift fluctuations between different objects and aims, with corresponding fluctuations in the nature of the defences. In my view, the Oedipus complex starts during the first year of life and in both sexes develops to begin with on similar lines. The relation to the mother's breast is one of the essential factors which deter-

mine the whole emotional and sexual development. I therefore take the breast relation as my starting point in the following description of the beginnings of the Oedipus complex in both sexes.

It seems that the search for new sources of gratification is inherent in the forward movement of the libido. The gratification experienced at the mother's breast enables the infant to turn his desires towards new objects, first of all towards his father's penis. Particular impetus, however, is given to the new desire by frustration in the breast relation. It is important to remember that frustration depends on internal factors as well as on actual experiences. Some measure of frustration at the breast is inevitable, even under the most favourable conditions, for what the infant actually desires is *unlimited* gratification. The frustration experienced at the mother's breast leads both boy and girl to turn away from it and stimulates the infant's desire for oral gratification from the penis of the father. The breast and the penis are therefore the primary objects of the infant's oral desires.¹⁴

Frustration and gratification from the outset mould the infant's relation to a loved 'good' breast and to a hated 'bad' breast. The need to cope with frustration and with the ensuing aggression is one of the factors which lead to idealizing the 'good' breast and 'good' mother, and correspondingly to intensifying the hatred and fears of the 'bad' breast and 'bad' mother, which becomes the prototype of all persecuting and frightening objects.

The two conflicting attitudes to the mother's breast are carried over into the new relation to the father's penis. The frustration suffered in the earlier relation increases the demands and hopes from the new source and stimulates love for the new object. The inevitable disappointment in the new relation reinforces the pull-back to the first object; and this contributes to the lability and fluidity of emotional attitudes and of the stages of libidinal organization.

Furthermore, aggressive impulses, stimulated and reinforced by frustration, turn, in the child's mind, the victims of his aggressive phantasies into injured and retaliating figures which threaten him with the same sadistic attacks as he commits against the parents in phantasy.¹⁵ In consequence, the infant feels an increased need for a loved and loving object—a perfect, an 'ideal' object—in

¹³ My main purpose in this summary is to provide a clear presentation of my views on some aspects of the Oedipus complex. I also intend to compare my conclusions with certain of Freud's statements on the subject. I find it impossible, therefore, at the same time to quote other authors or to make references to the copious literature dealing with this subject. With regard to the girl's Oedipus complex, however, I should like to draw attention to Chapter XI in my book, *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* (1932), in which I have referred to the views of various authors on this subject.

¹⁴ In dwelling on the infant's fundamental relation to the mother's breast and to the father's penis, and on the ensuing anxiety situations and defences, I have in mind

more than the relation to part objects. In fact these part objects are from the beginning associated in the infant's mind with his mother and father. Day to day experiences with his parents, and the unconscious relation which develops to them as inner objects, come increasingly to cluster round these primary part-objects and add to their prominence in the child's unconscious.

¹⁵ Allowance must be made for the great difficulty of expressing a young child's feelings and phantasies in adult language. All descriptions of early unconscious phantasies—and for that matter of unconscious phantasies in general—can therefore only be considered as pointers to the contents rather than to the form of such phantasies.

order to satisfy his craving for help and security. Each object, therefore, is in turn liable to become at times 'good', at times 'bad'. This movement to and fro between the various aspects of the primary imagos implies a close interaction between the early stages of the inverted and positive Oedipus complex.

Since under the dominance of the oral libido the infant from the beginning introjects his objects, the primary imagos have a counterpart in his inner world. The imagos of his mother's breast and of his father's penis are established within his ego and form the nucleus of his super-ego. To the introjection of the 'good' and 'bad' breast and mother corresponds the introjection of the 'good' and 'bad' penis and father. They become the first representatives on the one hand of protective and helpful internal figures, on the other hand of retaliating and persecuting internal figures, and are the first identifications which the ego develops.

The relation to internal figures interacts in manifold ways with the child's ambivalent relation to both parents as external objects. For to the introjection of external objects corresponds at every step the projection of internal figures on to the external world, and this interaction underlies the relation to the actual parents as well as the development of the super-ego. In consequence of this interaction, which implies an orientation outwards and inwards, there is a constant fluctuation between internal and external objects and situations. These fluctuations are bound up with the movement of the libido between different aims and objects, and thus the course of the Oedipus complex and the development of the super-ego are closely interlinked.

Though still over-shadowed by oral, urethral and anal libido, genital desires soon mingle with the child's oral impulses. Early genital desires, as well as oral ones, are directed towards mother and father. This is in line with my assumption that in both sexes there is an inherent unconscious knowledge of the existence of the penis as well as of the vagina. In the male infant, genital sensations are the basis for the expectation that his father possesses a penis which the boy desires according to the equation 'breast = penis'. At the same time, his genital sensations and impulses also imply the search for an opening into which to insert his penis, i.e. are directed towards his mother. The infant girl's genital sensations correspondingly prepare the desire to receive her father's penis into her vagina. It appears therefore that the genital desires for the penis of the father, which mingle with oral desires, are at the root of the early stages of the girl's positive and of the boy's inverted Oedipus complex.

The course of libidinal development is at every stage influenced by anxiety, guilt and depressive feelings. In some former papers (1935 and 1940) I have referred to the infantile depressive position

as the central position in early development. I would now rather suggest the following formulation: the core of infantile depressive feelings, i.e. the child's fear of the loss of his loved objects, as a consequence of his hatred and aggression, enters into his object relations and Oedipus complex from the beginning.

An essential corollary of anxiety, guilt and depressive feelings is the urge for reparation. Under the sway of guilt the infant is impelled to undo the effect of his sadistic impulses by libidinal means. Thus feelings of love, which co-exist with aggressive impulses, are reinforced by the drive for reparation. Reparative phantasies represent, often in minute details, the obverse of sadistic phantasies, and to the feeling of sadistic omnipotence corresponds the feeling of reparative omnipotence. For instance, urine and faeces represent agents of destruction when the child hates and gifts when he loves; but when he feels guilty and driven to make reparation, the 'good' excrements in his mind become the means by which he can cure the damage done by his 'dangerous' excrements. Again, both boy and girl, though in different ways, feel that the penis which damaged and destroyed the mother in their sadistic phantasies becomes the means of restoring and curing her in phantasies of reparation. The desire to give and receive libidinal gratification is thus enhanced by the drive for reparation. For the infant feels that in this way the injured object can be restored, and also that the power of his aggressive impulses is diminished, that his impulses of love are given free rein, and guilt is assuaged.

The course of libidinal development is thus at every step stimulated and reinforced by the drive for reparation, and ultimately by the sense of guilt. On the other hand, guilt which engenders the drive for reparation also inhibits libidinal desires. For when the child feels that his aggressiveness predominates, libidinal desires appear to him as a danger to his loved objects and must therefore be repressed.

(b) *The Boy's Oedipus Development*

So far I have outlined the early stages of the Oedipus complex in both sexes, and I shall now deal particularly with the boy's development. His feminine position—which vitally influences his attitude to both sexes—is arrived at under the dominance of oral, urethral and anal impulses and phantasies and is closely linked with his relation to his mother's breasts. If the boy can turn some of his love and libidinal desires from his mother's breast towards his father's penis, while retaining the breast as a good object, then his father's penis will figure in his mind as a good and creative organ which will give him libidinal gratification as well as give him children as it does to his mother. These feminine desires are always an inherent feature in the boy's development. They are at the root of

his inverted Oedipus complex and constitute the first homosexual position. The reassuring picture of his father's penis as a good and creative organ is also a precondition for the boy's capacity to develop his positive Oedipus desires. For only if the boy has a strong enough belief in the 'goodness' of the male genital—his father's as well as his own—can he allow himself to experience his genital desires towards his mother. When his fear of the castrating father is mitigated by trust in the good father, he can face his Oedipus hatred and rivalry. Thus the inverted and positive Oedipus tendencies develop simultaneously, and there is a close interaction between them.

There are good grounds for assuming that as soon as genital sensations are experienced, castration fear is activated. Castration fear in the male, according to Freud's definition, is the fear of having the genital attacked, injured or removed. In my view this fear is first of all experienced under the dominance of oral libido. The boy's oral-sadistic impulses towards his mother's breast are transferred to his father's penis, and in addition rivalry and hatred in the early Oedipus situation find expression in the boy's desire to bite off his father's penis. This arouses his fear that his own genital will be bitten off by his father in retaliation.

There are a number of early anxieties from various sources which contribute to castration fear. The boy's genital desires towards his mother are from the beginning fraught with phantastic dangers because of his oral, urethral and anal phantasies of attack on the mother's body. The boy feels that her 'inside' is injured, poisoned and poisonous; it also contains in his phantasy his father's penis which—owing to his own sadistic attacks on it—is felt as a hostile and castrating object and threatens his own penis with destruction.

To this frightening picture of his mother's 'inside'—which co-exists with the picture of his mother as a source of all goodness and gratification—correspond fears about the inside of his own body. Outstanding among these is the infant's fear of internal attack by a dangerous mother, father or combined parental figure in retaliation for his own aggressive impulses. Such fears of persecution decisively influence the boy's anxieties about his own penis. For every injury done to his 'inside' by internalized persecutors implies to him an attack too on his own penis, which he fears will be mutilated, poisoned or devoured from within. It is, however, not only his penis he feels he must preserve, but also the 'good' contents of his body, the 'good' faeces and urine, the babies which he wishes to grow in the feminine position and the babies which—in identification with the good and creative father—he wishes to produce in the male position. At the same time he feels impelled to

protect and preserve the loved objects which he internalized simultaneously with the persecuting figures. In these ways the fear of internal attacks on his loved objects is closely linked with castration fear and reinforces it.

Another anxiety contributory to castration fear derives from the sadistic phantasies in which his excrements have turned poisonous and dangerous. His own penis too, which is equated with these dangerous faeces, and in his mind is filled with bad urine, becomes therefore in his phantasies of copulation an organ of destruction. This fear is increased by the belief that he contains the 'bad' penis of his father, i.e. by an identification with the 'bad' father. When this particular identification gains in strength, it is experienced as an alliance with the bad internal father against his mother. In consequence, the boy's belief in the productive and reparative quality of his genital is diminished; he feels that his own aggressive impulses are reinforced and that the sexual intercourse with his mother would be cruel and destructive.

Anxieties of this nature have an important bearing on his actual castration fear and on the repression of his genital desires, as well as on the regression to earlier stages. If these various fears are excessive and the urge to repress genital desires is over-strong, later difficulties in potency are bound to arise. Normally such fears in the boy are counteracted by the picture of his mother's body as the source of all goodness (good milk and babies) as well as by his introjection of loved objects. When his love impulses predominate, the products and contents of his body take on the significance of gifts; his penis becomes the means of giving gratification and children to his mother and of making reparation. Also, if the feeling of containing the good breast of his mother and the good penis of his father has the upper hand, the boy derives from this a strengthened trust in himself which allows him to give freer rein to his impulses and desires. In union and identification with the good father he feels that his penis acquires reparative and creative qualities. All these emotions and phantasies enable him to face his castration fear and to establish the genital position securely. They are also the pre-condition for sublimated potency, which has an important bearing on the child's activities and interests; and at the same time the foundation is laid for the achievement of potency in later life.

(c) *The Girl's Oedipus Development*

I have already described the early stages of the girl's Oedipus development in so far as it is in line with the boy's development. I shall now point out some essential features which are specific to the girl's Oedipus complex.

As soon as genital sensations in the infant girl gain in strength, the receptive nature of her genital

organ prepares the desire to receive the penis.¹⁶ At the same time she has an unconscious knowledge that her body contains potential children whom she feels to be her most precious possession. The penis of her father as the giver of children, and equated to children, becomes the object of great desire and admiration for the little girl. This relation to the penis as a source of happiness and good gifts is enhanced by the loving and grateful relation to the good breast.

Together with the unconscious knowledge that she contains potential babies, the little girl has grave doubts as to her future capacity to bear children. On many grounds she feels at a disadvantage in comparison with her mother. In the child's unconscious the mother is imbued with magic power, for all goodness springs from her breast and the mother also contains the father's penis and the babies. The little girl—in contrast to the boy, whose hope for potency gains strength from the possession of a penis which can be compared with his father's penis—has no means of reassuring herself about her future-fertility. In addition, her doubts are increased by all the anxieties relating to the contents of her body. These anxieties intensify the impulses to rob her mother's body of her children as well as of the father's penis, and this in turn intensifies the fear lest her own inside be attacked and robbed of its 'good' contents by a retaliating external and internal mother.

Some of these elements are operative in the boy as well, but the fact that the girl's genital development centres on the feminine desire to receive her father's penis and that her main unconscious concern is for her imaginary babies, is a specific feature of the girl's development. In consequence, her phantasies and emotions are predominantly built round her inner world and inner objects; her Oedipus rivalry expresses itself essentially in the impulse to rob her mother of the father's penis and the babies; the fear of having her body attacked and her inner good objects injured or taken away by a bad retaliating mother plays a prominent and lasting part in her anxieties. This, as I see it, is the leading anxiety situation of the girl.

Moreover, while in the boy the envy of his mother (who is felt to contain the penis of his father and the babies) is an element in his inverted Oedipus complex, with the girl this envy forms part of her positive Oedipus situation. It remains an essential factor throughout her sexual and emotional development and has an important effect on her identification with her mother in the sexual relation with the father as well as in the maternal rôle.

The girl's desire to possess a penis and to be a boy is an expression of her bisexuality and is as

inherent a feature in girls as the desire to be a woman is in boys. Her wish to have a penis of her own is secondary to her desire to receive the penis, and is greatly enhanced by the frustrations in her feminine position and by the anxiety and guilt experienced in the positive Oedipus situation. The girl's penis envy covers in some measure the frustrated desire to take her mother's place with the father and to receive children from him.

I can here only touch upon the specific factors which underlie the girl's super-ego formation. Because of the great part her inner world plays in the girl's emotional life, she has a strong urge to fill this inner world with good objects. This contributes to the intensity of her introjective processes, which are also reinforced by the receptive nature of her genital. The admired internalized penis of her father forms an intrinsic part of her super-ego. She identifies herself with her father in her male position, but this identification rests on the possession of an imaginary penis. Her main identification with her father is experienced in relation to the internalized penis of her father, and this relation is based on the feminine as well as on the male position. In the feminine position she is driven by her sexual desires, and by her longing for a child, to internalize her father's penis. She is capable of complete submission to this admired internalized father, while in the male position she wishes to emulate him in all her masculine aspirations and sublimations. Thus her male identification with her father is mixed with her feminine attitude, and it is this combination which characterizes the feminine super-ego.

To the admired 'good' father in the girl's super-ego formation corresponds to some extent the 'bad' castrating father. Her main anxiety object, however, is the persecuting mother. If the internalization of a good mother, with whose maternal attitude she can identify herself, counterbalances this persecutory fear, her relation to the good internalized father becomes strengthened by her own maternal attitude towards him.

In spite of the prominence of the inner world in her emotional life, the little girl's need for love and her relation to people show a great dependence on the outer world. This contradiction is, however, only apparent, because this dependence on the outer world is reinforced by her need to gain reassurance about her inner world.

(d) *Some Comparisons with the Classical Concept of the Oedipus Complex*

I now propose to compare my views with those of Freud on certain aspects of the Oedipus complex, and to clarify some divergences to which my experience has led me. Many aspects of the Oedipus complex, on which my work fully confirms

¹⁶ The analysis of young children leaves no doubt as to the fact that the vagina is represented in the unconscious of the child. Actual vaginal masturbation in early child-

hood is much more frequent than has been assumed, and this is corroborated by a number of authors.

Freud's findings, have been to some extent implied in my description of the Oedipus situation. The magnitude of the subject, however, makes it necessary for me to refrain from discussing these aspects in detail, and I have to limit myself to clarifying some of the divergences. The following summary represents in my opinion the essence of Freud's conclusions about certain essential features of the Oedipus development.¹⁷

According to Freud, genital desires emerge and a definite object choice takes place during the phallic phase, which extends from about three to five years of age, and is contemporaneous with the Oedipus complex. During this phase 'only one kind of genital organ comes into account—the male. The primacy reached is, therefore, not a primacy of the *genital*, but of the *phallus*'. (1923 b ; 245.)

In the boy, 'the phallic stage of the genital organization succumbs to the threat of castration'. (1924 ; 271.) His super-ego, the heir of the Oedipus complex, is formed by the internalization of the parental authority. Guilt is the expression of tension between the ego and the super-ego. It is only when the super-ego has developed, that the use of the term 'guilt' is justified. Predominant weight is given by Freud to the boy's super-ego as the internalized authority of the father ; and, though in some measure he acknowledges the identification with the mother as a factor in the boy's super-ego formation, he has not expressed his views on this aspect of the super-ego in any detail.

With regard to the girl, in Freud's view her long 'pre-Oedipal attachment' to her mother covers the period before she enters the Oedipus situation. Freud also characterizes this period as 'the phase of exclusive attachment to the mother, which may be called the *pre-Oedipal* phase'. (1931 ; 286.) During her phallic phase, the girl's fundamental desires in relation to her mother, maintained with the greatest intensity, focus on receiving a penis from her. The clitoris represents in the little girl's mind her penis, clitoris masturbation is the expression of her phallic desires. The vagina is not yet discovered and will only play its part in womanhood. When the girl discovers that she does not possess a penis, her castration complex comes to the fore. At this juncture the attachment to her mother is broken off with resentment and hatred because her mother has not given her a penis. She also discovers that even her mother lacks a penis, and this contributes to her turning away from her mother to her father. She first turns to her father with the wish to receive a penis, and only subsequently with the desire to receive a child from him, 'the child taking the place of the

penis, in accordance with the old symbolic equation'. (1932 ; 164-5.) In these ways her Oedipus complex is ushered in by her castration complex.

The girl's main anxiety situation is the loss of love, and Freud connects this fear with the fear of the death of her mother.

The girl's super-ego development differs in various ways from the boy's super-ego development, but they have in common an essential feature, i.e. that the super-ego and the sense of guilt are sequels to the Oedipus complex.

Freud refers to the girl's motherly feelings derived from the early relation to her mother in the pre-Oedipal phase. He also refers to the girl's identification with her mother, derived from her Oedipus complex. But he has not linked these two attitudes, nor shown how the feminine identification with her mother in the Oedipus situation affects the course of the girl's Oedipus complex. In his view, while the girl's genital organization is taking shape, she values her mother predominantly in her phallic aspect.

I shall now summarize my own views on these essential issues. As I see it, the boy's and girl's sexual and emotional development *from early infancy onwards* includes genital sensations and trends, which constitute the first stages of the inverted and positive Oedipus complex ; they are experienced under the primacy of oral libido and mingle with urethral and anal desires and phantasies. The libidinal stages overlap from the earliest months of life onwards. The positive and inverted Oedipus tendencies are from their inception in close interaction. It is during the stage of genital primacy that the positive Oedipus situation reaches its climax.

In my view, infants of both sexes experience genital desires directed towards their mother and father, and they have an unconscious knowledge of the vagina as well as of the penis.¹⁸ For these reasons Freud's earlier term 'genital phase' seems to me more adequate than his later concept of the 'phallic phase'.

The super-ego in both sexes comes into being during the oral phase. Under the sway of phantasy life and of conflicting emotions, the child at every stage of libidinal organization introjects his objects—primarily his parents—and builds up the super-ego from these elements.

Thus, though the super-ego corresponds in many ways to the actual people in the young child's world, it has various components and features which reflect the phantastic images in his mind. All the factors which have a bearing on his object relations play a part from the beginning in the building-up of the super-ego.

The first introjected object, the mother's breast,

¹⁷ This summary is mainly derived from the following of Freud's writings : 1923 a, 1923 b, 1924, 1925, 1931, 1932. Except where this is explicitly indicated, the statements which follow are not literal quotations.

¹⁸ This knowledge exists side by side with the infant's unconscious, and to some extent conscious, knowledge of the existence of the anus which plays a more frequently observed part in infantile sexual theories.

forms the basis of the super-ego. Just as the relation to the mother's breast precedes and strongly influences the relation to the father's penis, so the relation to the introjected mother affects in many ways the whole course of super-ego development. Some of the most important features of the super-ego, whether loving and protective or destructive and devouring, are derived from the early maternal components of the super-ego.

The earliest feelings of guilt in both sexes derive from the oral-sadistic desires to devour the mother, and primarily her breasts (Abraham). It is therefore in infancy that feelings of guilt arise. Guilt does not emerge when the Oedipus complex comes to an end, but is rather one of the factors which from the beginning mould its course and affect its outcome.

I wish now to turn specifically to the boy's development. In my view, castration fear starts in infancy as soon as genital sensations are experienced. The boy's early impulses to castrate his father take the form of wishing to bite off his penis, and correspondingly castration fear is first experienced by the boy as the fear lest his own penis should be bitten off. These early castration fears are to begin with overshadowed by anxieties from many other sources, among which internal danger situations play a prominent part. The closer development approaches genital primacy, the more does castration fear come to the fore. While I thus fully agree with Freud that *castration fear is the leading anxiety situation in the male*, I cannot agree with his description of it as the *single factor* which determines the repression of the Oedipus complex. Early anxieties from various sources contribute all along to the central part which castration fear comes to play in the climax of the Oedipus situation. Furthermore, the boy experiences grief and sorrow in relation to his father as a loved object, because of his impulses to castrate and murder him. For in his good aspects the father is an indispensable source of strength, a friend and an ideal, to whom the boy looks for protection and guidance and whom he therefore feels impelled to preserve. His feelings of guilt about his aggressive impulses towards his father increase his urge to repress his genital desires. Again and again in the analyses of boys and men I have found that feelings of guilt in relation to the loved father were an integral element of the Oedipus complex and vitally influenced its outcome. The feeling that his mother too is endangered by the son's rivalry with the father, and that the father's death would be an irreparable loss to her, contributes to the strength of the boy's sense of guilt and hence to the repression of his Oedipus desires.

Freud, as we know, arrived at the theoretical conclusion that the father, as well as the mother, is an object of the son's libidinal desires. (Cf. his concept of the inverted Oedipus complex.) Moreover, Freud in some of his writings (among his case

histories particularly in the 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy', 1909) has taken account of the part which love for his father plays in the boy's positive Oedipus complex. He has, however, not given enough weight to the crucial rôle of these feelings of love, both in the development of the Oedipus conflict and in its passing. In my experience the Oedipus situation loses in power not only because the boy is afraid of the destruction of his genital by a revengeful father, but also because he is driven by feelings of love and guilt to preserve his father as an internal and external figure.

I will now briefly state my conclusions about the girl's Oedipus complex. The phase in which, according to Freud, the girl is exclusively attached to her mother already includes, in my view, desires directed towards her father and covers the early stages of the inverted and positive Oedipus complex. While therefore I consider this phase as a period of fluctuation between desires directed towards mother and father in all libidinal positions, there is no doubt in my mind as to the far-reaching and lasting influence of every facet of the relation to the mother upon the relation to the father.

Penis envy and castration complex are always inherent features in the girl's development. But they are very much reinforced by frustration of her positive Oedipus desires. Though the little girl at one stage assumes that her mother possesses a penis as a male attribute, this concept does not play nearly as important a part in her development as Freud suggests. The unconscious theory that her mother contains the admired and desired penis of the father underlies, in my experience, many of the phenomena which Freud described as the relation of the girl to the phallic mother.

The girl's oral desires for her father's penis mingle with her first genital desires to receive that penis. These genital desires imply the wish to receive children from her father, which is also borne out by the equation 'penis = child'. The feminine desire to internalize the penis and to receive a child from her father invariably precedes the wish to possess a penis of her own.

While I agree with Freud about the prominence of the fear of loss of love and of the death of the mother among the girl's anxieties, I hold that the fear of having her body attacked and her loved inner objects destroyed essentially contributes to her main anxiety situation.

FINAL REMARKS

Throughout my description of the Oedipus complex I have attempted to show the interdependence of certain major aspects of development. The sexual development of the child is inextricably bound up with his object relations and with all the emotions which from the beginning mould his attitude to mother and father. Anxiety, guilt and depressive feelings are intrinsic elements of the child's emotional life and therefore permeate

the child's early object relations, which consist of the relation to actual people as well as to their representatives in his inner world. From these introjected figures—the child's identifications—the super-ego develops and in turn influences the relation to both parents and the whole sexual development. Thus emotional and sexual development, object relations and super-ego development interact from the beginning.

The infant's emotional life, the early defences built up under the stress of the conflict between love, hatred and guilt, and the vicissitudes of the child's identifications—all these are topics which may well occupy analytic research for a long time to come. Further work in these directions should lead us to a fuller understanding of the personality, which implies a fuller understanding of the Oedipus complex and of sexual development as a whole.

REFERENCES

- FREUD S. (1909). (*Trans.* 1925.) 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy', *Collected Papers*, III, 149.
 — (1912). (*Trans.* 1925.) 'Contributions to the Psychology of Love: The Most Prevalent Form of Degradation in Erotic Life', *Collected Papers*, IV, 203.

- (1923 a). (*Trans.* 1927.) *The Ego and the Id* (Hogarth Press).
 — (1923 b). (*Trans.* 1924.) 'The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido', *Collected Papers*, II, 244.
 — (1924). (*Trans.* 1924.) 'The Passing of the Oedipus-Complex', *Collected Papers*, II, 269.
 — (1925). (*Trans.* 1927.) 'Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 8, 133.
 — (1926). (*Trans.* 1936.) *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (Hogarth Press).
 — (1931). (*Trans.* 1932.) 'Female Sexuality', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 13, 281.
 — (1932). (*Trans.* 1933.) *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (Hogarth Press).
 KLEIN, M. (1929). (*Trans.* 1929.) 'Personification in the Play of Children', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 10, 193.
 — (1932). (*Trans.* 1932.) *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* (Hogarth Press).
 — (1935). 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 16, 145.
 — (1936). 'Weaning', *On the Bringing Up of Children*, by Five Psycho-Analysts, ed. J. Rickman (Kegan Paul).
 — (1940). 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 21, 125.

THE CONCEPT OF TRAUMA IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL THEORY¹

By OTTO FENICHEL, LOS ANGELES

By way of introduction I shall go over some familiar ground and briefly summarize a number of fundamental facts from the general theory of the neuroses.

Neurosis is in the first place a motor irruption, unrecognized and undesired by the ego, of quantities of dammed-up excitation. The damming-up may be caused by an increase in influx during a given unit of time, as is the case in traumatic neuroses, or by a decrease in discharge (whether this is inhibited by fear of the external world or at the bidding of the super-ego), as is the case in the psycho-neuroses.

Hence arises a peculiar relation between neurosis and anxiety. Anxiety too, according to Freud (1926), is in the first instance a mode in which an increase in the tension arising from urgent needs is experienced. Later, however, it is 'harnessed' and turned to account by the ego when it judges a situation to be 'dangerous'. Thus both in the case of neurosis in general and of anxiety in particular the situation of origin is the same—namely a damming-up of excitation, with a relatively inadequate apparatus of discharge. This is in accordance with the important part played by anxiety in the psychology of the neuroses and with the fact that neuroses that are free from anxiety

produce anxiety as soon as they are prevented from making use of their symptoms; so that the latter can be regarded as a kind of defence against, or as a secondary and further modification of, anxiety. This will become clearer if we recall to our mind Freud's description (*ibid.*) of anxiety in traumatic states and of the way in which it is subsequently 'harnessed' by the ego.

It is only by the ego that anxiety can be felt as a quality of experience accompanied by a particular syndrome of somatic processes of discharge: 'the ego is the seat of anxiety' (Freud, *ibid.*; 23). But originally the ego—or rather the mental apparatus which is not yet differentiated into ego and id but which fulfils the functions of what will later become an ego—experiences anxiety *passively*, as something that sets in automatically if id-impulses can find no outlet, and a damming-up of a need has taken place. In that case anxiety can be regarded as a 'discharge in spite of everything' of the dammed-up excitation (which is denied outlet through the skeletal musculature) along the pathway of the vegetative nervous system; or rather, it can be regarded as the way in which the ego experiences a 'discharge in spite of everything' of this kind.

The so-called 'harnessing' of this powerful

¹ [This paper, written some years ago, now appears for the first time in English. Its original publication was in *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, 23 (1937), 339.]

affect by the help of the gradual formation of the ego's function of judgement is a special case of the ego's general function of acting as the representative of the external world. The development of the pleasure principle into the reality principle—that is, from the motor standpoint, the replacement of mere acts of discharge by actions, the acquisition of a certain degree of tolerance of tension, the 'binding' of primitive reactive impulses by anticathexes—presupposes not only a mastery over the somatic apparatus but also the formation of the function of judgement, i.e. a capacity for forming some sort of anticipation of the future through the notion of 'experimenting', which is the essence of thought in general. The expression 'danger' means that the judging ego declares that a particular situation which is not yet a traumatic one might become a traumatic one. To say that the ego develops the function of a protective barrier against stimuli from the external world means no more than that it develops a capacity for judging dangers, that is, for foreseeing wherever possible any traumatic excess of excitation and so for avoiding it. Such a judgement, however, must evidently set up in the id conditions similar to those of the appearance of the traumatic situation itself, though to a less degree. And this too must necessarily be experienced by the ego as anxiety. Thus the *expedient* component of anxiety arising during danger (or supposed danger)—the putting into action of measures of defence—is due to the judging ego. The *inexpedient* component, which sometimes frustrates the measures of defence by paralysis, must be attributed to the fact that the ego does not produce anxiety but merely makes use of it and that it has no more expedient means at its disposal, since its judgement of 'danger' creates conditions that are 'analogous to trauma'.

Let us proceed at once to consider the case where this analogy is carried too far. It may happen, both where there is real danger and where there is neurotic anxiety, that the 'signal' is far from giving an impression of being a 'small dose' but that the subject behaves in the danger or supposed danger as though it was a traumatic situation. He reacts to the situation with a major attack of anxiety, with something that overwhelms the ego violently and entirely against its will, while it maintains an attitude of passivity. Clearly the ego's intention of giving a signal has failed. With that intention in view the ego has set something going which it cannot control. The condition which causes the intention of giving a signal to fail in this way is the presence of a damming-up of libido brought about by chronic inhibitions of discharge. This damming-up causes the freshly received anxiety-signal to act like a match in a barrel of gun-powder. (Cf. Fenichel, 1934 c.) That an anxiety attack in an anxiety hysteric is really analogous to a trauma may be seen too from the fact that it is followed by delayed attempts to

master it, corresponding exactly to those, for instance, that follow a motor accident. This has also been pointed out by Edoardo Weiss (1934) in a paper upon trauma, which in other respects, however, diverges so widely from my position that I shall make no further reference to it.

It is thus only this possibility—that what is intended as a guard against a traumatic state may in certain circumstances actually produce one—that makes it necessary for the ego to make arrangements for warding off the unpleasure of anxiety. It is obvious indeed that people will seek to avoid *any* anxiety, on the ground of its being unpleasurable; but the reality principle would necessarily approve, as a serviceable institution, an anxiety-signal which could be kept as small as possible and would be a protection against greater unpleasure. It is only the uncertainty as to whether the anxiety-signal may not produce greater and more disagreeable results than was intended that explains the immense expenditure of anticathexis which, as we know, is made in order to save anxiety.

For the sake of clarification, it must be added that anxiety is not the sole answer that can be made to the increase of excitation when discharge is relatively insufficient. There may also be phenomena due to the cessation of ego-functions—the organism's most primitive means of protection and one which may itself produce damming-up and so still further increase the tension (Kardiner 1932)—as well as powerful attempts of all sorts at 'discharges in spite of everything' acting not only in the domain of the vegetative system but also by the help of the skeletal musculature (including that of the larynx). What these processes cannot master all at once they seek to discharge or to bind subsequently by means of the notorious 'repetitions', whether in dreams or in waking life (Freud, 1920; 37). Ferenczi (1934) is certainly right in suggesting that normal dreams also perform this function. It is well known that *unexpectedness* increases the effect of a trauma. 'Anticipatory anxiety' lays up a store of anticathexis ready to bind and so to diminish any unbound quantities of excitation that may subsequently press for discharge (Freud, *ibid.*). The essence of the ego is anticipation of the future. Consequently, unexpected, unanticipated events are *a priori* liable to overwhelm the ego. Nevertheless I do not agree with Ferenczi when he says (*ibid.*) that anxiety corresponds to the feeling of inability to avoid the unpleasure of the trauma. What unpleasure? physical pain perhaps? This unpleasure is surely in fact already itself anxiety. Nor do I agree with him in regarding loss of consciousness as self-destruction by means of the death-instinct which has been preferred to patient toleration. I should rather regard it as an act of self-protection of a regressive kind—as it often is in other circumstances—a flight to the period before the differentiation of the ego. It may be doubted whether *all* vegetative

'discharges in spite of everything' should be subsumed under 'anxiety'. Nevertheless I think we should not be justified in entirely avoiding the term 'anxiety' in referring to traumatically determined vegetative unpleasure and in reserving it solely for the lesser degree of anxiety intentionally brought about by the ego, while speaking of the former case as 'fright' (Reik, 1929). This word does not picture the intensely unpleasurable sensations of a major attack of anxiety. On the other hand, it is true that the experience of fright is essentially related to trauma: the vegetative sensations correspond to a sudden and unexpected influx of excitations.

After this long introduction I will return to my point of departure. It appears, then, that the excessive tension which is the situation of origin of every neurosis can be determined either by a true trauma or by damming-up through a defence against instinct. The second possibility is the more familiar analytically but the more complicated theoretically, since in this second case it is necessary in addition to study the psychogenesis of defence against instinct. I shall therefore begin with the first alternative.

It is easily intelligible that a shattering experience (that is, sudden and unexpected, powerful, external stimuli in all the sensory fields) cannot be mastered immediately. I may remark here that the best opportunities for self-observation of the effects of a trauma in small doses are afforded by experiences which are not absolutely but relatively shattering, experiences which are not of vital concern but which merely produce too much excitation in a given unit of time—such as falling down or even simply stumbling. These effects include a regression of the entire muscular activity including that of the larynx—I may recall Miss Searl's paper (1933) upon screaming in children, which is certainly highly relevant in this connection—a regression varying from actions to purely senseless acts of discharge in the form of vegetative sensations and to delayed attempts at mastery by means of repetition in dreams and phantasies.

Is it possible for a sudden and unexpected increase in excitation from *within* to produce effects similar to those seen in these cases of an increase of *external* excitation? A sudden onset of *pain* is also answered by a cessation of ego-functions (by fainting), by aimless muscular (vocal) and vegetative acts of discharge and by delayed attempts at mastery;² but it is not so easy to say whether in this case we should speak of 'external' or 'internal' sources of excitation. How is it in the case of the instincts? According to Freud (1915 a), excitations flow into the organism from two sources: from outside through the sensations and from inside through the instincts. In the first place it must be remarked that this distinction still has a

meaning even if Landmark (1935) is right in warning us to be cautious in our formulation and to bear in mind that the biological modification that we call instinctual tension is not an internal sensation in contradistinction to external sensation, but only a sensitization (not perceptible as such) which determines whether succeeding sensations (either internal or external) shall be experienced as having a quality of 'incitement' or not. For the excitation, even though it always proceeds from sensations, may sometimes be determined by the nature of the object perceived but sometimes by what the object perceived stimulates us to do or to desire.

At first sight the possibility of an excitation having a quantitatively traumatic effect seems less in the case of an instinctual excitation than in that of a sensory excitation. For instinctual excitations are as a rule processes which increase by degrees, and which lead in a biological rhythm to the act of satisfaction, after which the instinctual tension disappears, to arise again gradually only after an interval of quiescence. Instinctual tension, so long as hope is present of an eventual relaxation of tension, so long as the unpleasure of tension is in imagination confronted by this hope, is in itself pleasurable and has the character of fore-pleasure. At all events this is true of the sexual instincts, and it may well be that in their case we are merely able to see more clearly what is in fact also present in the other instincts. Only under two conditions, so it seems, can instinctual tension lead to traumatic states and true 'instinctual danger' emerge (in the sense of 'danger' that I have defined above):

(1) If the external world threatens to intervene in an unpleasurable way in the process of the instinctual action. In that case the instinctual demand is not in itself a danger but is only a danger because it involves an external danger.

(2) If there is a chronic or acute inadequacy in the apparatus for producing instinctual satisfaction (whether the inadequacy is of somatic or of psychic origin), so that satisfaction is unattainable and consequently hope of satisfaction has already vanished during the excitation itself. And this is the case that deserves special study.

Human beings are born in a far more helpless condition than other mammals. Neither their perceptual apparatus nor their motor apparatus are fully formed. At the time of their birth they still possess no ego; they are not only exposed to the effects of the external world but are not even in a position to satisfy their emerging needs. Since that part of the external world which replaces their ego in the task of taking care of them cannot be always automatically at their service, traumatic situations are biologically unavoidable. It is undoubtedly these traumatic situations which

² It is also possible, precisely on the analogy of anxiety, to speak of the pain being 'harnessed' by the ego and of a 'pain-signal' designed to initiate measures of defence.

make *possible* the view, which is so essential in the subsequent formation of neuroses and character, that instincts are dangers. For the judgement 'danger' is always the recollection of a traumatic state that has once been experienced.

Melanie Klein (1932) and other English authors were the first to attribute to this fact the essential aetiological factor of the neuroses. The social factor in their aetiology was thus under-estimated and the neuroses were 'biologized'. On this view the ego, recollecting instinctual tensions in which the assistance of the external world was absent (or in which, owing to the unattainability of the instinctual aims, the assistance was bound to be absent), becomes an enemy of its instincts and seeks to repress them in order to avoid a repetition of such situations. Now it is certainly true that later experiences can only lead to neuroses if certain biological peculiarities of the mental apparatus are given. But the later actual warding-off of the instincts is not explained by being traced back to the first occasion on which instinctual tensions were felt as disagreeable. The neuroses—and this was precisely the discovery made by psychoanalysis—are consequences of these later experiences. Anna Freud (1936; 63 and 147 ff.), too, believes that it is necessary to assume the existence of a 'fear of quantity of instincts' in general, which might undo the organization of the ego, a 'primary hostility of the ego to instincts'; she does not, indeed, regard this as the *sole* motive for the development of a defence against instinct but as one which exists in addition to 'realistic anxiety' and to expectations of loss of love and of castration, which are subsequently internalized as moral anxiety. No doubt she also has in mind memory-traces of the first traumatic states occurring while the apparatus for satisfaction was inadequate. I shall return to this point, but I will here remark that *after* that apparatus was developed human beings would have no real grounds for such anxiety. It would merely be that, since what is old is always retained alongside what is new in mental development, they would always, when at some later period they developed fear for other reasons, somehow or other at the same time mobilize the ancient memory-traces once again.

I shall begin by bringing up still more material to remind us what a number of phenomena even in the ordinary psychoneuroses, particularly in the nature of defensive anxieties, speak in favour of the influence of memories of traumas in the strict sense. From fear of the consequences of sexual activity, the neurotic has warded off portions of his sexuality in an unlucky way, has disconnected them from his ego and has thus retained them in his unconscious in an infantile shape. The cause of this warding-off, or rather of the belief in the evil results of instinctual activities which was its motive, was to begin with attributed theoretically to traumatic experiences. Subsequently, and

especially in connection with the psychoneuroses, the further factor emerged of the effects of chronic sexual prohibitions on the part of the educational environment. The warding-off of instinct was now extended over the whole history of childhood and the few 'traumatic' experiences were merely regarded as being more marked episodes in the course of a continuous process.

Accordingly, analysis shows that the evil which it is intended to obviate by the avoidance of sexual actions and by the warding-off of instinct is as a rule a threat from without. The putting into operation of instinctual prohibitions can be derived historically from common-sense experiences—a burnt child dreads the fire—but also from the situation of a child which is itself not yet capable of action. Since it stands in need of 'ego-assistance' from the external world, its first general notion of a danger threatening from without is the dread of loss of love, the dread of having been or being about to be abandoned, which at this period also implies loss of ego-feeling. This first general picture of anxiety is then filled out with *concrete* pictures of what it is that bad objects in the external world can do to it. The 'animistic misunderstanding of the world' is of decisive importance in the formation of these fears of physical injury, which subsequently develop into the fear of castration.

To these 'danger situations of the immature ego' (Searl, 1930), loss of love and physical injury, which threaten from without, there is then added a closely related threat from within. The ego's dread that a traumatic state which it has once experienced may return is the true content of every anxiety. An experience of the dreaded vegetative sensations can therefore lead at a very early age to a general fear of excitations in the child's own inside. So that sexual sensations, for instance, and aggressive ones as well, can only be experienced as pleasurable up to a certain degree of excitation: beyond that they become charged with anxiety. The bridge that connects fear of the external world as it is misunderstood during the child's pregenital period with fear of excitation in the inside of its own body is the mechanism of introjection, by means of which the child living in its pregenital world of thought seeks to escape from the dangers which threaten it in the external world. The experience of the dreaded sensations is then unconsciously attributed to the activity of an 'introjected bad object'.

I will now consider some examples of this anxiety and then examine its relation to trauma.

We know that the anxiety hysteric who avoids certain situations in a phobic manner uses that means for keeping out of the way of temptation and especially for avoiding sexual (and aggressive) excitation. But we also know from analysis that what he is afraid of are the dangers which threaten him from the external world or from his super-ego

in the event of his performing an instinctual action. And if some anxiety hysterics flirt with their anxiety-situations and even seek them out in mild degrees, and in short exhibit an ambivalent attitude to them, that may either represent an attempt at cure on the over-compensating pattern of Demos-thenes or may simply show that the aggressively felt sexual situation, which is unconsciously meant by the anxiety-situation, is desired by the id though at the same time repudiated by the ego from fear of punishment. So that here there is as yet no proof that instinctual excitation is feared as such, though that might be the case. There are, however, other phenomena which show it more clearly.

I will quote a case in which a pathological incapacity to experience sexual excitation beyond a certain degree without its changing round into traumatic anxiety was exhibited not in a region of the ego which had an unconscious sexual meaning but in the region of sexuality itself. I have described the case elsewhere (Fenichel, 1934 b) in these words: 'He suffered from an acute libidinal disturbance. If he copulated with a woman, he began the copulation in a normal manner and felt normal enjoyment until the excitation reached a certain degree. Then, often before but sometimes after insertion of the penis, a sudden reversal would occur. He no longer felt pleasure but intense unpleasure of a general kind, did not know what to do and was 'angry' with the woman because he thought she ought instantly to take some action which would get him out of his disagreeable position.' He then further transformed the general unpleasure into a masochistic, motor restlessness or into tormenting boredom, which was found to be a tonic binding of this motor restlessness. The unpleasure had the significance of an 'anxiety-signal': if he were to allow the sexual excitation to proceed further, then, evidently in connection with its aggressive tinge, a 'traumatic state' would emerge. By means of his restlessness and by means of his appeal for help to the object (a point to which I shall return later), he avoided this emergence. But the true content of his (ostensibly well founded) fear was not castration or loss of love but this: he could tolerate sexual excitation only up to a certain degree of intensity; from that point onwards it was no longer increasing enjoyment concentrated more and more upon his genitals but a vegetative attack accompanied by anxiety and unpleasure.

In another paper (Fenichel, 1934 a) I have described the remarkable behaviour of a frigid woman: 'The patient was not entirely without excitation, but the excitation disappeared when it had reached a certain height. It was not hard to show that the patient was afraid of the increase in her own excitation. She had had a bad habit when she was a child in her gymnastics class. When she was swinging with her hands holding the rings, she

used as a regular thing to leave go suddenly and fall to the ground. Kindly remonstrances and punishments from the mistress were equally without effect. Now the patient was peculiarly susceptible (in other circumstances as well as in this one) to equilibrium-erotism. There can thus be no doubt that while she was swinging she had particularly strong erotic sensations and corresponding phantasies. Her sudden leaving-go was thus a precursor of her frigidity. When the excitation had reached a certain height, she was *obliged* to leave go, however much she might want to hold on, because an increase in the sexual excitation would have involved something happening that was too bad.' For our present purposes it is of less interest to learn that this something was bed-wetting or rather a fear of being punished for bed-wetting. This seems, indeed, to be the typical meaning in such cases; and the fear of a person's own excitation, represented as fear of an explosion, of bursting, of falling down, etc. (especially in subjects of the female sex), seems always to be linked to the idea of losing urine or faeces. (I may remark in parenthesis that in the event of excessive excitation *all* the apparatus of discharge are set in motion, including, regressively, the anal-urethral ones. To lose control over one's ego means losing control over the sphincters as well. The fear of this is justified in so far as the 'expectation of trauma' is justified: even adults wet and dirty themselves in states of anxiety and fright, or at least have an urge to do so.) For our present purposes it is more important to notice that the anxiety was experienced not as fear of punishment but as fear of excitation, as an incapacity to allow the excitation to proceed further.

These two examples show nothing out of the ordinary: this form of sexual disturbance is of course of everyday occurrence among neurotics. I therefore proceed.

Another woman patient had an obsessional impulse to pull open the doors on the Underground railway and jump out. This again is not an uncommon symptom. It signifies in a typical fashion the avoidance and the carrying through in spite of everything of dreaded sado-masochistic phantasies (Freud, 1926; 164 n.). And this was also so in the present case, where the unconscious sexual aim was to be beaten. (The aggressive component in the sexuality of such patients is always striking.) A more exhaustive analysis, however, showed the *form* in which the avoidance and the irruption in spite of everything were bound in the symptom; and this was exactly as with the swinging in the last case. The rapid movement on the Underground train, with its vibration, produced sexual excitation in the patient, to which, to begin with, she blissfully surrendered (with unconscious phantasies). But this was so only up to a certain height of excitation. Then came the command: 'Now you must get

out at any price'—get out of the Underground train which was causing the excitation, that is, get out of the excitation itself. If it went any further, a traumatic state would develop. (If one gets out of a moving Underground train, one *falls*. The vegetative sensations of the traumatic state are sensations of the sense of equilibrium and of space. The neurotic dread of falling is a fear of the same thing. If a person jumps out or jumps down anywhere from fear of excitation, what he is warding off returns to him in the very process of warding-off.)

At this point perhaps I may be allowed a brief excursus on something that is closely allied to the fear of falling, namely claustrophobia. Not long ago an extraordinarily good clinical study by Lewin (1935) demonstrated the unconscious sexual wishes which are warded off by the typical content of this strange neurosis. They are sexual phantasies, which are based upon the patient's unconscious identification of himself with an embryo in the womb, and which receive their particular form as a result of infantile sexual wishes in regard to the womb and of the child's phantasies of intrauterine existence. In a review of this paper (Fenichel, 1935) I pointed out that the path that leads from the warding-off of phantasies of this kind to the clinical picture of claustrophobia is especially facilitated by two physiological circumstances. In the first place, being shut up is experienced by the patient above all as an interference with movement. Such an interference, however, seems in itself and quite generally to favour the development of anxiety states, in that the external interference with movements of discharge increases the damming-up of instinct; so the *idea* of an interference with movement naturally operates in the same way as an *actual* interference. Secondly, the feeling of anxiety goes along physiologically with the sensation of being 'hemmed in'. So that, in a reverse way, an external constriction (or the idea of one) can facilitate the reproduction of the whole syndrome of anxiety. I should now like to add to these a third factor. Being shut in is *not* felt so oppressively, if the subject feels that he is able to break out. But the anxiety becomes intensified to the highest degree if the situation arises of having suddenly to leave the place and not being able to. Those who suffer from anxiety in trains, ships or aeroplanes declare that the worst of it lies in the impossibility of getting out if they want to, and they get round it, for instance, on a train journey by travelling from station to station. These anxieties are constructed on the same model as the Underground railway anxiety which I have been describing. The excitatory process is projected on to the vehicle in which the subject is travelling; and the need to escape suddenly from a place in which he is enclosed is a need to escape from his own excitation if it has reached a certain height.

In this connection it may further be remarked that people with increased or repressed equilibrium-erotism are particularly liable to anxieties and sensations of this kind. Owing, moreover, to the connection between these vegetative excitations, determined as they are by sensations of equilibrium, and anxiety, various forms of sea-sickness of organic origin are closely related to these same anxieties—whether because people with such anxieties are more inclined to sea-sickness or, conversely, because the experience of sea-sickness stirs up the memory of the anxieties and operates like a trauma that recalls primal scenes.

It is easy to demonstrate that what is feared in an excessive excitation is some kind of 'collapse of the ego'. One of my patients used to produce motor-car anxiety only when some one other than himself was acting as driver. 'Why should I be afraid', he said, 'when I can put on the brakes and stop at any moment?' Thus it is loss of voluntary control over the subject's own ego which is dreaded in vehicles that proceed independently of the passenger's wishes, in places that cannot be left at will and in sexual processes that rise to an involuntary orgasm. And there seems no difficulty now in assigning the point at which the sexual process ceases to be enjoyable for these patients and becomes unpleasurable. Reich (1927) has shown in his analysis of the normal and pathological course of sexual excitation that a phase of voluntary movements is succeeded by a phase of involuntary spasms of the pelvic muscles and of concentration of the sexual process in the genitals. This latter phase, in which the sexual process can no longer be voluntarily interrupted without serious unpleasure, is the *sine qua non* of an economically satisfactory discharge in the orgasm. This 'loss of the ego' at the climax of sexual excitation is normally also the climax of pleasure. Some egos—those, according to Reich, which are 'orgastically impotent'—do not experience this pleasure; in their case it changes over into fear of loss of control over the ego³ and into anxiety.

Before considering the reasons for this change-over, I should like to point out that beginnings of this fear of the subject's own excitation can be seen in many other forms of neurotic anxiety, irrespective of the fact that in their content they are also at the same time fears of castration or of loss of love. The obsessional neurotic, for instance, makes a specially great expenditure of anticathexis upon 'isolation', is careful that ideas and the sum of emotion belonging to them shall be kept apart, and lays the emphasis of his personality (from fear of his instincts) upon the world of words and concepts which lies remote from instincts—a world into which, incidentally, the instincts that he has warded off follow him, turning an instinctual conflict, perhaps, into an obsessive doubt. In all this he is showing his fear of loss of self-control, a

³ In anal erotics loss of control over the ego is equated with loss of control over the sphincters.

fear which among other things makes free association so hard for him. The endeavour to fit the whole universe into systems and to carry out everyday actions in accordance with a prescribed and formulated programme always has as its aim the avoidance of what is sudden and unexpected, the prevention of any loss of control by the ego. In the case of these obsessional neurotic characters, too, the ego's dread of instinct seems to be unspecific, to radiate out from sexual prohibitions of a particular kind over sexuality in general—as is to be seen with children at the age of puberty who incline to asceticism (cf. A. Freud, 1936; 167). Again, a patient of a more hysterical type filled her whole existence with restless energy which drove her into perpetual activity, into constantly starting up some new undertaking and into asking ceaselessly what she was to do now. Analysis revealed that the cause of this mania for activity on the part of her ego was a general dread of spontaneous processes overpowering her ego. Another patient, an intellectual, had to a great extent built up his life upon reaction-formations against an early dread of stupidity, by seeking to prove himself a clever teacher. He displayed the reactive quality both of his success in life and of his sexual experiences by small phobic manifestations, such as a fear of swimming in deep water, a fear of passing beyond the forest-belt on high mountains, and a fear of certain forms of sport, all of which had in common a fear of plunging into something greater than himself, which might wash his ego away like a flood or blow it away like a wind. It was no accident that this patient's earliest anxiety in childhood, which came to light during analysis, was a fear of death. The phenomenon of neurotic fear of death is in itself highly complex and may be of various types and it is easy to convince oneself, too, that Freud (1923) is right in asserting that it has something to do with the relation of the ego to its super-ego, with the dread of losing the protection of the super-ego. Nevertheless, besides this it seems to have a simpler sense. Death seems to be thought of as something that is powerful and unescapable, something that overwhelms the poor little ego and makes it its plaything. The neurotic fear of death is fear of excitation washing away the control of the ego (Reich). Here too belong (what are also insisted upon by Reich) the frequent anxiety-pictures of bursting, of being washed away, and particularly of falling down, as well as of other physical sensations. In one case, a fear of going mad, accompanied by a fear of pains and physical sensations, also turned out to be a fear of the patient's own excitation, intensified by his mistaken belief that he was the only person who had sexual sensations. (For just as adults try to cling to the illusion that children have no sexual sensations, so many children think that such 'bad' things as sexual sensations occur only in children and not in adults.) As regards hypochondria,

which is related to the point we are now discussing—fear of processes occurring inside the body—I will recall what I have already said, to the effect that the experience of these dreaded sensations is often attributed unconsciously to the activity of an introjected object.

Are these phenomena, then, evidence that *before* the fear of castration and loss of love, *before* the recognition of dangers in the external world, there was present already another fear which has left these traces behind—a fear by the ego of the *quantity* of its instincts in general, a primary hostility to instinct on the part of the ego? In my opinion such a notion needs a thorough discussion, which will take us back to our problem as to the nature of trauma.

The involuntary phase of sexual excitation and the 'traumatic state', however greatly they may differ—the latter being the climax of unpleasure and the former the climax of pleasure in human life—, have nevertheless one thing in common, namely the fact that in both of them the ego is swept along and overwhelmed by a biological process which occurs without its having any say in the matter. If, then, we were to assume the existence of this primitive hostility to instinct on the part of the ego, the following question would suggest itself: on what does it depend whether or not the dread felt by every ego of the full quantity of its instincts is overcome sufficiently to make it possible to enjoy an orgasm? It seems more profitable to begin, rather, by doubting the primitive character of such a fear, to assume that the capacity for enjoying the loss of the ego in an orgasm is normal and to investigate the findings of analysis in the case of people who suffer from a disturbance of that capacity.

One can think of two kinds of events which might be responsible for such disturbances, and which shade off into one another.

(1) They might be due to real instinctual prohibitions, or to imaginary ones arising from a projective and magical misunderstanding of the world. For the idea of danger threatening from without in the event of an instinctual activity will not merely induce the ego to take defensive measures against the instinct; these defensive measures will also result in the ego blocking the excitation's normal path of discharge. The excitation will consequently be forced physiologically along the vegetative paths and thus the ground will be prepared for the experience of anxiety and traumatic unpleasure; and this in turn will be interpreted by the ego as the realization of the dreaded annihilation of the ego by the external world. It may be that this interpretation is the clinical basis of what Jones (1927) has called 'aphanisis'. When once someone is in the condition of expecting castration, he interprets every experience of the powerlessness of his ego as the annihilation of his ego which he dreads; and

he can no longer enjoy a pleasure in which the ego loses itself, because every time the ego begins to lose itself the situation is felt as equivalent to completed castration.

(2) They might be due to the experience of traumas in the restricted sense, which at a given moment bring about higher quantities of excitation than the endogenous instinct could have produced spontaneously: such, above all, are seductions and primal scenes. They are a continuation of the inevitable traumas of the period of suckling which have already been described and which prepared the ground for the view that 'instincts are dangers'. We shall return again to the possibility of 'sexually traumatic neuroses' in the narrower sense; but at this point I will only remark that such experiences of primal scenes evidently increase the effect (which, as we have seen, is analogous to a trauma) of subsequent sexual prohibitions, while, *vice versa*, earlier sexual prohibitions are apt to lend a peculiarly traumatic character to subsequent primal scenes. The content of the sexual components involved seems not to be specific. I have already pointed out the importance of anal and equilibrium-erotism, and I will only add that in men the fear of the ego being overwhelmed is certainly greater if sexual wishes of a passive-feminine kind are prominent in their unconscious, and also that in both sexes sadistic sexual components operate in the same sense.

At this point we ought to raise the question of the behaviour of the 'dread of instinctual quantity' in the case of the destructive instincts. May it not perhaps be that, while what has just been said holds good of sexuality, the ego's fear of its own aggressive impulses is primary? This seems improbable. In the instances in question sexual and aggressive excitation are always found to be inextricably intertwined; those concerned are always people with a pregenital orientation and an impaired genitality. Theoretically, too, what is true of sexuality must apply to aggressivity: in the case of aggressiveness, too, if it is satisfied it will not be dammed up as it is when unsatisfied; a fit of rage exhausts its fury and subsides.

We thus come back to our starting-point. If the apparatus of discharge is inadequate, whether owing to the influx of excitation being too great (a trauma proper) or owing to the discharge of excitation being too small (sexual prohibitions), the result is the automatic development of severe anxiety, which may subsequently become modified into 'anxiety signals' or into neurotic symptoms that are free from anxiety. The experience of traumatic states lies at the back of all judgements of danger, that is, of all realistic anxiety; traumatic major anxiety, realistic anxiety and moral

anxiety constitute genetically a developmental series.

If, however, the apparatus of discharge is adequate, and if the ego has no grounds (owing to recollections of traumas and sexual prohibitions) for actively bringing an inadequacy about by means of defensive processes, then, as it seems to me, the ego which is primarily enticed by an especially intense pleasure into allowing its organization to be temporarily overwhelmed in an orgasm, has no more reason for dreading the quantity of instinct as such than it has for dreading sleep, for instance, in which its organization is also dissolved.⁴ (Fear of sleep is fear of death and, like it, goes back to fear, produced by traumas or instinctual prohibitions, of loss of the ego.)

For the sexual instincts are *periodic* processes. It is not true that the ego would be flooded by every instinct if it did not keep permanent defences against instinct in operation. It would in fact merely be driven into a *satisfying* instinctual action. After satisfaction the demand of the instinct would vanish, and would only re-appear by degrees after some lapse of time. It is only the damming-up due to incapacity to carry out the satisfying action that gives to sexuality the attribute of insatiability which is so much dreaded by the educator. We can find no grounds for thinking that things are otherwise in the case of the aggressive instincts.

Anna Freud (1936; 167) has described how in puberty there is a general inclination to ward off all instincts, irrespective of their quality, and her findings can certainly not be questioned. But a thorough study of pubertal life in other forms of society would be essential before we could be certain that the ego would necessarily feel such a degree of dread of its instincts, would necessarily have a *primary* hostility to them, if sexual education in childhood were different and the *possibilities* of satisfaction were less severely restricted. And it seems unlikely that this would be so, in view of the fact that it is precisely surrender to these instincts that brings the most intense pleasure to the ego in search of pleasure. Is it the *quantity* of the instincts that the ego is afraid of? Quantity, however, is better diminished by satisfaction than by defence. It is only owing to a pre-existing dread of experiencing this satisfaction that the different possibilities of a dissolution of the ego in adult life—on the one hand the *pleasurable* possibility of sexual satisfaction and of extreme fits of rage and on the other hand the *unpleasurable* possibility of the traumatic anxiety attack—come to be amalgamated into a single possibility and that the unpleasurable one.

The intimate connection between traumatic experiences of anxiety and intense sexual excita-

⁴ It is only in so far as anxiety in general is a result of the traumatic situations experienced by everyone during their period of suckling, that a trace of this dread of being

overwhelmed by one's own instincts survives in everyone, as a memory-trace of the period in which the apparatus of discharge was inadequate.

tion is also shown by a closer consideration of the safety-measures adopted by sufferers from these disorders.

What governs self-assurance in the first instance is, as we know, the factor of being loved. A baby feels its self-assurance diminished if it suffers loss of love and *vice versa*. At this level narcissistic and erotic needs still coincide completely. (Both go back as it were to a primary prototype in the shape of a desire for satiation.) Babies and people who are orally fixated have only one way of escape from all forms of mortification or loss of strength of their ego, namely clinging on to someone bigger than themselves. A child suffering from traumatic anxiety asks to be taken into its mother's bed, and the frightful thing about the primal scene is that its mother does not do so but leaves the child alone with its unmasterable excitation. Paradoxically, then, the best protection against the feeling of losing one's ego in an unpleasurable way and of being swept away by something bigger than oneself is the feeling of being able to hide one's ego in a pleasurable way in something bigger than oneself. The question is what determines whether this bigger thing shall be felt as hostile or protective. My patient who suffered from boredom (see page 37) sought protection from his fear of sexual excitation in oral-sexual actions by his sexual partner, whom he expected to take over his activity; if she failed to do so he got angry and by warding off this aggressive impulse intensified his feeling of being destroyed internally. There is thus a remarkable identity of opposites: the sexual experience which is feared and the sexual experience which is to serve as a protection. The fear of the act of surrender to the experience can be overcome by a phantasy of the surrender already completed. We know this from patients who are haunted by oral-sadistic conflicts. A fear of being devoured is warded off by a phantasy of having been devoured (a longing to be in the womb); a fear of devouring is warded off by a phantasy of having devoured (e.g. in women the fear of orally robbing a penis is warded off by the phantasy of a girl being a phallus). A patient after an acute anxiety-attack felt as his first phobic requirement the unfulfillable claustrophobic demand: 'You must never again go indoors, you must always stop in the open air.' But he described the blissful pleasure he felt when, after overcoming the anxiety, he went into a room and lay down in bed and was so able to feel at rest at last in the room and the bed—inside his mother and protected by her. It is patients suffering from fear of death who in different quantitative circumstances are capable of blissful pleasure in giving way to fatigue and in gradually losing consciousness in sleep.

If, then, we find patients who suffer from sexual disturbances of this kind constantly seeking out the conditions which cause their anxiety, namely direct or symbolic sexual excitation, we shall feel

no more puzzled than when we find phobic patients flirting with their anxiety-determinants. Their id drives them on, their ego drives them back. Their 'repetition' is not 'beyond the pleasure principle' but the consequence of the fresh somatic production of sexual desire. They are constantly *striving* towards pleasure; but their ego, under the influence of the external world (that is, of recollections of traumas and sexual prohibitions), invariably puts the same obstacle in the way, which in turn, for physiological reasons, always occasions the same unpleasurable result. Moreover, the repetition in the transference of the unpleasurable passing of the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1920; 18) seems to be of the same kind. The demand for repetition is not necessarily beyond the pleasure principle, but arises from the Oedipus wish which has not yet been disposed of and is still striving towards pleasure. The fact that the *failure* is also repeated corresponds to an intervention on the part of the ego (attached as it is to the external world) in the nature of an anxiety signal: 'Remember what happened to you the other time!' The constant pressure of sexual desire results in the endeavour to avoid a repetition producing—a repetition.

But, it will be asked, cannot the repetition of the anxiety situation be explained also in another way, namely (on the analogy of the repetition symptoms in traumatic neuroses and in children's play) as an endeavour to gain subsequent control over excitation which had been unmasterable in the first instance, by means of a later, active repetition set in motion by the ego? Certainly. These two explanations are not in the least contradictory: they are complementary. A repetition which has as its purpose a subsequent discharge and binding must also in the last resort have as its aim the avoidance of unpleasure, and this is in fact ultimately achieved. It must be that the re-experiencing of the unpleasure of the traumatic experience is an unpleasure relatively less than the toleration of the continuously 'tonic' disturbance of unmastered quantities of excitation.

A number of patients who in this fashion constantly seek out sexual excitations that lead to anxiety nevertheless succeed, as I have said, owing to certain quantitative relations, in attaining a relative release of tension after their great anxiety. We have here, presumably, an economic determinant for the occurrence of the paradoxical pleasure in anxiety. It is a familiar fact that in the normal sexual process the excited tension which precedes the release of tension is itself pleasurable, probably in connection with an anticipation in phantasy of the subsequent end-pleasure. If someone in whom sexual excitation always turns into anxiety nevertheless arrives eventually at a relative release of tension and if this experience impresses itself on him, he may well come at last to feel the anxiety itself as a fore-

pleasure and to approve of it as the only door open to him that leads to a relative end-pleasure. This, incidentally, is by no means the only or the most frequently chosen method by which the ego can attempt a secondary warding-off of this anxiety. There are numbers of individual variations in the conditions intended to exclude or reduce anxiety (e.g. perverse ones), which, so long as they are fulfilled, make it possible in spite of everything to obtain relative, though never economically sufficient, satisfaction.

I shall now return once again to the distinction between traumatic neuroses and psychoneuroses from which we started, in order to show its relative nature.

Though it may be true that in the case of the former category the influx of excitation is too great and in that of the latter category the discharge of excitation is too small, yet the fact cannot be overlooked that in practice neuroses represent combinations of both possibilities. The so-called traumatic neuroses 'proper', comprising losses of ego-function, anxiety and other vegetative states, as well as epileptic reactions and acts and sensations in the nature of subsequent repetitions (which have unfortunately been little studied hitherto), are certainly never completely uninfluenced by the subject's instinctual conflicts. The discussion on *Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses* (1919) gave examples enough of the way in which a trauma causes old infantile sexual conflicts to flare up again, whether because the trauma is unconsciously regarded as castration and consequently upsets the balance between the repressed instincts and the defensive forces, or because it operates as a temptation for unconscious sadistic instincts. On the other hand, it is possible to regard the psychoneuroses quite generally as a species of traumatic neuroses, in so far as the motive for the warding-off of instinct which leads to its damming-up is always in the last resort anxiety and in so far as anxiety (that is, the judgement that there is a danger) is a kind of recollection of a traumatic state that has once been experienced. But among the psychoneuroses a number of cases stand out (with symptomatologies covering every form of neurosis), which display in a peculiar sense a combination with the traumatic neuroses. There are cases in which the operative sexual defences have attained their effectiveness owing to particular infantile sexual traumas (real seductions or primal scenes). In their symptoms are to be found not only a condensation, of the sort I have described, of ideas of castration or loss of love with self-perceptions of the subject's own dreaded states of excitation, but also a competition between irruptions in spite of everything of repressed instincts and repetitions of the traumas, to which repetitions the function must be ascribed of bringing about a gradual subsequent diminution of the excitation.

Those who suffer from neuroses of this kind which can be described as combinations of psycho-neuroses and traumatic neuroses, are worse off than traumatic neurotics proper on account of the physiological properties of sexual excitation. A person who has suffered an external trauma, let us say a motor accident, with his instincts relatively little involved, will have dreams about the accident for some time, will be unable to drive in a car, will begin to tremble at the sight of one, and so on until the discharge of the quantities of excitation that could not be dealt with has been achieved and the dammed-up excitation 'abreacted'. After a certain time the whole thing passes off. What has become of the 'shakers' who filled the streets of the big towns during the first years after the last war? The shaking has ceased. But if the trauma is of such a kind that it has caused the ego to make the judgement 'sexual excitation, or rather the loss of ego involved in it, is dangerous', then this judgement will induce the ego to interfere every time with the normal sexual process. That process will then be diverted from the genitals into the vegetative nervous system and so once more confirm the ego's incurable mistake about the danger of sexual excitation. The fact that sexual excitation after it has calmed down is ceaselessly renewed from somatic sources results in a neurosis of this kind never coming to rest. It has become caught in a vicious circle. Mastery of the excitation can never be subsequently obtained, because every attempt at mastering it leads to fresh traumatic experiences. It is as though every time the person who had the motor accident makes up his mind at last to get into a car again—he has a fresh motor accident.

There are neuroses which give a stronger impression of a vain, life-long struggle for a subsequent mastery of excitations arising from the primal scene than of a revolt against the defensive forces on the part of instincts that have been warded off out of fear of castration. In place of a case history I should like to bring forward an instance from literature.

I have in mind Céline's *Voyage au bout de la nuit*, a remarkable work and one, as it seems to me, of high artistic merit. The critics gave the most varied judgements upon this strange novel. Most frequently it was described as a piece of social criticism. It gives a moving picture of the hopelessness of the individual in the chaos of the contemporary social order and of the desperate position in which mankind find themselves in the conditions—such as war and colonial exploitation—which they themselves set in motion but which continue to operate like forces of nature. But a reader who is well-informed psychologically soon gets an impression that such a view of the work only touches its surface. It cannot account even superficially for the circumstance that Nature itself is portrayed in such a fearful light nor can it explain

the romantic and fantastic elements, such as the author's uncanny doubles. One has a feeling that in these pages deep unconscious impulses are struggling for expression. The strange effect of the book resembles that produced by the works of Kafka and suggests that a similar interpretation may be possible. In Kafka's case no doubt we are faced with a moving portrayal, drawn from internal sources, of schizophrenic experiences. On the same analogy, may it not be that what is revealed to us by Céline is a great depression at work and the ego lying helplessly at its mercy? But this cannot be so. It is true that the manner in which the world and our existence in it are experienced in the book shows many of the traits of a typical depression. Such, for instance, are the axiomatic manner in which only the gloomy aspects of reality are presented and the unceasing but vain attempts at becoming master of these horrors by means of self-sacrificing object-relationships which perpetually fail. There are other traits, too, of what is described as 'melancholia agitata', namely the restlessness which drives the hero round the world and the anxiety which intensifies a cruel reality into still more cruel delusions. But there is a complete absence of all self-reproaches, of any split between ego and super-ego. It was right to suppose that what is here depicted is a world of experience that approaches the psychotic; but the diagnosis of depression or melancholia was wrong. Here are the essentials. A perpetual unrest and anxiety, which allow the hero not a moment's respite, drive him on in flight from something unspeakably terrible. But he cannot escape it, since existence itself has assumed that character for him. His self is threatened with actual annihilation in the war and in the colonies; but elsewhere, too, he is in ceaseless dread of this annihilation. It seems indeed as though he only went in search of war and the tropics in order to rationalize his expectation, just as the man who is a criminal owing to his sense of guilt commits his crime out of remorse (Freud, 1915 b). For him existence in the world has the quality of a constant threat of annihilation; and this annihilation always exhibits pregenital and sadistic (cannibalistic) attributes. Against this eternal terror there is only one protection, which he always seeks but can never attain: rest in the arms of a motherly woman who will give him 'the love which is strong enough to overcome death'. There are enough passages to bear out the correctness of the interpretation: a primal scene, sadistically perceived, has changed the character of the world for the hero, so that he sways to and fro between an expectation of a repetition of the trauma and an actual repetition of it which aims at finally mastering the old excitation but is never able to master it.

It is evident that mixed neuroses of this kind must, from the standpoint of therapy, be counted among the psychoneuroses and not among the

traumatic neuroses. If we contented ourselves, as in the case of the latter, with waiting for a spontaneous recovery, we should wait in vain. The responsibility for the fact that the subsequent mastery never succeeds lies with the interference of the ego, which, allowing itself to be led by an unconscious expectation of evil, sets itself to ward off the instincts. It may be possible (as in the case of the psychoneuroses) to remove the defences by psycho-analysis, to bring about a junction of the excluded sexual portions of the ego-organization with the rest of the ego and thus to change the infantile sexuality into adult, genital sexuality, capable of orgasm. If so, the experience in sexual satisfaction that it is possible for an involuntary process to be *pleasurable* will be the best guarantee of the possibility of also overcoming the quantities of excitation, unmastered since infancy, arising from an involuntary process which at that time was *unpleasurable*. Thus the removal of the pathogenic defences, which can only be achieved by psycho-analysis, operates just as in the psychoneuroses proper. Indeed, as I have said, these do not differ in principle from the mixed conditions which I have been describing. For all defence against instinct arises from anxiety, and all (secondary) anxiety is an effort on the part of the ego to avoid traumatic experiences.

REFERENCES

- FENICHEL, O. (1934 a). 'Weiteres zur präödiipalen Phase der Mädchen', *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, **20**, 167.
 — (1934 b). 'Zur Psychologie der Langeweile', *Imago*, **20**, 725.
 — (1934 c). 'Über Angstabwehr, insbesondere durch Libidinisierung', *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, **20**, 476.
 — (1935). Review of Lewin's 'Claustrophobia', *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, **21**, 597.
 FERENCZI, S. (1934). 'Gedanken über das Trauma', *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, **20**, 6-7.
 FREUD, A. (1936). (Trans. 1937.) *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (Hogarth Press).
 FREUD, S. (1915 a). (Trans. 1925.) 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', *Collected Papers*, IV, 60.
 — (1915 b). (Trans. 1925.) 'Character Types in Psycho-Analytic Work: III. Criminality from a Sense of Guilt', *Collected Papers*, IV, 342.
 — (1920). (Trans. 1922.) *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (Hogarth Press).
 — (1923). (Trans. 1927.) *The Ego and the Id* (Hogarth Press), 86.
 — (1926). (Trans. 1936.) *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (Hogarth Press).
 JONES, E. (1927). 'The Early Development of Female Sexuality', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **8**, 461.
 KARDINER, A. (1932). 'The Bio-Analysis of the Epileptic Reaction', *Psychoanal. Quart.*, **1**, 375.
 KLEIN, M. (1932). (Trans. 1932.) *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* (Hogarth Press).
 LANDMARK, J. (1935). 'Der Freudsche Triebbegriff und die erogenen Zonen', *Imago*, **21**, 345.
 LEWIN, B. D. (1935). 'Claustrophobia', *Psychoanal. Quart.*, **4**, 227.

Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses (1919). (Trans. 1921.) (Hogarth Press).

REICH, W. (1927). *Die Funktion des Orgasmus*.

REIK, T. (1929). *Der Schrecken*.

SEARL, M. N. (1929). 'Danger Situations of the Immature Ego', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 10, 423.

— (1933). 'The Psychology of Screaming', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 14, 193.

WEISS, E. (1934). (Trans. 1935.) 'Agoraphobia and its Relation to Hysterical Attacks and to Traumas', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 16, 59.

THE UNCONSCIOUS ORIGIN OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY¹

By J. O. WISDOM, ALEXANDRIA

My aim is to find the psychical meaning of Schopenhauer's philosophy; the pattern of his mind that will be arrived at will be based upon his chief philosophical work, without having recourse to biographical material beyond a couple of well-known facts.²

Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819) runs to fifteen hundred pages in the English translation; the material could probably be completely expressed in fifty pages; now the merest outline of his metaphysic and practical philosophy must suffice.

Schopenhauer's logical weapon is his Principle of Sufficient Reason, which has four derivative forms; its general purport is that there is a reason why a thing should be as it is rather than otherwise.

His metaphysic divides into four parts. First the world is considered as *percept*, exactly as with Berkeley: natural objects exist only when someone perceives them. Following Kant, he gives perception an *a priori* framework of space, time and causation. (I am using 'percept' instead of the more customary word 'idea' to translate '*Vorstellung*'.) Like Berkeley, he cannot remain in this position, for, underlying fleeting percepts, there is something permanent or persisting to be taken account of. This he describes by means of Kant's *thing-in-itself*, though, unlike Kant, he holds that the *thing-in-itself* is knowable. This brings us to the second part, where the world is considered as *will*. A man knows his body as percept but his inner nature he knows as will. The percept is a manifestation of the will; a movement of the body is an act of will objectified, i.e. passed into perception; and this applies to all actions, voluntary or involuntary. Motives determine only the form an act of will may take; the will itself is beyond motivation, and it is therefore simply a blind striving. The manifestations of will must obey the natural laws of phenomena, as with Kant,

but the will itself, again as with Kant, is independent of all restriction. In the third part of his metaphysic, this conception of will is extended to all parts of nature, on the basis of analogy. It is clearly at work with animals and the point is easily argued for plants; but he extends it to the inanimate because of intermediate phenomena, such as the behaviour of the magnet and the crystal. The argument is not clear; one is supposed to apprehend the result intuitively; then, one will understand the force through which crystals are formed, bodies gravitate, life lives, and the magnet attracts. Schopenhauer calls this general *élan vital* by the name 'will' after its most important species; but, because it is far removed from what can be known to a man's inner consciousness, the designation *mechanical conatus* will be more appropriate. Thus far, then, the world is entirely percept, will, and mechanical conatus—the phenomenal world is the mirror of the will; and, because the will underlies phenomena and because it is knowable, it is identified with the thing-in-itself. The fourth part treats of the world as *archetype* (a more suitable translation of '*Idee*' than the word '*Idea*' spelt with a capital.) There are various grades of objectification of the will, the lowest, for example, being the universal forces of nature, such as gravitation, while the highest include man. Corresponding to every objectification is a universal archetype, which is an *Idea* in Plato's sense; the archetypes multiply themselves throughout nature. Archetypes may conflict with one another: thus the pattern of behaviour of the magnet conflicts with and seeks to dominate that of gravitation. From the strife of the lower arise the higher—no victory without conflict; the more completely the lower form is overcome, the more the higher archetype is expressed. Now in the order of objectifications of

¹ Given in abstract as a Public Lecture at Farouk I University, Alexandria, April 21, 1945.

² No adequate biography was accessible to me. A biographical approach from the analytical point of view was made by Hirschmann ('Schopenhauer', *Imago*, 2 (1913), 101, of which an abstract will be found in *Psychoanal. Rev.*, 4 (1917), 110-5). The two approaches are therefore supplementary and they appear to agree. Notable points from the abstract are as follows: 'A life-long fear manifesting itself in so many ways is closely bound up with infantile sexuality and death wishes and is stamped particularly with a strong disposition outwardly restrained but powerfully directed toward the self, just as with Schopenhauer' (112). Nietzsche 'recognized the

sadistic-masochistic foundation of Schopenhauer's exaltation of humanity and self-denial, of his ascetic ideal' (115). These agree with the analysis given here. On the other hand Hirschmann would seem to place more emphasis upon the paranoid aspect, and mentions that Schopenhauer was dominated by fear of loss, theft, illness and infection. So far as these last symbolize castration they fit in with the analysis given below; so far as they refer to persecution, however, the point is not taken up here. This would fall into line, however, if we remember that pessimism meant that the world or nature was always thwarting him and was thus a symbol of the castrating father.

the will—gravitation, man, and so on—the most adequate objectivity is the archetype. Since the archetype is the most complete objectification of the will, Schopenhauer regards the archetype and the will as complementary—they are not, of course, the same. The important question now arises how archetypes are known, for they lie outside the knowledge of particular things. The general way of attaining to knowledge of them is by self-transcendence, relinquishing one's knowledge of things through the senses, so that one can no longer distinguish between perceiver and perception; then arises a pure, will-less, timeless subject of knowledge; in this condition archetypes can be known. The media by which self-transcendence may be attained are philosophy and art, the adequate pursuit of both of which require genius; hence to reach the archetypes one has to be a genius.

This concludes Schopenhauer's *metaphysic* according to his conception: *The World as Percept, Will, Mechanical Conatus, and Archetype*. As a metaphysic it is not of the first rank. Its interest, however, lies in the practical philosophy and other ideas he based upon it. To these we now turn.

Schopenhauer's practical philosophy places an enormous stress on pessimism, the will to live, and the denial of the will to live. His pessimism is unlimited. Optimism he regarded as 'a really wicked way of thinking, as a bitter mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity' (I, § 59, 420). In opposition to Leibniz, he held that this was the worst of all possible worlds. He gives a most graphic account of human striving, suffering, insatiable desire; every satisfied desire only gives rise to a new one (III, 383-5). 'Whence did Dante take the materials for his hell but from this our actual world? And yet he made a very proper hell out of it. And when, on the other hand, he came to the task of describing heaven and its delights, he had an insurmountable difficulty before him, for our world affords no materials at all for this' (I, § 69, 419). None the less he finds ways of mastering such a lot: by repudiation of the will and through the power of art and philosophy. These are connected, for the pursuit of art and philosophy is simply a means of silencing the will. This takes on additional significance from his belief that love and sexual pleasure were founded on a delusion: 'nature can only attain its ends by implanting a certain illusion in the individuality on account of which that which is only a good for the species appears to him as a good for himself' (III, 340-9); thus nature impels man towards propagation, but having attained its end it is indifferent to him and cares only for the preservation of the species (I, § 60, 425). Chastity, therefore, provides another way of silencing the will. The trouble is, of course, due to the inordinate assertion of the will to live; the will wills life and 'the will' means 'the will to live'. Schopenhauer believes

in no ordinary kind of immortality. Individuals may come and individuals may go, but the will persists and it alone. His view may perhaps be described as *transmigration* of will. In consequence we need have no fear for our existence, even in death, and life cannot be ended even by suicide (I, § 54, 354, 358-62); the will persists, like gravity when a pendulum comes to rest (III, 259). In particular the sexual passion leads beyond one's own existence and continues life indefinitely: parent and child are different as phenomena but identical as will and as archetype; generation is only the expression, the symptom, of the begetter's assertion of the will to live; with this assertion, suffering, and death have been asserted anew (I, § 60, 423-4). How, then, is the will to live to be denied? This is achieved by a strategy of indirect approach, which depends upon the power of the intellect, for, apparently, upon gaining full self-knowledge, volition ends, i.e. upon gaining full knowledge of the human archetype, one finds in it a quieter of the will (I, § 54, 367). The goal may be achieved also by voluntary renunciation of the sexual impulse (I, § 62, 430).

Schopenhauer lays a good deal of stress on the unity of will throughout all mankind: the will of the agent and the sufferer is one and the same; because of this identity, love and friendship for others help not only them but oneself, just as this identity is a reason for not taking revenge upon others (I, §§ 63-7 *passim*). This notion is strikingly similar to some Indian thought, in which Schopenhauer steeped himself: thus it is said that a Hindu holy man, when bayoneted by a soldier, remarked calmly, 'And thou also art He' (Bouquet, 1941). It was a truth to be seen through the veil of Maya. He who has this insight must take on himself the suffering of the whole world. This is the reverse of the assertion of life, from which the will now turns away. All this is closely bound up with the denial of sexuality, for, Schopenhauer remarks, the first step towards renunciation of the world is voluntary and complete chastity (I, § 68, 489-94). Regarding the idea that in hurting others, one hurts the will in oneself, it is interesting to find that he disapproved of vivisection (I, § 66, 481 n.).

It is noteworthy that suicide, so far from being a denial of the will to live, is a strong assertion of that will; for suicide is due to dissatisfaction, which implies desire, and it occurs because a man cannot endure the breaking of his will (I, § 69, 514-17).

Let us turn now from Schopenhauer's practical philosophy to his psychological insight. He is sometimes regarded as the father of modern psychology. This is true up to a point, but to put it in that way is apt to suggest that he had very important contributions to make. He was the first to show some psychological insight into the unconscious, but this should not be exaggerated; he had not the profundity of Nietzsche. He shows

himself aware of the enormous power of the sex instinct, of the phenomenon of wish-fulfilment, which he attributes to the intellect, of repression due to painful emotion, how impossible it is for the intellect to control one's behaviour and how impossible it is to overcome one's fundamental faults, and of the psychical mechanism of projection, by which we instinctively seek factors external to our mind as causes of our distress (II, 419-40; I, § 57, 411). But his most interesting intuition concerns madness, which he attributed to a break in the thread of memory: A certain amount is correctly remembered but the thread is broken. The onset of madness is induced by violent mental suffering for this reason: suffering is of the present, and therefore transitory and never excessively heavy; great suffering has the character of lasting pain and therefore lies in the memory. 'Then terrified Nature seizes upon madness as the last resource of life; the mind so fearfully tortured at once destroys the thread of its memory, fills up the gaps with fictions, and thus seeks refuge in madness from the mental suffering that exceeds its strength' (I, § 36, 247-50). It is striking that he should have thought of madness as a *defence*, 'the last remedy of harassed nature' (III, 169). A further point is that even if not all geniuses are mad, philosophical geniuses certainly are: for, in contemplating archetypes the genius breaks the links of the connections between things, and this gives rise to phenomena akin to madness (I, § 36, 251). He adds that all men must have this power to some degree, else they would have no appreciation of art; hence, it would seem, genius and madness are not different in kind but only in degree from 'normality'.

This brief outline must suffice as an indication of Schopenhauer's metaphysic, practical philosophy and psychological ideas. What does it all mean?

We first wish to know what was signified by the *will*. Its meaning is not far to seek, for Schopenhauer himself makes it clear: 'The genital organs are, far more than any other external member of the body, subject merely to the will, and not at all to knowledge. . . . The genitals are properly the *focus* of the will' (I, § 60, 425-6). The meaning of 'will', he points out, is seen in the German sentence, '*Er verlangte von ihr, sie sollte ihm zu Willen sein*'. This has been rendered by Schopenhauer's Victorian translators, 'He desired her to comply with his wishes' (III, 379); but it would be more suitably rendered, 'He was insistent upon having his will of her'. Thus the will is plainly identified with sexual desire. Moreover, 'the will objectifies itself most immediately in the blood'; the heart is 'at once vessel and muscle, and there is the true centre and *primum mobile* of the whole life' (II, 481). That is to say, blood here symbolizes semen emitted by the heart, the vessel and muscle symbolizing the male organs. There

are passages in Schopenhauer, worth quoting in full but far too long for this, pointing out that sexuality permeates every corner of life—as the will does (III, 313-14, 339-40).

Schopenhauer wrote a chapter of forty pages entitled 'The Metaphysics of the Love of the Sexes', the only modern philosopher to have written on the subject. Correlative with this is his treatment of *death*, to which he devoted a chapter of sixty pages. In the main he is concerned to find a remedy for the fear and pain of death, and even to overcome death itself, that is, to show that it is unreal. Thus he quotes with approval the saying of Epicurus that, when we are, death is not, and, when death is, we are not (III, 255). On the other hand he realizes that in a sense death is more than simply not being; he senses that psychologically to be dead is in a subtle way to be living, and living in an unpleasant way—you may imagine yourself vanishing away but then to your astonishment you will find yourself still present (III, 279-80). What, then, is the meaning of death? He first equates it with excrement. Thus 'constant nourishment and renewal differ from generation only in degree, and constant excretion differs only in degree from death. . . . Excretion, the constant exhalation and throwing off of matter, is the same as that which, at a higher power, death, is the contrary of generation' (I, § 54, 357). This throws light on the horror of death if it is remembered that death is what he calls a pole of all life. It is clear, further, that death, when not accepted with resignation in the spirit of the denial of the will to live, is a frustration of the will to live; it is therefore opposed to sexual satisfaction, and hence means castration—which in fact it is well known to symbolize. There is now no difficulty in understanding why death is more than not being; it is castrated living.

Bound up with death is the feeling of *guilt*. Thus 'death is the great reprimand which the will to live . . . receives . . . ; and it may be conceived as a punishment for our existence'; 'death says: "Thou art the product of an act which should not have been; therefore to expiate it thou must die"' (III, 306, 306 n.; cf. 377). In short, the wages of sin (sexuality) is death (castration). Indeed the connection between the two was even closer than this in his mind. Thus fecundation 'is followed in the case of every animal individual by momentary exhaustion and debility of all the powers, and in the case of most insects indeed by speedy death. . . . In the case of man the extinction of the generative power shows that the individual approaches death. . . . Excessive use of this power at every age shortens life' (III, 310). He almost grasped the connection between death and castration, for just above this passage he makes a reference to castration. Schopenhauer's way of meeting the threat of castration is to acquiesce in it. Thus the peace

upon the countenance of dead persons is due to their recapturing the original freedom of the will. 'Quiet and easy is, as a rule, the death of every good man: but to die willingly, to die gladly, to die joyfully, is the prerogative of the resigned, of him who surrenders and denies the will to live' (III, 308). The acute will notice also the significance of regaining the original freedom of the will. Parallel with this is his acceptance of what he regarded as the essence of Christianity, i.e. the doctrine of original sin (assertion of the will, of sexuality) and that of salvation (denial of the will, embracing castration). The last feature of death to be noted is Schopenhauer's clear identification of the tomb with the womb: regarding the dangers that beset living creatures, 'if now the all-mother sends forth her children without protection to a thousand threatening dangers, this can only be because she knows that if they fall they fall back into her womb, where they are safe' (III, 263). It is clear, moreover, that the doctrine of renunciation, the acquiescence in death, means a return to the womb; the doctrine is therefore symptomatic of this regression in Schopenhauer. With it may be connected the identification already noted between death and ordure; for to die can mean both to become ordure and to return to the womb—provided *faeces* can be thought of as belonging to the womb, and this is well known to be true of children's phantasies according to which babies are equated with *faeces*. This association of ideas was not, of course, conscious in Schopenhauer.

It is now easy to see the significance of Schopenhauer's attitude towards beauty, for which he had a considerable passion. He himself tells us that a beautiful view is 'a cathartic of the mind' (III, 174), and the sense of beauty directs the sexual impulse which otherwise 'sinks to the level of a disgusting necessity' (III, 347). In other words, beauty discharges and purifies feelings of disgust. What Schopenhauer did not completely grasp was that disgust was essentially concerned with ordure, based upon an inhibited interest in it. Thus love of beauty was a reaction-formation, or a transformation of coprophilia. Such a transformation in the field of aesthetics has already been pointed out by Ernest Jones (1914).

The most interesting conception to be interpreted is the *archetype*. The archetype is the perfect expression of the will. It is therefore a pure form of sexuality, a sublimation whose roots are not recognized. Hence, when a man succeeds in apprehending the archetypes, he is enjoying a pure sexual activity, uncastrated and uncastratable; he is clean, segregated from all disgust. But, like many symptoms, the archetype expresses a compromise or rather allows the unconscious to have things both ways; for, on the one hand, to achieve cognition of the archetype is to achieve renunciation of the will to live—we know that for Schopenhauer knowledge gained from comprehension of

the archetype acted as a *quieter* of the will—and therefore the conception of the archetype also expresses castration. Thus the two urges, the will to live and its denial, the desire for sexuality and the guilt that needs castration, were woven into a single means of expression in the archetype. By losing himself in contemplation of this symbol, Schopenhauer could attain a resolution of his conflict, even though only temporarily. It is now possible to understand his view that in the world of archetypes neither the will nor the knowing subject is affected at all by birth or death; for these belong merely to life and are transcended in the archetype which satisfies the demands of both at once. Significance may now be attached also to his remark: 'death is the true inspiring genius, or the muse of philosophy' (III, 849); 'without doubt it is the knowledge of death, and along with this consideration of the suffering and misery of life, which gives the strongest impulse to philosophical reflection and metaphysical explanation of the world' (II, 360-1). This can mean only that philosophy is a way of enduring and weathering castration; castrated though he might feel in his unconscious, Schopenhauer was able to give birth to a philosophy of archetypes.

Another striking feature of his philosophy is the Principle of Sufficient Reason, with its fourfold form. Like Kant, he had a compulsive tendency towards architectonic, which he openly admits (III, 118). Thus his chief work was constructed in four parts. In his treatment of sufficient reason the four main conceptions are: percept, *a priori* knowing, space and time as *a priori*, and willing. The percept involves space and time unified by the understanding, and the principle at work is the law of causality or the principle of *becoming*. If we remember that the material whose laws he wishes to establish is always life, manifestations of will or sex, we see that the principle of becoming is simply a cloak for the origin of living beings; in other words, the theme is how babies are born, and Schopenhauer was seeking a principle of sufficient reason of birth. This was, of course, unconscious, since he knew all about the reason; but it implies that at some time in his youth the knowledge was withheld from him. The second conception of *a priori* knowing is easily interpreted: being unable to gain this knowledge from outside he had to fall back on phantasy to produce his own explanation of birth, which may be dignified as *a priori* and synthetic. The third conception is that of space and time as *a priori* intuitions. Philosophically this means that the mind provides the framework into which the perceptual world fits. This clearly means creating something outside oneself, and in the present context means procreating. The fourth conception, willing, is simply the sexual desire presupposed by the interest shown in the other three ideas. The fourfold root of his theme is thus: desire, carrying

this into effect, having sanction for this, and interest in the created product. This conforms with his expressed opinion that love and desire are delusions implanted in the individual to serve the interests of the race. The Principle of Sufficient Reason in general expresses the power of the *a priori* not only in gaining knowledge, but in gaining knowledge of a special kind hardly obtainable in any other way—the knowledge of philosophical connections, by means of which one can learn to contemplate the archetypes. Thus this principle, too, was dominated by the need to find a philosophical resolution of the fundamental castration conflict.

The fourfold division of Schopenhauer's main work does not fit the four themes that logically make up his metaphysic; but it does fit his metaphysic and practical philosophy, if these are taken as a whole as he intended them to be. The four themes are: percept, will, archetype and renunciation. The chief feature of his metaphysic of the percept is that there is no object without a subject. The psychological meaning is therefore creation. The will, whether human or external mechanical conatus, means the urge to create. The archetype is the highest creation of the will, in addition to being the resolution of conflict as already noted. And renunciation means castration. Thus the structure of this work is not exactly the same as that of his earlier essay on sufficient reason (Schopenhauer, 1813). The questions of birth and sanction to have knowledge about it have disappeared; instead we find renunciation and its most satisfactory attainment is the knowledge of archetypes. It may be inferred that between the times of writing the two works Schopenhauer's *joie de vivre* had given way to pessimistic depression.

The archetype, as the highest expression of the will, can be interpreted as a child, not only because a child is the highest expression of sexuality, but also because the archetype is a product of Reason, and Reason had sex—in fact it was feminine: 'Reason is feminine in nature; it can only give after it has received' (I, § 10, 65). Moreover, Schopenhauer regarded the premisses of a syllogism as the father and mother of the conclusion (II, 292), so that reasoning is clearly identified with bringing forth. Most important of all is his belief that we inherit the will—and characteristic traits—from the father and the intellect from the mother (III, 318–20). Hence, since the archetype is a product of the will and the intellect, it can symbolize a child. The question may now be raised whether it makes sense to speak of a child forming a resolution of a castration conflict. This is possible, for on the one hand a child is an expression of potency, while on the other it could express the completion of the work of propagation, not a thwarting castration but (like the archetype) a satisfied inactivity. If this is correct, the archetype stands not only for a philosophical resolution of Schopen-

hauer's castration conflict but also for a child. Had he been more fortunate he might have found this more normal solution to his problem instead of burdening himself and the world with volume of pessimism. The question is at once raised therefore, why he did not form a home (this is one of the two biographical facts I am using).

His pessimism amounts to this, that a pleasure envisaged is no longer a pleasure when attained, but he is more explicit on the subject than this: thus every lover after he has had his will find himself disillusioned and cheated; only the blindness of love can account for the way excellent men bind themselves to termagants and she-devils (III, 348–9, 368). Clearly womankind was a dangerous snare, with a goodly outside, rotten at the heart. Moreover, he believed, 'sexual love is compatible even with the extremest hatred towards its object' (III, 368). This ambivalence would obviously make it impossible for him to have a happy married life. But what did it rest upon? Unconsciously he felt castrated, and therefore a woman—since those that have this conflict think of woman not as a different kind of being from man but as an imperfect, i.e. castrated man. Because of the guilt that lay beneath the castration fear, he felt essentially evil: thus, he finds that if we try to know ourselves by introspection we are terrified at the spectre that confronts us (I, § 54, 358 n. § 55, 382). He did not wholly realize that this evil in him was a highly charged sadism, and that his way of avoiding the realization was by turning his aggression against himself.

Further light is thrown on this by the ideas he associates with madness. He makes the striking remark that *smell* is the sense of the memory (because of its greater power of recalling things to us) (II, 196–200). It follows that a break in the memory is due to inhibition of the sense of smell. Further, since madness was a break in the memory, madness and genius and the urge to philosophy arose out of inhibition of the sense of smell. This clearly means the repression of coprophilic interests. Again, he remarked that sounds were disturbing and hostile. Now sound is primordially associated with two objects: the voice and passing flatus, and the former (i.e. noise with breath) symbolizes the latter (Jones, 1914). Hence interest in sound, as with smell, would have to be repressed: it would re-awaken interest in excrement, revive the memory, diminish madness, restore conflict, and thus set up the irritation caused by sound that Schopenhauer mentioned. In addition, sound attacks the hearing, which he described as the passive or feminine sense and the sense of the reason which he also regarded as feminine. Here, then, is the feeling of being womanlike and subject to anal-sadistic assault; sound would awaken this feeling. In all this, the dominant ideas are coprophilia and fear of assault.

In connection with this we must note his opinion

that mourning the dead shows itself chiefly in regard to one's father (I, § 67, 487-8). The dead represent excrement, identified with the father, and mourning is the time-honoured reaction on eating the totem or father-substitute. Thus Schopenhauer is giving vent to repressed coprophagia and cannibalism, as a result of which he suffered from depression.

This brings us to the main features of his make-up. His suffering and depression are plainly stated: thus 'the life of our body is only a constantly prevented dying, an ever-postponed death' (I, § 57, 401). That is to say, not only was he feeling himself constantly dying, constantly castrated, but he felt his dead father, on account of his cannibalism, within him. His painful thoughts would naturally refer to this—thoughts that 'inflict torments in comparison with which all the sufferings of the animal world are very small. . . . Indeed, in the case of keen mental suffering, we even inflict physical suffering on ourselves merely to distract our attention from the former to the latter' (I, § 55, 386). This reveals fierce sadism, which being repressed was directed against himself—it attacked his ego instead of the outer world. On the other hand, he had his periods of normality, for he recognized that the normal character was not like this: thus 'in a healthy mind . . . only deeds oppress the conscience, not wishes and thoughts' (I, § 55, 387). Then he also manifests yet a third state of mind. Thus he held that though joy and pain are usually attributed to external circumstances they are really determined from within; moreover, 'excessive joy and very keen suffering always occur in the same person' (I, § 57, 408-10). It is important to observe that with Schopenhauer joy and suffering came from within. That the two always occur in the same person is not an objective truth; what is objective is that if the *capacity* to suffer is lacking the *capacity* for joy will be lacking also; but which would come into play in a healthy mind depends upon external circumstances, and neither operates *necessarily*. With Schopenhauer, however, the two were necessarily connected. This, therefore, is evidence that he experienced joy caused by his own psychical condition, not justified by external circumstances, which is characteristic of mania.

We have, then, a naked statement of the three phases of cyclothymia—depression, normality of a sort, and mania.

With Schopenhauer, the three phases are not equally marked: there is little indication of normality, not much of the manic phase—the depression overshadows all else. It is probable, however, that he experienced some degree of mystic elation in the experience of beauty and in contemplating the archetypes.

There remain two other important features of his mentality—first his narcissism. As usual he makes the facts plain and accessible to us—he

enjoyed watching his own actions, held a fine opinion of his own philosophy, wrote truth as did the ancients, felt he possessed a beautiful and rich mind, and believed himself a genius (III, 132, 247-8, 393; I, § 47, 296). Here, in contrast with his sadism which turned in on himself, we find its obverse—over-valuation of the ego. It is an everyday occurrence to meet with ambivalence directed towards external objects; it is of some interest, therefore, to observe this attitude focussed upon an internal object. It is impossible to avoid associating the love of the ego with the manic phase, seeing that the sadistic impulse underlies the depressive phase. Then, just as the mania is commonly interpreted as an escape from depression, or, more exactly, as a state in which the castigating attack on the ego is overcome, so is the ego-love an escape from self-hatred.

The other remaining feature, not so accessible as some of the others since there is not even an indirect hint of it, is pæderasty. A short appendix to the chapter on 'The Metaphysics of the Love of the Sexes' was inserted in the third German edition (1859; II, 641-9); this was omitted from the English translation, a grave omission seeing that a fundamental point of his metaphysic was at stake. In view of the tenet that nature is throughout concerned with the propagation of the species, the existence of pæderasty is extremely paradoxical and Schopenhauer sought a resolution. He begins by stating that, though in itself pæderasty appears as a monstrosity, the facts down the ages belie this, and he cites several of the most famous ancients to show that it was both universal and looked upon without disfavour. It is, then, no mere occasional occurrence, which there is no need to reconcile with nature's aim. He asserts, and quotes support for this, firstly that the issue of the very old and the very young are in every way decadent, and secondly that homosexual tendencies are chiefly to be found in the very old and the very young; hence, he concludes, pæderasty is nature's way of circumventing the procreation of the weedy; thus nature by fostering or utilizing pæderasty is really serving her own ends. Pæderasty, he expressly states, is in fact the lesser of two evils.

This is of psychological importance. Pæderasty occurs with those whose potency is undeveloped or waning (Schopenhauer remarks that semen deteriorates with the old); that is, it occurs when they are not fully masculine, when they are psychically eunuchs. Now, since the castration complex was a fundamental structure in his make-up, he himself must have possessed the pæderastic counterpart. This was, of course, wholly unconscious; in fact he displays repugnance to the phenomenon.

What part, then, did his unconscious homosexuality play in his inner life? It fits in with the anal features already noted; but it also implies that primarily he had in phantasy wished to play this rôle with his father. This early situation

would have become inflamed or reinforced in proportion as his disappointment in his mother grew.

The foregoing interpretations centre around castration, excrement, and oral concepts, and some of the connecting links between them have already been described, but Schopenhauer throws further light upon the subject. Two *juxtaposed* illustrations of stimulus-reaction causation are significant: one concerned 'disgusting things, which excite the desire to vomit' (I, § 23, 150); the associated illustration concerned an erection, which cannot be resisted directly but only allayed by putting away the idea that caused it. The association makes it clear that sexuality was parallel to vomiting. That is, semen was unclean—and it was (psychologically) inherited from the father. The father was assimilated cannibalistically and was vomited; semen likewise had to be got rid of, and castration was a way of achieving this. Thus sexuality was condemned because of the basic cannibalism and the coprophagia connected with it. In this way castration and excrement go back to the oral-sadistic concept of cannibalism. Related to this is a further point: reminiscent of undergraduates on occasions of bacchanalian conviviality, vomiting would characterize the cycle of the elation and mourning of the totem feast.

The case contains most if not all of the features of a typical manic-depressive psychosis. Now according to Abraham (1924), each such feature is to be found in some other disease, though the combination characterizes this psychosis alone. He tabulates its aetiological factors as follows: (i) Constitutional. There need be no direct inheritance of the disease, but there is usually inheritance of oral erotism. (ii) Fixation of libido on the oral level. This is only too clear with Schopenhauer. (iii) Severe injury to infantile narcissism brought about by early disappointments in love. Schopenhauer's attitude to women shows this, for his attitude manifests inherent mistrust of them. (iv) The occurrence of the first important disappointment in love before the Oedipus-wishes have been overcome. Before the Oedipus complex is mastered and object-love stabilized, narcissism is strong and revolt against the father is in full flood. 'Since at that date his oral sadistic instincts are still in full force, a permanent association will be established between his Oedipus complex and the cannibalistic stage of his libido. This will facilitate a subsequent introjection of both his love-objects—that is, his mother in the first place and in the second place his father.' This describes Schopenhauer's state very exactly. (v) Later repetition of the primary disappointment—the exciting cause of depression. It is impossible to doubt from the tenor of his writings that Schopenhauer experienced continued love-disappointments. Not all of these characteristics,

however, can be verified without drawing on biographical details.

Abraham adds that the mother-hatred is characteristic of male patients, unlike their attitude in other neuroses in which it is the father against whom aggression is directed; but that the mother-hatred is secondary for all that, the result of a tendency to invert the Oedipus complex. He agrees that ambivalence concerns both parents alike and that both are introjected. With Schopenhauer the manifest hatred is against the mother; the attitude already noted towards his father was deep in his unconscious. The order of his hatreds therefore conforms with the pattern discovered by Abraham.

The most interesting question that arises concerns Schopenhauer's repudiation of suicide. He repudiated it intellectually, and after a long life died naturally (our second biographical fact), i.e. he repudiated it emotionally. This consistency of thought and behaviour is very striking. 'John Robeck, a Swedish philosopher, is one of those rare writers whose practice conformed to his theory' (Fedden, 1938; 210); in certain circumstances Seneca and Zeno, the Stoics, advocated it, and they committed it (*ibid.*; 78-9); but this consistency appears to be exceptional. Brutus as a young man wrote a philosophical work in which he maintained that suicide was wrong (*ibid.*; 57 n.); perhaps he changed his mind or perhaps he was simply driven to doing wrong. It would be less surprising if Schopenhauer had advocated suicide but failed to practise what he preached, or if he had repudiated the idea but was compelled to adopt it. The first of these alternatives would not characterize his psychosis, but the second might have been expected. Since the facts were otherwise, his philosophical denial of suicide faithfully reflected the inner impossibility of his committing it.

The situation in which sadism is directed against the self is known to be a protection against a more ultimate situation in which the sadism is directed at someone else; and it is known that suicide is the murder of that person introjected within the self. This though a necessary condition of suicide, is not, however, the only factor involved, and it is not yet known exactly what other determining factors there are. I would suggest that one such additional cause is the depth of repression of the identity between the self and the primordial energy in an introjected form, for if this identification is realized the factors weighing against a straightforward murder of the enemy would weigh equally against suicide. Now Schopenhauer held that the will was one and the same in all mankind. Then to kill himself, i.e. to castrate himself and annihilate his will, would have been to kill the universal will, and thus castrate and annihilate some other person, namely, the primordial object of his hate

indeed he went so far as to disapprove of vivisection, i.e. he would not attack the will even in animal form. This belief in the universal will shows that he had this realization of identity with his enemy too deeply to kill himself. His denial of suicide would then signify that he could not attack the object of his hate even in a fairly well disguised form. The identity of will shows that the object of hate was his father. The way he had of dealing with the will was by the Reason, in his mind feminine; so that the criticizing side of his mind, which silenced the will, was an introjection of his mother. Here then is a second factor militating against suicide—the introjected presence of a soothing mother. This aspect of his mentality depends upon an unusually sharp cleavage between the image he had of a kindly mother and that of the mother he hated, the one introjected in a sublimated form, the other not. A third factor is to be found in his narcissism; with him narcissism was hardly directed literally towards his body but largely towards his mental qualities and powers. His philosophy, which was a product of his qualities, may be regarded as a quality of himself, and towards it narcissism was certainly directed. It was non-temporal in character, so that it would buoy him up even in depression. Thus, however much he was overburdened with depression or self-hatred, there was this constant source of self-esteem tending to prevent the introverted sadism from attaining its logical conclusion of killing him. A fourth factor was homosexuality, which would make the introjected father a love-object.

These four factors are connected. The identity of the will throughout all nature is the Oneness characteristic of mysticism; it also implies that time is unreal, another such characteristic, since time was a form not of the thing-in-itself but of its manifestations; and lastly it carries with it another feature of mysticism, that evil is a delusion, for evil with Schopenhauer belongs also to the phenomenal world. Hence the essence of his metaphysic reflects the pre-reality stage of mental development. Assuming the well-known classification of phases from babyhood to manhood, of oral, anal, phallic, and adult, according to which the conception of the real world develops in the second of these, we see that the metaphysic manifests the oral phase or perhaps the early anal—in keeping with this is the oral feature of cannibalism and cannibalism already mentioned. It is at that time, when no distinction between the inner and outer world is recognized, that the child's philosophy is Solipsism—as Schopenhauer puts it, every object is for a subject or the world is my percept; and it is then that narcissism is normal and at its height. Subsequent development may be described as a weaning from narcissism; and Schopenhauer's metaphysic shows that on the intellectual plane he was never weaned from it. Thus two of the factors counteracting suicide are connected. The third

one concerning the soothing mother also falls into place, for narcissism cannot be satisfied without the worship of at least one favourable parent. The fourth one, homosexuality, became reinforced when the narcissism could be satisfied no longer. His early development may therefore be put like this: primordial hatred of his father was kept in bounds by his homosexuality and by his mother's pandering to his narcissism—not at all a normal way of controlling the Oedipus situation. The two lived on, the hatred and the narcissism fixated, with homosexuality increased, so that Schopenhauer needed the narcissistic philosophy of solipsism, one will, and soothing archetypes in order to adjust his life. The effect of the strange infantile mental structure would be an inability to identify himself at all normally with his father (his father as phenomenon, that is, not as thing-in-itself), and hence followed his hatred of women.

A notable requirement for the success of this narcissistic defence-pattern is that the sublimated version of the narcissism was not accompanied by guilt. The basic reason for his not committing suicide seems to lie here. With types that would commonly be regarded as suicidal, I would indeed suggest that, when suicide is not attempted, a sufficient (though perhaps not a necessary) condition for the absence of any attempt is (a) the existence of narcissism accepted without guilt and (b) the continued existence of this even in depressed phases.

To conclude this attempt to find the psychical meaning of Schopenhauer's philosophy and to explain his emotional repudiation of suicide, which was strange in the circumstances: we see his philosophy not only as a manifestation of unconscious forces, but as a defence against them, as illness is a defence against disease; just as the wages of sin (sexuality) is death (castration), so is the quietus of the will to be found in the archetype.

SUMMARY

Will, the fundamental force in the world, is sexual drive, and it is eternal. Death, which means both castrated living and excrement, is the reward of sexuality; guilt feels it to be just. Conflict is overcome not by defying death but by acquiescing in it: castration is accepted; a return is made to nothingness, to the womb, in the form of excrement. Beauty and philosophy are the forms in which this resolution manifests itself. With beauty this is because the feeling for it is based upon repression of its opposite, ugliness and dirt. With philosophy, in which the process is more complicated, there is the highest manifestation of will, i.e. sublimated sexuality, expressed by the archetype; and this at the same time acts as a quietus of the will and is outside space and time and the course of life, so that it expresses castration—the archetype fuses lust and castration. Thus philosophy's muse is death.

The forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason mean the origin of babies, unsanctioned knowledge about the process, desire to produce them, and living in the child. The Principle in general means the way of gaining knowledge of the archetype. The fourfold scheme of philosophy signifies creation, the urge to it, the resolution of conflict in the archetype, and renunciation.

The archetype is the child intellectually born of parents consisting of sexual premisses. A real child is impossible because he felt the blindness of love hides the evil nature of women. This means Schopenhauer hated women because he felt himself deceived by them, and this because he felt castrated and womanlike. The evil was his own sadism.

Philosophical genius is the capacity to apprehend the archetypes; the value of it lies in its making possible a painless castration. It is allied with madness, which is due to a break in the memory. Sounds disturb and smell is the sense of memory; sounds and smell are attributes of defaecation; therefore sounds would reawaken interest in this, make the memory recover, remove the power of genius, and abolish the archetypal resolution of castration. Thus at the root of castration lay repudiated coprophilia—which, however, was satisfied in another form by death in the sense of excrement. Hence death, as castration and as excrement, is to be understood as a compensation for inhibited coprophilia.

Mourning refers to the father, and mourning means the incorporation of the dead or faecal. It therefore signifies coprophagia.

Schopenhauer's fierce sadism was directed against himself and he could not direct it outwards. The affect was depression. He also had a strain of near-normality and a capacity for joy—there was a necessary connection between joy and depression. Thus he manifested the full cycle of manic-depressive psychosis.

Most important in this was the incorporation of his father and the coprophagia, showing a cannibalistic impulse. Sexuality is made parallel to vomiting. That is, semen was unclean—and it was inherited from the father. Thus sexuality was condemned because of the basic cannibalism and coprophagia.

Parallel to his savage attitude to his ego was his narcissistic over-valuation of it. His ego was subject to ambivalence, narcissistic love and oral sadistic attack. His case seems to fit the structure of manic-depressive psychosis as described by Abraham. Homosexuality was stimulated by failure to satisfy narcissism.

Schopenhauer might have been expected to commit suicide. That he did not was because of the identity of will throughout nature, involving a realization of his identity with the introjected bad object, because of the introjected presence of a soothing mother, because of homosexuality, and because of his narcissism. The four are connected but the narcissism was basic. In certain conditions it can prevent suicide.

His philosophy is to be understood as a defence against conflict.

REFERENCES

- ABRAHAM, K. (1924). (*Trans.* 1927.) 'A Short Study of the Development of the Libido', *Selected Papers* (Hogarth Press), 457-460.
- BOUQUET, A. C. (1941). *Comparative Religion* (Penguin Books).
- FEDDEN, H. R. (1938). *Suicide: a Social and Historical Study*.
- JONES, E. (1914). 'The Madonna's Conception through the Ear', *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis* (Hogarth Press, 1923).
- SCHOPENHAUER, A. (1813). *Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde*.
— (1819; third ed. 1859). *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. (References are to English translation, by Haldane and Kemp, *The World as Will and Idea*, 1883-6.)

TWO SHORT COMMUNICATIONS

By ADRIAN STEPHEN, LONDON

(1) RUMINATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC SECRETARY¹

... So much about the conduct of our meetings; I want now to start a discussion on our research work. In particular I want to raise two questions: as to the possibility of organizing our work more systematically and as to the direction in which, at this moment, research is most likely to be profitable.

So far as I know, psycho-analytical research, at any rate in this country, has in the past been mainly a by-product of clinical medicine. In one

sense it always must be so—clinical investigation must give us the material for scientific theory; but it has been a by-product in the sense that it is almost a chance result. I mean that analysts have usually accepted just whatever cases offered themselves; there has not been a practice of selecting for treatment cases that might throw light on specific problems. There has certainly been some specialization, and child analysis is the most obvious example, but there has not been much

¹ Extract from a paper read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, October 18, 1944.

selection of cases with the object of research into particular clinical entities such as for instance Asthma or Peptic Ulcers or the Obsessional Neurosis or into particular phases of development. It seems to me likely that, just as in somatic medicine valuable advances have been made through specialized research, so the same will be true in psychological medicine and, having this idea in mind, I was particularly interested when, at our last meeting, some one suggested the possibility of specialized research into certain phases of the development of girls. I do not mean to suggest of course that it would be wise for any analyst to confine his attention to a single type of case. Anyone who did so would be likely to lose his sense of proportion, and in order to form a just opinion of one single type it would surely be best to see it against a background of others. I want only to suggest that, for purposes of research, it would be advisable to exercise more choice than has commonly been exercised in the past. Not all but a certain proportion of analysts' cases might be selected with the object of illuminating specific questions.

There are two obvious criticisms to be made of this suggestion: first that most analysts have their living to make and cannot afford to be too 'choosy' with their patients, and second that those analysts who are interested in research pick their cases like this already. There is probably something in both of these points, but, all the same, I cannot help thinking that a good deal more might be done than has been. Even if analysts cannot all afford to be 'choosy' in their private practice it might be possible to exercise some care in choosing their Clinic cases, and I feel sure the Director of the Clinic would be glad to co-operate in this. With a case or two of their own (and probably a case or two in their own practice would have started them on their particular line of research) and with one or two more from the Clinic, or referred to them by fellow members, analysts would be provided with as much clinical material as they could deal with.

In connection with specialized research it will be appropriate to mention another idea. It has often occurred to me, as, I have no doubt, it has to other members, that however valuable the ordinary meetings of the Society may be for certain purposes yet they do not, or have not in the past, provided a perfect setting for the development of new ideas. New ideas, obviously, first germinate in the minds of individuals, but the circumstances of their birth and early years may be more or less favourable to their development. It may, of course, be that the new conditions will be more favourable than the old and I hope they will; on the other hand it seems to me likely that it is easier to give birth to new ideas in groups smaller than those constituted by full meetings and especially in groups pursuing a specialized line of thought. I know well, of

course, that in the past small discussion groups have been formed by various members and that their small size and comparative informality have seemed propitious to freedom of discussion. These small groups have not, however, so far as I know, usually had any object more definite than the discussion of whatever might be interesting one of their members at any given meeting. They have, no doubt, been of great use in stimulating thought and I hope they will continue to exist, but I want to suggest that there is room for groups of another kind, small groups of perhaps half a dozen members, which should set before themselves definite subjects for research such as, for example, those already mentioned. In other words it seems to me that specialized research by individuals is to be greatly encouraged, but that specialized research by groups is even more likely to produce good results. By pooling their clinical experience group members would draw on a wider source of observation and would profit by sharing and criticizing each other's ideas.

But the collection and description of clinical material, however important it may be, is, of course, not the whole of scientific research. Almost, if not quite, equally important is the construction of a conceptual system which will serve to bring order into our observations, the formation of a pattern of concepts into which the observed facts will fit or, in other words, explaining them or formulating the natural laws which they obey. For myself I am not sure that the construction of such a conceptual pattern is not at this conjuncture the most important task that analysts can undertake. I say this, not in order to minimize the importance of clinical observation in general, for obviously unless the facts are observed there is nothing to fit into a pattern, nothing to explain. I say it because I believe that this aspect of our work is lagging behind the rest and so hindering progress. I believe, indeed, though I am not going to argue the point here and now, that our neglect of this aspect of our work has been, not the sole reason, but one important reason why our Society has been brought as near as it has been recently, to a split. The tendency to a split has of course been extremely regrettable, but it is not in itself of tremendous scientific importance; what has been and is of tremendous importance, as it seems to me, is the fact that we have no adequately clear means for exchanging scientific views. To put the matter very bluntly, it has seemed to me that in some of our discussions we have sometimes just not known what we were talking about. We have, many of us, not been clear enough in formulating our own views to ourselves and we have been unable to understand each other's formulations and we have, consequently, spent much time in talking at cross-purposes. I am not, by the way, trying to put the blame for this on the shoulders of any particular person or group, I am merely stating what I think

is an unfortunate fact which ought to be remedied as quickly as possible.

Perhaps, if our science had reached an ideal state of perfection, all our concepts would have been clearly defined, the observed data on which they were based would have been clearly indicated and perhaps, even, all our technical words would be used to convey one meaning each and only one. If psycho-analysis had reached this stage there would still be room for disagreement among us but our arguments might be more purely scientific and there would be less room, anyhow, for misunderstandings. It seems to me, however, that we are very far indeed from having reached this degree of perfection; but though I doubt very much that we shall ever quite reach it I am quite sure that we ought to try to get a bit closer.

I would wish to see us, then, explore the way by which we can creep closer to this goal, if only by a few inches. We need not be too ambitious to start with. I do not think, for instance, that we need really use each of our technical words in one sense and in one sense only, though I have heard an eminent analyst uphold the view that this is what we do in fact at present. As most of us probably know already the German word '*Zug*' can be used to mean almost anything from a railway train or a draught of air to a shoal of fish, and the English word '*train*' can refer to part of a lady's dress or to a thought sequence as well as to a railway train; yet no confusion is commonly caused by such a multiplicity of meanings. If I told a German that I was travelling to Berlin by *Zug* he would not imagine that I meant to be blown there by a draught or to swim there in company with a shoal of herrings. Even in the proverbially exact science of Mathematics the plus sign, according to Professor Whitehead, has four different meanings; so that I think we need not worry about our words having various senses so long as certain conditions are observed. We must be as clear as possible as to what those various senses are—there must be as little blurring about them as may be—and it must be possible, by the context or otherwise, to distinguish in which sense a word is used on any particular occasion.

I should like, incidentally, to give my opinion for what it is worth, that, at any rate until our ideas are more clearly defined than they are at present, we should do well to use as our medium of expression what I will call '*English*'. I do not press for what is called a '*good style*' or for unnecessary elegances of phrase, though of course if any one can achieve these so much the better. What I do suggest is that so far as possible we should avoid technical terms. I do not deny that technical terms have their uses or that they are sometimes even indispensable, but I do deny that in psycho-analysis, at any rate, they usually help towards clearness of thought. I believe that if we oftener tried to express ourselves in plain words

instead of in '*technical terminology*' we should both produce a livelier effect and we should be less apt to deceive ourselves and others that we give voice to profundities when all that we really do is to add to the world's store of verbiage. More important even than this, we might find it easier to think and to say things that really were profound.

There are certain obvious advantages, however in having technical terms and in using them, if only we give them definite meanings and it is to be hoped that ultimately our list of such words will grow. But I want to make it quite clear that I do not think we should profit much from a mere set of verbal definitions. Certainly a glossary of technical terms has its value, but the meaning of our scientific terms cannot be determined even by the best glossary: we do not know enough for that. At present, anyhow, we should do better to proceed by way of illustration rather than by definition.

In my view we should make a systematic attempt to examine the whole body of our technical words and concepts and to clarify the nature of our concepts and the various usages of our words by the help of suitable examples, just as, if we were trying to convey to a child the nature of the concept '*motor car*' or the usage of these words we should do well to point to examples rather than to offer a verbal definition. I do not deceive myself that the task is easy: some of our concepts are already, if not quite simple, at any rate fairly clearly understood; but it would not be easy to explain by examples what we meant by the words '*ego*' or '*super-ego*', that we so constantly bandy about, nor what we mean by our spatial and dynamic analogies. It might turn out, too, that such a task as I have indicated would be found to be impossible; it might turn out that some of our words were meaningless and some of our concepts redundant, and it is even conceivable that we might find that another set of concepts was more fruitful even than that with which we were supplied by Freud.

At this point I believe that I shall meet with disagreement. I have suggested that conceivably other concepts might turn out more fruitful than Freud's and it has seemed to me in the past that some members feel that any deviation from Freud is a deviation from psycho-analysis and that, as a psycho-analytic society, we have no right to make such deviations. If there are, in truth, any who think like this I would meet their objection with two replies: First I would say that they were being more Freudian than Freud himself, for he was constantly throwing his own ideas overboard when he found others that he thought fitted closer to the facts and I would ask why we should not follow Freud's own example. Next I would say that being psycho-analysts we are surely also scientists and that this implies that if we find it

brings us nearer to the truth to substitute new ideas for old then we must do so whoever first thought of the old ones.

The fact is that Freud was faced by a problem that was, essentially, the same as our own: that of making clinical observations and constructing theories to explain them. But he seems never to have been specially anxious to produce theories of perfect logical consistency or, rather, it would be truer to say that he knew that accuracy and logical consistency, however desirable they might be as ultimate goals, were not goals to be reached in one or two strides. In the state in which he found Psychological Medicine, a comprehensive and logical system was far more remote even than it is now. He did, indeed, make a notable attempt to introduce order into chaos but he was forced to do so piecemeal. He observed his clinical facts and he made his concepts and patterns of concepts to fit them as he went along and he adopted old words or invented new ones to describe them; but as time went on he would, if he found it necessary, discard his old concepts in favour of new and sometimes in the development of his theories he came gradually to use his old words to cover new concepts as well as the old, so that the system which he left, though it was an enormous advance on what had gone before, was still far from perfect. It is true that, just as in English there is something in common between the various concepts denoted by the word 'train' so there is usually something in common between the various concepts denoted by any one technical word in psycho-analysis. Yet the concepts are sometimes far from identical and for clearness' sake it is important to be sure not only of the exact nature of each concept to which a word may refer but also for what purpose a word is used on any given occasion.

What I want to suggest, then, is that it might be scientifically valuable if small groups were to undertake the task of examining some of our concepts—small groups of perhaps half a dozen, like those that I suggested for the exploration of clinical problems. They might tackle such tasks as describing what observed facts the fundamental concept of psychological 'force' helps us to explain and how it helps, how the concept 'ego' is valuable to us and whether we are getting confused by applying the same word to different concepts so that, for instance, we mistakenly assume that what is true of one concept named 'ego' is also true of another concept that goes by the same name. It is perhaps

necessary, though I hope it is not, to insist that such groups would be likely to do useful work only if they made it their object to find an interpretation of observed psychological facts and not an interpretation of texts. Freud having been the genius he was, there has been too great a tendency in the past merely to rely upon his authority. How often have we not heard or read the words 'we know from Freud' that such and such a theory is true? Strictly speaking of course we know nothing from him except the accounts he gives of his clinical material and the nature of the theories he built on this material. We cannot treat Freud like a railway time-table. We can legitimately say on the authority of a time-table that we 'know' of such and such a train, but neither the psychological theories of Freud or those of anyone else have the same order of validity nor are they equally unambiguous. I do not need to say that any such group as I suggest would examine Freud's theories with the greatest care and would certainly profit enormously by doing so, but their final aim must always be to find out what concepts fit the observed facts best and to give as clear an account of them as possible.

I know that many people regard so-called theoretical work as dull compared to clinical work, but the truth is, of course, that though it is possible to separate the two in theory and though I have so separated them here, they are really inextricably bound up together. We shall obviously not get far with our theories unless we have facts to base them on: but our theories, our conceptual patterns, also affect our observation of facts. Once observations have been made and a conceptual pattern formed to explain them it is far easier to observe—to pick out again—similar facts and to build further theories on them. But suppose that our theories do not quite fit the facts; then our future observations are also likely to be misguided—to become distorted—and any theories too that we may build on them are likely to lead us still further astray. True clinical observations are necessary for the formation of true theory and true theory is of almost equal importance for the making of clinical observations.

And now I feel that perhaps I ought to apologize for having made and even laboured many points that will have been obvious to most members, probably to all. My excuse must be that though these points are obvious yet we have tended in the past to overlook them and this has not been good for the development of our science.

(2) A NOTE ON AMBIVALENCE²

In a recent article Dr. Fairbairn (1944) raises a point which I have long felt to need more discussion. Speaking of the origin and consequences of ambivalence he remarks that we cannot content ourselves with saying that the infant becomes

ambivalent: 'From the point of view of the infant himself it is a case of his mother becoming an ambivalent object, i.e. an object which is both good and bad. Since it proves intolerable to him to have a good object which is also bad, he seeks

² Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, May 16, 1945.

to alleviate the situation by splitting the figure of his mother into two objects.'

I do not mean to discuss the rest of the article at present, but the passage that I have quoted seems to me to be the outcome of a view which is common among us, and which I believe to be mistaken, and I shall discuss that alone.

Dr. Fairbairn has tried, as every good analyst must, to see through the eyes or, perhaps, rather, to feel through all the sense organs of the patient under analysis. He has tried to free himself from grown-up preconceptions and prejudices and to become in imagination as a little child. That is, of course, what he ought to try and do; but the question is how far he has succeeded, and, if I am right, the answer is that in some important respects he has not succeeded but has failed.

I believe that Dr. Fairbairn's mistake consists essentially in attributing to small children a too highly sophisticated view of what is often called the 'external world'—a view that it must take them years to acquire and that none of us ever acquires completely. Apart altogether from the question of how far and how early children use concepts and words analogous to grown-up concepts and words, he seems to me to assume that small children create or at least isolate entities in much the same way as grown-ups create or isolate them. I should have liked to use the word 'object' instead of 'entity', but the word 'object' in analysis generally denotes the object of an emotion or of an instinctual impulse, and an 'entity', I suppose, need not be an object in this sense at all. I will use the word 'entity' to describe something that we isolate from the rest of the external world, as we isolate, for example, what we call a rock, a tree or a human being, and think of it as an individual unit. Dr. Fairbairn thinks of the infant as having isolated that entity which we describe as his mother and of his splitting it into two in order to avoid the pain due to ambivalence.

We grown-ups have our own point of view about entities which usually seems to us self-evident, indisputable. As I write I can see a roughly oblong yellowish grey patch of colour with a brilliant area of pinky orange in the middle of it and when I reach out towards it, my hand tingles agreeably. That is a rough account of what we grown-ups call the sensations caused by an electric stove with its glowing element radiating heat. Now I know quite well that when certain changes have taken place which I can indicate by saying that the morning has come and the curtains have been drawn again letting in the daylight and the stove which I turned out on going to bed has long grown cold—when all these changes have taken place, if (to use grown-up terms) I sit in this same chair again, I shall see a patch of roughly similar shape but of quite different colours and associated with quite a different temperature, and yet I shall think of my sensations as being caused by the same stove.

Certainly my sensations will be quite different from those of to-night, but all grown-ups in a position to form an opinion will agree that the stove that underlies them is the same. Probably most of us would regard the changes that I have mentioned, changes of colour and temperature, and (if the position of my chair has changed at all) even the changes of shape too, as being somehow accidental or inessential. For us the stove would be the same stove for all that.

From the whole continuously changing flux of our perceptions we isolate a continuously changing part and regard it as a thing by itself, an entity. But it is hard to say on what principles we grown-ups isolate entities, and especially hard when we consider that we would often admit that even what may be called the physical constituents of an entity change from moment to moment—as they do in human beings and still more obviously in the waves that ruffle the surface of a sheet of water. Yet some things are certain: that in isolating a stove as an entity we take no account of the state of its temperature or of the exact shade of colour it may from time to time present, and in isolating people we take no account of the state of their tempers or of their affections.

Let us now put a baby in my place in front of the stove—a baby gifted for the purpose of this argument with a grown-up's power of self-expression. Let us suppose that last night he was brought home shivering cold and was tucked up in his cot by the stove to warm him. He felt the delicious heat and perhaps he connected it with the glowing pinky orange patch because in his own experience heat had often been associated with patches like that. His shivering stopped and he had a good pull at his bottle and he fell comfortably asleep and later his mother came and turned the stove out and, being faddy, she opened the window to let in what she called 'a little fresh air'. The child slept on till morning but having been given too much to drink over night, and not having been too well trained in cleanliness, or having, perhaps, an attack of anxiety, he wet his bed. With the cold draught from the window and the wet bedclothes he started to shiver again, and what answer can we imagine that child giving, supposing he could give any at all, to someone who asked him where the stove was? Surely what looked to him in the cold light of morning a whitish and not a yellowish grey shape and one which had no glowing centre radiating heat, surely that could not be the stove for him—not in his earliest months.

For an infant still chiefly guided by the pleasure-pain principle, the main interest of the stove must lie in its immediate, warming, pleasure-giving character. He cannot be interested in what we grown-ups call its other qualities or attributes, the colour of its enamel paint, the hardness of its metal frame and so on. This entity that we adults regard as the cold stove this morning, if he isolates it as

an entity at all, can have no continuity with what we should call the warm stove of last night. There could be no continuity until at least he had more or less often observed what we should call the changing of its temperature. There must (to use adult terms) be sometimes a warmth-giving entity and sometimes a neutral entity, if such can exist for him at all at this stage. Later on perhaps there will be a disappointing entity, but at first, so far as it exists at all, a neutral entity.

I will apply what I have said about stoves to human beings. For the infant the essential qualities of the stove must be different in its two phases of warmth and coldness—and therefore so far as entities are isolated at all there must be two different entities. What I suggest is that in Dr. Fairbairn's patient we see the remnants of this outlook as it affects the infant's relation to other people. I suggest that the chief things which interest infants in other people are their emotive qualities, the qualities through which they evoke the infant's immediate emotion, and that it is on the basis of these emotive qualities that he isolates the first entities. The person who evokes pleasant, comforting, agreeable sensations has for him at first no continuity, no identity with what we grown-ups would describe as the same person in an irritating mood. Thus a kindly nurse can be identical with a kindly mother whereas what we regard as the same mother in an aggravating mood cannot be identical with the kindly mother. What some analysts call the 'bad mother' is not for the infant the same person as the 'good' mother, though the good nurse may be the same person as the good mother in spite of our adult opinion to the contrary.

Emotive similarity rather than physical continuity must form the first basis for entity formation. Instead, therefore, of describing an infant's mind in what seem to me the over-adult, oversophisticated terms used by Dr. Fairbairn, instead of saying that he split an ambivalent object into two, it would, I suggest, be nearer the truth to say that the infant was unable to unite into a single entity what seemed to him two quite separate entities and so to reach the ambivalent stage, or it might be truer in some cases to say that having reached the ambivalent stage where the two objects were united into one, the infant failed to maintain it.

If these views about the formation of entities are right, then it would follow that children would of necessity pass through a pre-ambivalent stage. There might be both love and hate for what is to us grown-ups the same object or entity and so to us there might appear to be ambivalence, but for the infant himself since the object of love could not be continuous with the object of hate there could of necessity be no true ambivalence.

There would be no conflict due to ambivalence during the early months, conflict would only arise when the child began to adopt the adult principle

and to isolate entities—not according to their emotive qualities but, principally at least, according to their more permanent physical qualities. It seems to me, too, that not only in Dr. Fairbairn's case but in every other case that we examine we find traces of this pre-ambivalent method of isolating entities. I do not suppose that adults often, or perhaps ever, regress so completely as to rely entirely on the modes of thought characteristic of an infant—but they do often use modes such as are best regarded as the relics of an archaic system not yet quite abandoned.

So-called 'transference' phenomena seem to provide one class of archaic survivals. When an analyst on account of his emotional relationship to the patient comes to 'bear the father imago' we might correctly describe the situation (though we do not usually do so) by saying that the patient 'identifies' the analyst with his father—which is simply saying that for some purposes at least he regards the two men as identical.

What is called the displacement of affect that occurs for example in cases like that quoted by Dr. Fairbairn or of Little Hans seems easiest to understand if it is regarded as due to a partial regression to the pre-ambivalent method of isolating entities. Little Hans's loved father and his feared father could not be identical—but the feared father could be and was identical with the feared horse.

It seems to me then that there must be a period where entities are formed on a principle that depends more on 'emotive' qualities than anything else. At this time out of the changing stream of our perceptions we must isolate constituents which cause us closely similar emotions and we must regard these as entities in the same sense as later on we regard what we call a stove or a particular human being as an entity.

Later on of course we change our attitude and this change must form an important aspect of the processes that Freud describes as the development of the ego and the abandonment of the pleasure-pain principle for the reality principle.

Some ego there must, of course, be from the start, but, though I believe with Freud that a child in its first months mainly uses, as a guide in its relations with the external world, its immediate experiences of pleasure and pain, and though I believe that it is on the basis of such experiences that it classifies the external world into the entities that I have been speaking of, yet I do not mean to say that it is pleasurable and painful stimuli alone that it perceives even in its earliest months. If it perceived these alone it is difficult to see how it could ever arrive at the reality principle. Putting it in adult terms all that I mean is that just as adults classify together the members of one series of experiences to form a single entity so small children classify together the members of a different series. Among infants the basis of classification is provided mainly though not entirely by emotive,

pleasure-pain sensations, whereas the adult relies more on so-called objective stimuli—sensations of colour, touch and so on apart from their immediate emotive value.

I can only suggest that the achievement of the reality principle must come with the power to hold within the child's immediate attention a longer period of time than is possible at first. As the period lengthened the child would realize that immediate pleasure was often associated with pain that was, perhaps, a little less immediate, and conversely immediate pain was associated with less immediate pleasure and he would then find it safer as a guide to attaining the maximum of pleasure to pay closer attention to qualities which were in themselves neutral. If this is so it would presumably be as this new development was taking place that the adult mode of isolating entities would be adopted.

At a later stage, of course, abstract concepts and words play a large part in carrying the development of the ego still further, but I am concerned at the moment only with the isolation of what may be called 'objective' entities, of entities in the external world, and words and concepts are not so important here as they are in the sphere of more abstract thought. It may, however, be worth recalling that though words are certainly invaluable

tools in the work of clear thinking yet they have their disadvantages. They may direct and even sharpen our vision but they also put us into blinkers. Once we are accustomed to thinking and expressing ourselves in words, it is much harder to see through the eyes of a child who has not reached that stage. It is much harder to free ourselves from the adult preconceptions that are stereotyped in words, to imagine what it can be like when the ideas which now seem so commonplace had not yet begun to dawn on us. It is difficult in particular to imagine what it must be like before we realize that in order to establish the most favourable balance of pleasure and pain in our lives it is not merely or even mainly our immediate sensations of pleasure and pain that provide the most useful basis for our practical classifications of external reality. It is just as hard to imagine what it must be like when, in the course of development, we realize that two things which had before seemed as the poles apart from one another are really more conveniently regarded as identical—when in other words we become ambivalent.

REFERENCE

FAIRBAIRN, W. R. D. (1944). 'Endopsychic Structure Considered in Terms of Object-Relationships', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 25, 82.

'NOTES ON METAPSYCHOLOGY AS PROCESS THEORY': SOME COMMENTS¹

By SUSAN ISAACS, LONDON

Dr. Brierley's valuable paper (1944) carries us several steps forward in the ordering and linking up of different parts of the theory of psychoanalysis. The width of ground it covers and the wealth of psychological detail which it embraces might easily be overlooked because of its highly condensed content and abstract style. I am in agreement with its general point of view and most of its detail. Some points, however, seem to call for further expansion, whilst from others I wish to dissent, at least in part.

(1) On p. 100, Dr. Brierley gives her view that memory-traces, the registrations of experience in the psyche, are better thought of as *experience-traces*, not as simply 'sensory'. 'Traces need not be thought of as literal imprints stamped in the mind but as functional predispositions', she says. They include impulse and affect, and are predisposing patterns of *response*.

In this connection, Dr. Brierley points out that it was under the influence of the old associationist terminology that Freud called the registration of experiences in the psyche 'memory-traces'. The earlier associationists (Wundt in particular—his

influence being paramount on the Continent when Freud first formulated his general theories of mental life) tended to overlook what impulse and affect contribute to the processes of perception and of memory. Under this influence, Freud's earliest formulations were not yet fully equal to his clinical work, to his own discovery of the fundamental significance of conative and affective elements, of wishes and drives and emotions in the cognitive work of the mind; although, as Dr. Brierley says, his 'Psychology of the Dream-Processes', (Freud, 1900; 470-570), taken as a whole, leaves us with little doubt that for him the theoretical unit of psychic life was always a complete, dynamic process. In his later studies, such as the essay on negation (Freud, 1925), however, his theoretical formulations are far more adequate to express those essential qualities of mental process which he himself had laid bare in his clinical work.

It is interesting to note that most academic psychologists in this country and in America had, by the time Freud's work on *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) was published, already freed themselves from the mechanistic view of association and approached the study of cognitive functions

¹ Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, May 16, 1945, as a contribution to the discussion on Dr. Brierley's paper, *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 25 (1944), 97.

with a strongly biological outlook. In Stout's *Manual of Psychology*, for example, published in 1899, in which he acknowledges the writings of still earlier psychologists such as James and Baldwin in America, Lloyd Morgan in this country, Stout (1899; 242) takes the view that: 'Perception is never merely cognition. It has also a conative character and feeling-tone. When we speak of perceptual process, we include these factors.' And Stout always emphasized that perception is a *process*, not a passive receiving of an isolated imprint from the outside. Attention, he says (*ibid*; 247), 'is nothing but conation defining itself in cognition.' He emphasizes its active character: 'To attend is always to *watch*, to *await*, to be on the *alert*' (Stout's italics); it always has a 'mental prospectiveness', while at the same time it 'profits by the results of past experience' (*ibid*.; 255), making use of this as a means of preparedness. In other words, perception is a means of living and of gaining satisfactions. And so with other mental functions.

These considerations have an important bearing on the relationship between perceptual and conceptual thinking, which I shall discuss at a later point.

In her present emphasis on mental phenomena as *processes*, and her view that metapsychology is a theory of mental process, Dr. Brierley is thus bringing closer together Freud's later metapsychology (those major elements in it which do the fullest justice to his own clinical discoveries), and the views of outstanding general psychologists. This aspect of Dr. Brierley's approach was already evident in her former paper on 'Theory, Practice and Public Relations' (1943). It is one which gives me particular pleasure.

(2) One point of focal significance which Dr. Brierley makes also interested me very specially. She defines mental mechanisms (on p. 99) thus: 'Dynamically, a mental defence-mechanism is an endopsychic vicissitude of instinct.'

I wish to link this view with my own remarks on the subject in my short communication² to the Special Discussions in this Society (October 1943). in which I considered the relation between instincts phantasies and mechanisms. As I then pointed out, Freud (1925; 369) showed that in his view phantasy is the link between the id-impulse and the ego-mechanism, the means by which the one is transmuted into the other. For example, he refers to what he calls 'the language of the . . . oral impulses': "'I should like to eat that, or I should like to spit it out"; or, carried a stage further: "I should like to take this into me and keep that out of me." That is to say', Freud adds, 'it is to be either *inside me* or *outside me*.' The phantasy 'I should like to eat that' is thus representative of the id-impulse in the psychic life, and,

at the same time, it is the subjective experience of the mechanism or process of introjection.

As I went on to point out, this process has profound real effects, on mind and body. It helps to build character and personality. It issues in material bodily changes, such as conversion symptoms, mannerisms, the bodily expressions of character and personality. The ego itself could not develop without the phantasy of incorporation and the process of introjection, since, as Freud shows, it makes possible knowledge of the external world and reality-testing.

I thus find myself very ready to accept Dr. Brierley's definition of a defence-mechanism, as being 'an endopsychic vicissitude of instinct', a process-response which leads on to the organization of adaptive responses and of the channels of instinct-discharge.

(3) On p. 102 Dr. Brierley translates 'the passing of the Oedipus complex' into terms of mental process as a 'distribution of its component systems between the ego- and super-ego-organizations'. She then goes on to suggest that the notion which some critics have formed that Melanie Klein's views on the genetic importance of infantile phantasies introduce false notions of an unchangeable *enclave* in the unconscious may be due to the fact that Mrs. Klein has not emphasized clearly enough the difference between two different economic situations. 'In one', Dr. Brierley says, 'an early phantasy-system is functionally integrated with the ego-system and operates through it, as in the case of successful sublimation; in another situation a phantasy-system retains or regains its autonomy and operates independently, as in the case of compulsive action.'

Most analysts would agree with this form of statement. And yet some analysts do occasionally give the impression that they tend to assume that the normal person has *got rid* of all unconscious phantasy. In view of this impression, as well as of the fact that this false notion of an 'unchangeable' *enclave* in the unconscious has been attributed to Mrs. Klein by some people, it might be worth while stating the issues once again.

Generally speaking, in the normal person, early phantasy-systems (e.g. the oral) contribute to the adult personality, not in their primary form, but as modified by all the later work which the psyche has done upon them by means of a variety of mental mechanisms. Oral libido and oral aggression with their related phantasies make a permanent contribution to the psychic life, but the forms through which they work become greatly changed in the course of development. The mental energy attached to these early phantasy-systems is to a large extent drained off and used by the adult personality in an endless variety of ways. But the fact that in most people these

² Not yet published.

systems are largely merged with the main ego-system does not mean that they have altogether ceased to exist in the unconscious, ceased to add their constant quota to the psychic energy organized into the total personality. The earliest anxieties have to be dealt with continuously, and are dealt with, not by fixed and irreversible transmutations or desiccations, but by living, dynamic processes of change, which draw much of their own impetus from the instinctual sources belonging to the earliest situations.

Dr. Brierley brings out this particular point in other words when she writes (p. 102): '... mental organization is not static shape but constant renewal of functional pattern. It is accepted that repression is not a single act but a course of action that has to be maintained, and it should also be accepted that organization is perpetual re-organization even where plasticity is reduced to such an extent that the successive re-organizations become almost stereotyped repetitions.'

We need to add, however, that it is not only in ill people (e.g. melancholics) that some part of the earliest systems of phantasy and affect remain dissociated from the main ego-structure and keep a relatively independent life. This is a matter of degree, not of absolute distinction. In ill people, such dissociated systems may be quite extensive, and the ego-structure correspondingly unstable. In more normal people, unmodified primitive systems bulk less large and the ego-organization is more massive and secure. Yet if their earliest anxieties had been *fully* worked over by ego-syntonic mechanisms, it is hard to see why so many normal persons should so readily become ill—even severely ill—if loss or shock or deprivation comes their way.

(4) Again, Dr. Brierley emphasizes the fundamental point that (p. 101): 'The effects of past experience are preserved in the mental organization through which they influence current experience.' In another passage she puts this in another way. Having referred to the nature of defence-mechanisms (p. 99), she says: 'All those other vicissitudes of instinct variously called symptom-formations, sublimation, etc., not excluding ego-differentiation, result from *the continued operation of instinct-stimuli on a psyche modified by the activation of defence-mechanisms.*' (My italics.)

Now closely related to this fundamental characteristic of mental process is Melanie Klein's emphasis on the fact that the earliest object-relationships and the affects belonging to them are bound to have a determining influence upon everything that happens later, including the development of the Oedipus complex. As she put it in her latest contribution to this Society (1945; 28): 'the core of infantile depressive feelings, i.e. the child's fear of the loss of his loved objects, as a con-

sequence of his hatred and aggression, enters into his object relations, and Oedipus complex from the beginning.' How, indeed, could it be otherwise, the mind having these intrinsic characters of retention and organization?

(5) Now I come to matters on which there is more room for dissent. On p. 103, Dr. Brierley returns to her former criticism of Melanie Klein, to the effect that in the formulation of her views there is a 'mixture of perceptual and conceptual thinking'. I commented on this in my own previous paper on 'Phantasy',³ contributed to the Special Discussions (January, 1943), but I shall now add some further considerations.

In the first place, it seems that Dr. Brierley is herself here doing what she attributes to Melanie Klein, i.e. mixing up perceptual and conceptual processes. She says: '... to imagine that a person is being dismembered is sound perceptual thinking appropriate to the description of phantasy. . . . ' Is there not a confusion here between the subject who does the imagining, on the one hand, and the observer or recorder, on the other? The term 'sound' can only be applied to the latter—it has no meaning when applied to the one who imagines: he either does imagine it or he does not. Only the describing or thinking of the psychologist can be called 'sound' or 'unsound'.

Now this way of putting it may easily be an accident, but in the context it seems to be more, since the same order of mistake comes in the next half of the sentence: '... but it is not possible to conceive of a mental object being literally shattered.' Are we to take 'literally' literally? Then of course a mental object cannot be literally shattered—but who imagines it could be? But if it means 'mentally' shattered, then the statement is false, since it certainly can be. An imagined object can be imaginatively shattered, and the shattering or dismembering is just as real or just as imaginary as the object itself.

What sort of mental objects do we *consciously* feel to be shattered? People commonly speak of their ideals, beliefs, hopes, opinions, being shattered and destroyed. When we analyse these situations, we find that the conscious metaphor covers a concrete belief in the unconscious, referring to the actual shattering of an internal physical object, the person of father or mother, or parts of them, felt to be inside the subject's body. The unconscious phantasies expressed in the conscious metaphor refer to concrete bodily events, although the phantasies themselves are psychic processes.

This mix-up between the experienter and the observer and between literal and imaginal is to my mind one of the sources of Dr. Brierley's difficulties on this point. Another is her absolute distinction between the processes of perception and conception. As Stout and James and Ward showed us long ago,

³ Not yet published.

and Spearman's work has confirmed, these are not in fact sharply distinct processes. The one develops into the other. The difference is mainly a matter of the degree of generality of the relationships referred to. E.g., take the following series: the young child says 'Miaow' when he sees the cat; later, he says 'Pussy', then perhaps 'Pussy is drinking'. Much later he may be able to define the cat as 'a four-footed animal which has soft fur, catches mice, likes drinking milk and sitting by the fire in the dwellings of human beings'. And eventually, he may be able to call the cat *Felis domestica* and define it zoologically. But the difference between the mental processes involved in the various members of this series is one of degree of generality of reference. The more abstract term covers a wider range of data and orders them in a more general relationship. For any given purpose of thinking, we have always to determine what degree of generality is the most relevant and the most useful.

Now the term 'object' is just as conceptual as the term 'process'. 'Good object' is slightly less general, since objects can be felt to be either 'good' or 'bad', or a varying admixture of both. 'Good' is a general description of the qualities of those objects in the child's mind which call out positive feelings, themselves based upon experiences of pleasure and satisfaction in the past. As used in the particular context of psycho-analytic theory, the word 'good' is an abstract term which serves to draw our attention to the common qualities of those objects to which the child responds in certain ways, towards which he has certain well-organized process-systems of feeling and response. A different system of feelings and impulses can be seen operating in the child's mind towards that other great class of objects, the 'bad' ones.

Again, the response (the process-system of impulse and affect) is different according to whether the mental object is (mentally) whole or dismembered. When the object is 'shattered', there is a profound change—arising in the first place from the *wish* to shatter, from the internal uprush of aggression, and carried further by the resultant anxieties—a change in the feelings and impulses and the mental mechanisms called into play to re-distribute the ensuing mental tension. This issues in behaviour which the observer calls 'disintegrated'; and the ego itself can be described as 'disintegrated', since some measure of organization is lost and more primitive and partial systems come into play.

Melanie Klein, I presume, uses the terms 'whole object' or 'good object', whenever her immediate purpose of description or explanation requires (in addition to the fact that an object-relationship is one essential element in the total situation being discussed) a reference to the distinction between that class of objects which the subject feels to be 'good' or 'bad', 'whole' or 'dismembered'—

that is to say, when this distinction is closely relevant to the understanding of the object-relationships under discussion and the process-systems operating at the time. In these senses the terms are highly abstract and fully conceptual, quite as much so as 'process' and 'organization'.

Whilst I was writing the above, however, it occurred to me that perhaps some of the difficulty arises from the fact that such a word as 'good' is also in very common usage for far more concrete purposes of everyday life. It is so often used as an adjective with a low degree of generality, as when we taste ice-cream or strawberries; or used as an interjection, when we say 'Good!' if someone promises to do what we want. Perhaps the word inevitably calls up in the minds of all of us a set of processes more appropriate to its less general references, those closely knit with immediate affect and sensory experiences. It would almost seem that in the conjunction of 'good' and 'object', the word 'good' is the more influential; it de-conceptualizes 'object', rather than 'object' de-emotionalizing and de-particularizing 'good'.

(6) Dr. Brierley discusses (p. 103) the view held by some analysts 'that Melanie Klein does not always differentiate between really satisfying relations with "good objects" and relationships with idealized objects. Idealization does not necessarily promote ego-stability.'

Now in this criticism, two distinct aspects of object-relationships seem to be blurred: (a) the relation between external and internal objects; and (b) that between good and bad objects. Both of these are at work in the development of unconscious phantasy and of the ego, but they have to be distinguished and their mode of interaction understood.

'Really satisfying relations with "good objects"' would seem to refer to external objects. These will be 'really satisfying' because they *are* external and real and therefore capable of bringing about the discharge of instinct tension. It also implies that they are not idealized, their good qualities are not over-stressed, their faults and deficiencies are accepted as well. All this is true, but what has to be considered is the ways in which these elements interact.

The understanding of the highly complex mental processes involved here is perhaps the most fundamental of all our problems, one which covers the whole development of object relationships. I cannot do more than merely point to the significance of one or two aspects.

In the first place, love for an idealized object is *built upon* the love of the primary good object, but it has undergone certain significant changes. Love for the idealized object cannot be understood apart from the anxieties felt in the relationship to the bad object. Where there is an idealized object, an

extremely bad one is always present in the background as well. The hate and fear felt towards the bad object give rise to the need to keep the two—the good and the bad objects—absolutely apart and separate, since if they came into contact the bad would destroy the good. There must be no contact between them, no mixing up of the feelings and impulses felt towards them. This separation of the good and the bad, with the splitting of the corresponding systems of impulse and affect, leads to a highly artificial and rigid attitude of mind. One essential element in idealization is this *controlling* of the idealized object and of its counterpart, the terrifyingly bad one, and of all mental processes relating to them. Here we have one of the differences between the relationship to an idealized object and that to a non-idealized good object. With the latter there is far less need to control the object, and the impulses and affects felt towards it are not only less extreme, but also more mobile and more flexible.

All this is true of objects in the *internal* world. It applies also to object-relationships in the external world, since there is always an intimate interplay between the two. The mind moves constantly back and forth between the inner and the outer worlds. On the one hand, the separation of good and bad objects in the internal world leads on to a constant search for idealized good objects in the external world as well. On the other hand, inevitable frustrations and disappointments ensuing in the outer world then augment aggressive wishes against the frustrating reality; the external world thus also becomes peopled with extremely 'bad' objects; and fear drives the mind back to the idealized inner objects. The mechanism of splitting is thus not only essentially dystonic; it also makes it more difficult to adapt to external reality. A vast amount of psychic energy is deployed in the task of keeping good and bad apart, and this leads to an artificial and rigid relation both to the external world and to the inner objects. It is thus this absolute need to separate the good from the bad, to use the idealized object as a *defence* against the extremely bad one, and con-

stantly to control them both, which makes the ego at once rigid and unstable. If the idealized object (whether inner or outer) gets out of control and disappoints or frustrates, it ceases to be 'ideal'; then the 'bad' object is felt to take charge, and the unstable ego tends to break down.

Yet at certain stages of development and under some conditions, idealization *may* contribute something to the stability of the immature ego. Attentive readers of Melanie Klein's papers will see in how many details she has traced the course of development from this precarious phase to the more secure finding of 'really satisfying relations with good objects'.

(7) A final point: On p. 101 Dr. Brierley seems to suggest that Freud and others have regarded the repressed as part of the id. She points out that it would be 'contradictory to regard the id as an unorganized reservoir of instinct and, at the same time, to regard the repressed as part of the id', since clinical experience insists that the repressed is organized. But surely Freud did not in fact ever suggest that the repressed was part of the id?

In conclusion, I should like to say again what satisfaction I have felt in reading Dr. Brierley's paper and noting how many facts it helped to order and to integrate, how much it narrowed the differences between various theoretical statements of clinical experience.

REFERENCES

- BRIERLEY, M. (1943). 'Theory, Practice and Public Relations', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **24**, 119.
 — (1944). 'Notes on Metapsychology as Process Theory', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **25**, 97.
 FREUD, S. (1900). (*Revised Trans.* 1932.) *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Allen & Unwin).
 — (1925). (*Trans.* 1925.) 'Negation', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **6**, 367.
 KLEIN, M. (1945). 'The Oedipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **26**, 11.
 STOUT, G. F. (1899). *Manual of Psychology* (University Tutorial Series).

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PROSTITUTION: THE PSEUDO-PERSONALITY

By TIBOR AGOSTON, NEW YORK

The problem of prostitution confronts the psychiatrist in various forms. In his practice he sees many people who make their living as prostitutes and many who resort to prostitutes either exclusively or to supplement their marital life. Frequently he observes phantasies of people under treatment, the contents of which are that a woman flirts with the idea of being a prostitute or a man thinks about visiting prostitutes, without these phantasies being

translated into reality, and he also meets patients with a horror of prostitution. (This can be illustrated by a certain news report to the effect that a large group of Polish-Jewish girls in a Nazi concentration camp committed suicide for fear of being taken to brothels by the Nazis. Nearly every woman patient I had in analysis when the report was published commented on the story, of which I shall have more to say later.)

The theory of instincts in *classical psychology* differentiates between two groups of instincts: those of self-preservation and those for the propagation of the species. In the light of this classical theory prostitution would be a deflection of the race-preservative instinct from its original aim, inasmuch as sexual intercourse, which theoretically serves the preservation of the species, is carried out for the purpose of earning a living, that is, to satisfy the aim of the instinct of self-preservation. Since the instincts for preservation of self and species are customarily juxtaposed as forces working in opposite directions, prostitution must be called a compromise between the two instincts, whereby one party is willing, for a monetary consideration, to cater to the sexual pleasure of the other, in such a way that neither party does anything in the interests of preserving the species.

Psycho-analytic observations, on the other hand, always following the lead of clinical facts, take into consideration all the genital and pregenital instincts and component instincts too, which have been conveniently classified and defined in psycho-analytic theory. The libido theory of psycho-analysis is, therefore, far more plastic and elastic than the simple dichotomy of instincts for self-preservation and for the propagation of the species.

In analysing the question of prostitution we must proceed on this psycho-analytic foundation if we want to reduce the problem to its elements.

Now we may ask, what is prostitution in the dictionary sense? According to Webster a prostitute is 'a woman who offers herself indiscriminately to sexual intercourse for hire' and prostitution is 'common and venal lewdness among a class of women'. Utilizing our clinical material we can amplify this definition. The psychiatrist sees the problem of prostitution in a much wider and deeper scope than would appear at first glance.

(I) THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROSTITUTION

In the psychological sense the essentials of prostitution are not fully covered by a definition which specifies that it is hired, indiscriminate sexual intercourse with a certain class of women.

For we see that:

(1) Actual or phantasied prostitution is by no means limited to class.

(2) The choice of partner is not only indiscriminate and promiscuous, but purposely unselective. There is involved a kind of defiant intent to show that 'anyone at all will do, no matter who, as long as he pays'.

(3) Not only is the sexual intercourse paid for, but the manner of payment is calculated to emphasize that the relation exists only for material ends and has nothing to do with love or affection.

(4) This is borne out by the usually brief duration of the relationship and

(5) By the contempt which each partner feels for the other. (The prostitute is thought of as 'degraded', her guest as a 'sucker'.)

(6) It is borne out also by the 'incognito' of those participating in an act of prostitution. By this I mean that neither partner reveals his or her true self. It is characteristic of this incognito partnership that no real curiosity exists regarding the identity of the other partner. If such an interest appears to be present in the form of questions, these are intended only to elicit false replies. Questions concerning the personality of the partner are mostly a kind of invitation to be told tales, which again points towards the fact that the partners have no real wish to know each other. Prostitution is intercourse of genitals only, but not of persons.

(7) The incognito partnership leads up to the point which I believe to be the essence of the psychology of prostitution. The partners not only remain unknown to each other but they mask themselves behind fictitious personalities. Prostitution and everything connected with it is saturated through and through with pseudo-personality.

(II) THE PSEUDO-PERSONALITY OF THE PROSTITUTE

What do we mean by pseudo-personality? Very briefly, it means that a person denies his or her identity in order to escape feelings of guilt: a process which might be phrased as 'I am not I'.

(a) The pseudo-personality is evidenced in that the partners remain unknown to each other. They do not reveal who they really are. Leonardo da Vinci, for example, it will perhaps be remembered, was interested in designing the perfect house of prostitution, which one could frequent without being seen or recognized.

(b) Keeping their personalities secret, is, however, not enough for those who participate in prostitution. They go further, telling fictitious tales about themselves and their families. All of these tales seem to follow a certain pattern. The tales of female prostitutes usually contain a rich or fabulous father who lost his wife and brought a wicked stepmother to the house, who, in turn, cast the daughter out. The tales men tell are usually about wicked and cruel, or else weak and infamous fathers and glorified mothers. Second marriages often figure in their stories as well. For example, one of my patients used to 'frighten' prostitutes by saying that he had just escaped from prison, where he had been confined for murdering his father. On other occasions this patient told prostitutes that he was released on probation from an asylum for the insane, where his family had him committed in order to protect him from criminal prosecution for the murder of his father.

All these tales express the Oedipus complex. In the woman's case there is a heroic father and a

wicked mother who casts the daughter out; in the man's, a long-suffering or glorified mother and a bad father who had to die.

(c) The pseudo-personality, in addition to masking the real personality behind invented tales, is manifested in another characteristic way, which may be called 'false toughness'. In the guise of toughness, both parties assume a pose of being money-mad or pleasure-hungry. The female prostitute emphasizes that the intercourse is purely a business proposition. She is always in haste because other guests are waiting; she lets her partner know that she does not expect tenderness, but that if the guest would like some, she can furnish that, too, for extra pay. She makes references to her strong-armed friends, to her wild dog, or to her violent temper: in other words she stresses, often in vulgar terms, that she is a tough, hard-boiled, unsentimental person. The man expresses false toughness by showing off, assuming the pose of a tough guy, who for his money can take his pick among women, and who can change off among them as he pleases, and cares about nothing but his pleasure. He often uses coarse language, too: he 'knows it all' and is 'game for anything' in matters of sex, being familiar with perversions and tricks; in other words he pretends that he is not afraid but free and untrammelled in sex and other things.

Under this cloak of false toughness one finds its very opposite. Prostitutes are so extremely shy and bashful that they are often ashamed to undress for a medical examination. They are very sentimental, with phantasies about great loves like those in the movies, about motherhood and large families. Men who visit prostitutes present the same type of picture. One of my patients, for example, went to a really dangerous part of Harlem, showing off with his money, and an hour later was badly frightened by a loud word in his office.

The pleasure-hungry *roué* who frequents prostitutes, often suffers from impotence or premature ejaculation, sometimes making use of his visit to a prostitute only to masturbate afterwards with recollections of his experiences. Prostitutes are frigid almost without exception, and especially frigid with their guests.

(III) THE MECHANISM AND AETIOLOGY OF PROSTITUTION

The pseudo-personality, the analysis of the invented tales and false toughness easily reveal to the psychiatrist the mechanism and aetiology of prostitution.

Prostitution is a temporary, compromise-solution of an anxiety, by means of the 'I am not I' mechanism. 'It is not I myself that takes part in intercourse; I don't feel anything; I am not emotionally involved; I am only earning money and the partner doesn't concern me.' In other

words, those who participate in prostitution resolve their anxiety on the principle that 'so long as I am hard-boiled, insincere, unemotional, not bound by ties to my partner, sexual intercourse is not sexual intercourse.'

(A) *The Oedipus Complex of the Prostitute*

What, we may now ask, is the source of these anxieties? Let us examine the tales behind which the participants in prostitution mask their true selves. Each of these stories represents the Oedipus complex and the castration fear which attaches to every unresolved Oedipus complex. We have seen that women tell of a heroic father and a bad mother who cast them out and forced them into prostitution. The stories of men, on the other hand, dealt with wonderful mothers, and bad, or unsatisfactory fathers who had to be killed, or who died. The son or daughter is always an outcast or orphan. The parent of the opposite sex is always wonderful and the parent of the same sex is always inadequate. All this points precisely to the basic Oedipus complex, the content of which is incestuous love for one parent and hostility towards the other parent, accompanied by feelings of guilt and fear of punishment in the form of castration, isolation, persecution or being cut off from the family.

Perhaps in no other connection is the Oedipus complex and the anxiety which stems from it revealed so clearly as in prostitution.

The Oedipus complex comes to light in the following circumstances pointing to the prostitute's wishes:

(a) The prostitute gets every man.

(b) To every man is assigned the rôle of father, provider, 'Sugar Daddy'.

(c) The prostitute takes vengeance on every decent woman (mother) when she, theoretically, takes her man away from her.

(d) 'She herself' is not involved in the whole procedure, as we have seen, for she is frigid and feels nothing. For example, she may consider herself a 'good little girl' and a bread-winner, who does those things only out of necessity. A prostitute patient of mine replied to a question about her livelihood with: 'If one is a good girl and industrious, one can make out quite nicely.'

(B) *The Castration Anxiety of the Prostitute*

The physical or psychic frigidity of the prostitute is in itself indicative of castration anxiety which derives from the unresolved Oedipus complex. Other traces of castration fear are, however, easy to find when we consider that:

(a) In order to avert her fear the prostitute castrates her partners by taking their money and their dignity. ('He is exploited, not I.')

(b) She enjoys triumphantly the partner's nudity, his excitement, and his loss of excitement.

(c) As a repetition compulsion she re-enacts over and over again her own separation from her partner.

(She punishes herself and accustoms herself to the fact of separation.)

(C) *The Specific Quality in the Prostitute's Castration Fear*

In psycho-analysis it has always been my experience that people who participated in prostitution, either actually or in phantasy, suffered from a specific form of castration fear. By this I mean that in childhood they experienced castration threats of an existential and social nature. The point of this is that constantly repeated threats or actualities were experienced over a period of years to the effect that the family will be ruined, they will get poor, and the child will end up in the street and starve. In other words, the prospect of a continually pending punishment was unfolded before the child, which was to be put in force if the child misbehaved or sinned and which consisted in the child's being cast out of the family and society and left, without shelter, food or protection, to die.

This specific castration fear may be designated as existential because its object is not separation from the genitals but from the benefits of the environment.

(D) *Rejection in the Prostitute's Childhood*

The invented tales in prostitution maintain that one parent was weak or bad and stress the excellence of the other. If, however, even one parent had been so wonderful as the story would have it, that would have prevented the development of a fear of such overpowering proportions as is uncovered in the analyses of prostitutes. For children, with their infinite capacity for adaptation, will cling to even the smallest particle of acceptance and security, and this serves to protect them from deep, intense and encompassing fears.

This brings us to the point which I have designated as the second essential factor in the ætiology of prostitution, co-existent with the specific existential quality of the castration fear. The stories told in prostitution are wish-fulfillments, or a distorted combination of wishes and reality. The truth is invariably that the prostitute felt completely rejected by both parents. This feeling was founded, in most cases, on fact, and sometimes in part on phantasy. Owing to the bi-parental rejection, the child's total personality became consumed with fear, and he came to feel isolated, so that the development and assertion of his real personality was inhibited.

This absolute bi-parental rejection, in conjunction with the existential castration fear, forms the second mainspring of the 'I am not I' mechanism (pseudo-personality). The double rejection, furthermore, makes possible the extremely intense overall castration fear observed in the prostitute. Also traceable to the bi-parental rejection is the fact that the child who for years attempted to reach his unresponsive parents and break through

his emotional isolation finally reacts with the determination never again to display real emotion, only pseudo-emotion, and even this only for profit. This is one of the reasons why acting is felt by a portion of the public to be very much akin to prostitution, and why certain people see a prostitute in every 'entertainer'.

The rejection by both parents as well as the existential castration fear are not at all limited to class or economic status. They occur in both rich and poor families. Not infrequently wealthy and socially prominent parents rationalize their coldness towards the child with 'I have no time for you now; I must earn money to support you' as the reason why they cannot devote themselves to the child. Needless to say, such parents are themselves neurotics, usually with repressed, narcissistic, oral-anal characters.

It is interesting psychologically that prostitutes and those with prostitution phantasies identify themselves with the rejecting parents in spite of the rejection. The identification is revealed in their carrying out of the parental prophecy: 'you will end up in the gutter.'

This identification, like all other manifestations of prostitution, is a make-believe, for by being a 'street-walker', the prostitute is actually taking measures against 'ending up in the street'. The pseudo-identification shows, rather, the totally dependent pseudo-personality of the prostitute, which compulsively accepts the parental prophecy, after the independent personality has been smothered by fear.

(IV) THE SPECIFIC REGRESSION OF THE PROSTITUTE

The social-existential castration threat and the actual bi-parental rejection are responsible for the specific regression which takes place in prostitution and which appears in the guise of an oral-anal regression, in which money, livelihood and material security assume prime importance in place of the dynamism of maturity based on object love and devotion.

This oral-anal regression, however, like everything else in the nature of prostitution, bears the stamp of falsity. The prostitute pretends that money and livelihood are the aim and end of her prostitution, although behind her ostentatious demonstration of these oral-anal characteristics is concealed her absolutely infantile, polymorphous perversion. The prostitute never saves money, but squanders it and is almost always poor. Tradition has it that prostitutes die in the poor-house. Although their eating and drinking habits are conspicuous, for they eat or drink continually, often in the street, and they are usually fat, they do not really enjoy their food: they are not *gourmets*.

The prostitute acts as though she were consenting to the use of her body exclusively for the purpose of making money. But the truth is that she gives

herself up to her infantile component instincts of scopophilia and exhibitionism, and enjoys the magic power, similarly infantile, with which she can bring about changes (erection, movements, ejaculation), in such a way that she is actually not even present affectively, not participating but hiding behind her mask, and above all she is provided with security (money and livelihood).

In men this is modified in the sense that they can obtain everything for money, without having to take part in it affectively or dynamically.

In women therefore, the emphasis on money and the insistent rationalization of the self-preservative instinct, without true sexuality (emotion or devotion), are only camouflage, serving to conceal the infantile, polymorphous perversions.

In men the emphasis on getting everything for money, 'keeping a woman', showing off one's power and influence, is also camouflage to cover infantile polymorphous perversion, for no real power, potency or personal attraction is involved, but only money, and what they receive is by no means 'everything', but only pseudo-sexuality and cold, unemotional contact.

(V) THE EXPLANATION OF THE PSEUDO-PERSONALITY AND THE PSEUDO-REGRESSION

We have already mentioned some elements of the pseudo-personality of prostitutes and those participating in prostitution. We have shown that the prostitute remains unknown, heightens her incognito with the aid of false tales, and exhibits false toughness in her behaviour. Although these points have been stressed, the personality of the prostitute may actually be described as false in *all* its manifestations. She gives false reasons for her prostitution; what she does is only a pseudo-revolution against society, for in reality she abuses not society but herself; she poses as very sexual although she does not enjoy sexuality; she pretends to have relations with all men, but actually she has no one.

I have designated the prostitute's regression to the oral-anal phase as false because no real greed for money and hoarding, nor any true enjoyment of orality could be observed.

The explanation of the complete falsity of the prostitute's personality may be found in the specific existential castration fear, which has been discussed above, and in the real bi-parental rejection.

Psycho-analysis teaches that castration fears which are the consequence of threats or phantasies are present in every individual. Sound personalities settle their castration fears in themselves and respect the presence of similar fears in others. It is largely for this reason that in our society sex relationships are preceded by introduction and courtship. By these means the castration fear of individuals can be stilled with the assurance that they will not be subjected to mutilation or annihi-

lation in the new relationship. Courtship offers the security that the partner who is known (introduced) desires not only the genitals but loves the entire person and will do no harm.

It seems contradictory that in the case of participants in prostitution, whose characteristic castration fear refers to danger to the existence of the entire personality, the reassuring customary introduction and courtship are lacking.

This apparent contradiction disappears when two things are examined: the rôle of money and the false genitality. On the one hand introduction and courtship are replaced in prostitution by money, which is the symbol of the self-preservative instinct and of existence. On the other hand in prostitution even the genital contact is false, because the intense and specific castration fear brings about regression to the absolutely infantile pregenital level of exhibitionism and scopophilia, and magic instinctual life.

In short, the prostitute, denying her true identity, offers a pseudo-personality for hire and, with the rented pseudo-personality, proceeds to a completely infantile regression.

(VI) ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE EXISTENTIAL QUALITY OF THE PROSTITUTE'S CASTRATION FEAR

Nothing could better reveal this very intense castration anxiety than that prostitutes themselves usually keep a gigolo, to whom they give all their money in order to be sure of a protector and lover.

Prostitution is very often ushered in by a psychic shock (trauma), frequently in the form of a serious physical disease, such as tuberculosis or heart disease, which arouses a feeling of hopelessness and fear of death. The trauma fulfils the castration threat of the past.

In this way people with the type of personality and castration fear which has been described above, when confronted with a seemingly incurable disease, will regress to the infantilism inherent in prostitution, using the doctor's advice to avoid worry, to take it easy, not to work and to eat well as a rationalization.

I mentioned at the outset that my female patients in analysis showed great interest in the reported suicide in a Nazi concentration camp of some Polish Jewesses who were to be transferred to Nazi brothels. The reactions of my patients may be summed up as follows:

(1) The non-prostituted personality feels distinctly that prostitution means the death of the personality. Therefore suicide is only a hastening of the step-by-step annihilation of personality which would take place in prostitution.

(2) Violent, unprepared, non-introduced intercourse, such as takes place in prostitution, elicits fear of death each time it occurs. Therefore a single, definitive death by suicide is preferable to the frequently repeated sense of dying in prostitution.

(3) The Nazis, who are the murderers of fathers, brothers, husbands and relatives, would end up by killing the girls themselves. Therefore it is better to forestall the slow torture by suicide.

(4) Intercourse with the father-killing Nazis would be incestuous, equivalent to complicity in the murder of the father, and this is punishable by death in any event.

(5) Two patients with intensive prostitution phantasies disapproved of the suicides. They felt that it would have been better to 'take a chance'.

(VII) THERAPY OF PROSTITUTES

Psychiatrists commonly hold a very pessimistic view of the prognosis of the rehabilitation and cure of prostitutes. This does not seem justified. Prostitutes are shy individuals. As I had the opportunity of pointing out five years ago (December 10, 1940) at the New York Psychoanalytic Society in discussing a paper on 'Blushing' which was read by Dr. Sandor Feldman (*Psychiat. Quart.* 15), patients often make an ostentatious show of genital exhibition or its equivalents in order to divert attention from a pregenital symptom, which they are anxious to hide from the analyst and the world. As I pointed out on that occasion, the lady who talks freely about her sexual experiences is ashamed to mention her flatus habits or that she picks between her toes.

The more pregenital or infantile a habit or symptom is, the more the patient will try to conceal it, and the more sensitive he will be about discussing it. As we have seen, prostitution deals with reactions which are localized in the most infantile mental layers. It is clear, therefore, that prostitutes will conceal their activities and patients will conceal their prostitution-phantasies because they feel ashamed.

It seems, however, that if in the treatment or analysis the castration anxiety which makes the whole personality feel endangered is considered and the positive sides of the personality are gradually emphasized, while the prostitution symptoms are passed over lightly and all but disregarded, the prognosis is no worse than in any other anxiety neurosis or character analysis.

SUMMARY

(1) The psychiatrist is often called upon to treat patients who (a) practise prostitution or (b) have phantasies about prostitution.

(2) On the basis of psychiatric experience, the dictionary definition of prostitution is modified as follows. According to the dictionary prostitution means sexual intercourse (a) for hire, (b) indiscriminately, (c) among a certain class of women. Psychiatric experience shows that in prostitution (a) promiscuousness implies an intentional, defiant indifference in the selection of partners ('Anyone at all will do'); (b) no limitation to class was observed; (c) the relationship is usually marked by brevity; (d) the partners are contemptuous of each other; (e) the partners remain incognito; and (f) their incognito is fortified by fictitious tales about themselves and their families.

(3) According to psychiatric experience the psychological essential in prostitution is the development of a pseudo-personality which is manifested chiefly in (a) the psychological incognito of the partners, (b) false tales about themselves and their origin and (c) false toughness.

(4) The aetiology of prostitution involves two co-existent factors: (a) deep, intense castration fear with a special, existential quality; (b) complete emotional rejection by both parents, usually in actual fact, very rarely with a partial element of phantasy. This in turn is caused by the repressed, narcissistic, oral-anal character of the parents.

(5) Concomitant with the pseudo-personality of the prostitute is pseudo-regression to the oral-anal level, which, in the guise of money-madness, conceals regression to the completely infantile level of (a) exhibitionism, (b) scopophilia and (c) enjoyment of magic power.

(6) The prognosis of prostitution and prostitution-phantasies is fairly good if the symptom (prostitution), of which the patient is ashamed, is treated nonchalantly and the patient's positive qualities are supported, so that by 'accepting' the patient, re-education and rehabilitation are made possible.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

LIST OF ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF FREUD'S WORKS

By JAMES STRACHEY, LONDON

What follows is intended to be a complete list of all of Freud's writings that have been published in the English language up to the end of August, 1945. In compiling the list I have been especially indebted to Dr. John Rickman's *Index Psychoanalyticus 1893-1926* (London, Hogarth Press, 1928) for the period which it covers. I have also made use of the very full Freud bibliography, extending to about the year 1930, compiled by Dr. K. Bühler and included in *The Psychological Register* (ed. Carl Murchison) III, 591-605 (Worcester, Mass., Clark University Press; London, Humphrey Milford, 1932). A subsequent list, also due to Dr. Rickman, will be found at the end of his *General Selection from the*

Works of Sigmund Freud (London, Hogarth Press, 1937; reprinted in *Civilization, War and Death*, same editor and publishers, 1939). This carries the list of translations down to July, 1937, but records only the English titles.

It may be of interest to give some approximate indication of the proportion of Freud's writings that remain untranslated into English. The list below contains nearly a hundred and fifty items. Of these some twenty represent self-contained volumes, while another eighty are comprised in the four volumes of the *Collected Papers*. This leaves about fifty that have not hitherto been brought together in volume form, though more than half of these (including almost all the more important ones) are to be found in the pages of the *International Journal*. Compared with this total of a hundred and fifty translated books and papers, there are about fifty items in the two German collected editions which have never been published in English. These vary greatly in length, though they are for the most part very short and none of them is of great scientific interest. Finally, in addition to these, there are about thirty books and papers which belong to Freud's pre-psychological period and are not included in the German collected editions. One of these was in fact his first work to appear in English and will be found at the head of the present list.

The list has no pretensions to bibliographical completeness in the technical sense: its aim is purely utilitarian—namely, to make it easy for an enquirer in search of any particular work to lay his hands on the original and its translation. No attempt has been made to enumerate successive editions either of the originals or of the translations. The references to the German originals are in most cases limited to the *Gesammelte Schriften* and to the more complete *Gesammelte Werke* which are now in course of publication. In the case of the translations, the reference is usually, where possible, to one edition each (by choice a fairly recent one) in England and America. At the present time, of course, many of the books are out of print in both countries. Anyone who requires fuller bibliographical information, whether about the originals or about translations into English or other languages, may be referred either to the *Index Psychoanalyticus*, to *The Psychological Register* or to the bibliographies appended to each volume of the *Gesammelte Werke*. The first volume of the latter is to include a list of Freud's pre-analytical works drawn up by the author himself and originally published in Vienna in 1897; this has already been reprinted in I.Z.P. 25 (1940), 69–93.

The entries are arranged in roughly chronological order and are numbered for convenience of reference. The dates introducing each entry are those of the original German publication, except in a few instances where the date of writing has been preferred. Where two or more translations have appeared of the same work, they are distinguished by letters; only in the case of the longer works have the names of the translators been specified. Titles of *books* are in italics; titles of *papers* are in inverted commas.

Any corrections and additions to the list will be gratefully received. It is scarcely necessary to add that inclusion in it is no guarantee of the accuracy or elegance of a translation. The versions are in fact highly variable in these respects.

Finally, I must express my thanks to those who have helped me with information and criticism, and in particular to Dr. W. Hoffer; and to Dr. Gosselin and the staff of the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, who, though in no way responsible for any errors in the final result, have taken the most generous trouble in verifying the American data.

ABBREVIATIONS

- G.S. = Freud, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Vienna, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1924–34, 12 vols.).
- G.W. = Freud, *Gesammelte Werke chronologisch geordnet* (London, Imago Publishing Co., 1940—, to be completed in 18 vols. Vol. XVII of this is identical with Freud, *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*, same publishers, 1941. References in the following list to volumes not yet published are printed in brackets.).
- C.P. = Freud, *Collected Papers* (London, Hogarth Press, 1924–5, 4 vols.).
- S.P.H. = Freud, *Selected Papers on Hysteria* (New York, Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, third, enlarged, edition, 1920).
- I.J.P.A. = *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* (London).
- I.Z.P. = *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* (Vienna and London).
- P.Q. = *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* (New York).
- L. = London.
- N.Y. = New York.

- (1) 1884 'A New Histological Method for the Study of Nerve-Tracts in the Brain and Spinal Chord'. Original unpublished. *Brain*, L., 7 (Part 25, April, 1884), 86–88.
- (2) 1893 'Über den psychischen Mechanismus hysterischer Phänomene'. (With Breuer.) G.S. I, 7–24; (G.W. I). Also included in No. 7.

- (a) 'The Psychic Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena'. (With Breuer.) S.P.H., 1-13. Also included in No. 7.
- (b) 'On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena'. (With Breuer.) C.P. I, 24-41.
- (3) 1893 'Charcot'. G.S. I, 243-257; (G.W. I).
'Charcot'. C.P. I, 9-23.
- (4) 1893 'Quelques considérations pour une étude comparative des paralysies motrices organiques et hystériques'. Original in French. G.S. I, 273-289; (G.W. I).
'Some Points in a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Paralysis'. C.P. I, 42-58.
- (5) 1894 'Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen'. G.S. I, 290-305; (G.W. I).
(a) 'The Defense Neuro-psychoses'. S.P.H., 121-132.
(b) 'The Defence Neuro-Psychoses'. C.P. I, 59-75.
- (6) 1895 'Obsessions et phobies'. Original in French. G.S. I, 334-342; (G.W. I).
'Obsessions and Phobias'. C.P. I, 128-137.
- (7) 1895 *Studien über Hysterie*. (With Breuer.) Vienna, Deuticke; G.S. I, 1-238; (G.W. I).
The two latter omit Breuer's contributions. Includes No. 2.
Studies in Hysteria. (With Breuer.) Trans. A. A. Brill. N.Y., Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1936. This includes Breuer's contributions. Includes No. 2 (a).
- (8) 1895 'Über die Berechtigung, von der Neurasthenie einen bestimmten Symptomenkomplex als "Angstneurose" abzutrennen'. G.S. I, 306-333; (G.W. I).
(a) 'On the Right to Separate from Neurasthenia a Definite Symptom-complex as "Anxiety Neurosis"'. S.P.H., 133-154.
(b) 'The Justification for Detaching from Neurasthenia a Particular Syndrome: the Anxiety-Neurosis'. C.P. I, 76-106.
- (9) 1895 'Zur Kritik der "Angstneurose"'. G.S. I, 343-362; (G.W. I).
'A Reply to Criticisms on the Anxiety-Neurosis'. C.P. I, 107-127.
- (10) 1896 'Weitere Bemerkungen über die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen'. G.S. I, 363-387; (G.W. I).
(a) 'Further Observations on the Defense Neuropsychoses'. S.P.H., 155-174.
(b) 'Further Remarks on the Defence Neuro-Psychoses'. C.P. I, 155-182.
- (11) 1896 'Zur Ätiologie der Hysterie'. G.S. I, 404-438; (G.W. I).
'The Aetiology of Hysteria'. C.P. I, 183-219.
- (12) 1896 'L'hérédité et l'étiologie des névroses'. Original in French. G.S. I, 388-403; (G.W. I).
'Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses'. C.P. I, 138-154.
- (13) 1898 'Die Sexualität in der Ätiologie der Neurosen'. G.S. I, 439-464; (G.W. I).
'Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses'. C.P. I, 220-248.
- (14) 1900 *Die Traumdeutung*. G.S. II, 1-543 (reprint of 1st ed.) and III, 1-185 (corrections and additions up to 8th ed.); G.W. II-III, 1-642 (reprint of 8th ed.).
The Interpretation of Dreams. Trans. A. A. Brill. Revised ed. (in accordance with 8th German ed.), L., Allen & Unwin, 1932; N.Y., Macmillan, 1937. Included in *Basic Writings of S. Freud*, N.Y., Modern Library, 1938.
- (15) 1901 *Über den Traum*. G.S. III, 187-256; G.W. II-III, 645-700.
On Dreams. Trans. M. D. Eder. L., Heinemann, 1914.
- (16) 1904 'Die Freudsche psychoanalytische Methode'. G.S. VI, 3-10; G.W. V, 3-10.
'Freud's Psycho-Analytic Method'. C.P. I, 264-271.
- (17) 1904 *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens*. G.S. IV, 1-310; G.W. IV, 1-310.
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Trans. A. A. Brill. N.Y., Macmillan, 1914; L., Fisher Unwin, 1914; L. and N.Y., Penguin Books, 1938. Included in *Basic Writings of S. Freud*, N.Y., Modern Library, 1938.
- (18) 1904 'Psychopathische Personen auf der Bühne'. Original unpublished.
'Psychopathic Characters on the Stage'. P.Q. II (1942), 459-464.
- (19) 1905 'Über Psychotherapie'. G.S. VI, 11-24; G.W. V, 13-26.
(a) 'On Psychotherapy'. S.P.H., 175-185.
(b) 'On Psychotherapy'. C.P. I, 249-263.
- (20) 1905 *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*. G.S. V, 1-119; G.W. V, 29-145.
Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex. Trans. A. A. Brill. Revised ed. (in accordance with 4th German ed.), N.Y., Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1930. Included in *Basic Writings of S. Freud*, N.Y., Modern Library, 1938.

- (21) 1905 *Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten*. G.S. IX, 1-269; G.W. VI, 1-269.
Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious. Trans. A. A. Brill. N.Y., Moffat, Yard, 1917;
 L., Kegan Paul, 1922. Included in *Basic Writings of S. Freud*, N.Y., Modern
 Library, 1938.
- (22) 1905 'Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse'. G.S. VIII, 1-126; G.W. V, 163-286.
 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria'. C.P. III, 13-146.
- (23) 1906 'Meine Ansichten über die Rolle der Sexualität in der Ätiologie der Neurosen'. G.S.
 V, 123-133; G.W. V, 149-159.
 (a) 'My Views on the Rôle of Sexuality in the Etiology of the Neurosis'. S.P.H.,
 186-193.
 (b) 'My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Ætiology of the Neuroses'.
 C.P. I, 272-283.
- (24) 1906 'Tatbestandsdiagnostik und Psychoanalyse'. G.S. X, 197-209; G.W. VII, 3-15.
 (a) 'The testimony of Witnesses and Psychoanalysis'. S.P.H., 216-225.
 (b) 'Psycho-Analysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts of Law'. C.P. II,
 13-24.
- (25) 1907 'Zwangshandlungen und Religionsübungen'. G.S. X, 210-220; G.W. VII, 129-139.
 'Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices'. C.P. II, 25-35.
- (26) 1907 'Zur sexuellen Aufklärung der Kinder'. G.S. V, 134-142; G.W. VII, 19-27.
 'The Sexual Enlightenment of Children'. C.P. II, 36-44.
- (27) 1907 *Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens 'Gradiva'*. G.S. IX, 271-367; G.W. VII,
 31-125.
Delusion and Dream. Trans. Helen M. Downey. N.Y., Moffat, Yard, 1917; L., Allen
 & Unwin, 1921.
- (28) 1908 'Die "kulturelle" Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervosität'. G.S. V, 143-167;
 G.W. VII, 143-167.
 '"Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness'. C.P. II, 76-99.
- (29) 1908 'Über infantile Sexualtheorien'. G.S. V, 168-185; G.W. VII, 171-188.
 'On the Sexual Theories of Children'. C.P. II, 59-75.
- (30) 1908 'Hysterische Phantasien und ihre Beziehung zur Bisexualität'. G.S. V, 246-254;
 G.W. VII, 191-199.
 (a) 'Hysterical Fancies and their Relations to Bisexuality'. S.P.H., 194-200.
 (b) 'Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality'. C.P. II, 51-58.
- (31) 1908 'Charakter und Analerotik'. G.S. V, 261-267; G.W. VII, 203-209.
 'Character and Anal Erotism'. C.P. II, 45-50.
- (32) 1908 'Der Dichter und das Phantasieren'. G.S. X, 229-239; G.W. VII, 213-223.
 'The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming'. C.P. IV, 173-183.
- (33) 1909 'Allgemeines über den hysterischen Anfall'. G.S. V, 255-260; G.W. VII, 235-240.
 'General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks'. C.P. II, 100-104.
- (34) 1909 'Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben'. G.S. VIII, 127-265; G.W. VII,
 243-377. See No. 98.
 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy'. C.P. III, 149-287. See No. 98.
- (35) 1909 'Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose'. G.S. VIII, 267-351; G.W.
 VII, 381-463.
 'Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis'. C.P. III, 293-383.
- (36) 1909 'Der Familienroman der Neurotiker'. G.S. XII, 367-371; G.W. VII, 227-231.
 'The Family Romance of Neurotics'. Included in Rank, *Myth of the Birth of the Hero*,
 63-68, N.Y., Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1914.
- (37) 1909 *Über Psychoanalyse*. G.S. IV, 345-406; G.W. VIII, 3-60.
The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis (Five Lectures Delivered at Clark Uni-
 versity). Trans. Harry W. Chase. *American Journal of Psychology*, 21 (1910),
 181-218. Included in *Outline of Psychoanalysis* (ed. Van Teslaar), N.Y., Modern
 Library, 1924.
- (38) 1910 *Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci*. G.S. IX, 369-454; G.W. VIII,
 128-211.
Leonardo da Vinci. Trans. A. A. Brill. N.Y., Dodd, Mead, 1932; L., Kegan Paul,
 1922.
- (39) 1910 '"Über den Gegensinn der Urworte"'. G.S. X, 221-228; G.W. VIII, 214-221.
 '"The Antithetical Sense of Primal Words"'. C.P. IV, 184-191.
- (40) 1910 'Die zukünftigen Chancen der psychoanalytischen Therapie'. G.S. VI, 25-36;
 G.W. VIII, 104-115.

- (a) 'The Future Chances of Psychoanalytic Therapy'. S.P.H., 207-215.
 (b) 'The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy'. C.P. II, 285-296.
- (41) 1910 'Über "wilde" Psychoanalyse'. G.S. VI, 37-44; G.W. VIII, 118-125.
 (a) 'Concerning "Wild" Psychoanalysis'. S.P.H., 201-206.
 (b) 'Observations on "Wild" Psycho-Analysis'. C.P. II, 297-304.
- (42) 1910 'Die psychogene Sehstörung in psychoanalytischer Auffassung'. G.S. V, 301-309; G.W. VIII, 94-102.
 'Psychogenic Visual Disturbance according to Psycho-Analytical Conceptions'. C.P. II, 105-112.
- (43) 1910 'Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens: (i) Über einen besonderen Typus der Objektwahl beim Manne'. G.S. V, 186-197; G.W. VIII, 66-77.
 'Contributions to the Psychology of Love: (i) A Special Type of Choice of Object made by Men'. C.P. IV, 192-202.
- (44) 1911 'Formulierungen über die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens'. G.S. V, 409-418; G.W. VIII, 230-238.
 'Formulations regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning'. C.P. IV, 13-21.
- (45) 1911 'Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)'. G.S. VIII, 353-435; G.W. VIII, 240-320.
 'Psycho-Analytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)'. C.P. III, 387-470.
- (46) 1912 'Die Handhabung der Traumdeutung in der Psychoanalyse'. G.S. VI, 45-52; G.W. VIII, 350-357.
 'The Employment of Dream-Interpretation in Psycho-Analysis'. C.P. II, 305-311.
- (47) 1912 'Zur Dynamik der Übertragung'. G.S. VI, 53-63; G.W. VIII, 364-374.
 'The Dynamics of the Transference'. C.P. II, 312-322.
- (48) 1912 'Über neurotische Erkrankungstypen'. G.S. V, 400-408; G.W. VIII, 322-330.
 'Types of Neurotic Nosogenesis'. C.P. II, 113-121.
- (49) 1912 'Ratschläge für den Arzt bei der psychoanalytischen Behandlung'. G.S. VI, 64-75; G.W. VIII, 376-387.
 'Recommendations for Physicians on the Psycho-Analytic Method of Treatment'. C.P. II, 323-333.
- (50) 1912 'Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens: (ii) Über die allgemeinste Erniedrigung des Liebeslebens'. G.S. V, 198-211; G.W. VIII, 78-91.
 'Contributions to the Psychology of Love: (ii) The most Prevalent Form of Degradation in Erotic Life'. C.P. IV, 203-216.
- (51) 1912 'Einige Bemerkungen über den Begriff des Unbewussten in der Psychoanalyse'. G.S. V, 433-442; G.W. VIII, 430-439.
 'A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis'. C.P. IV, 22-29.
- (52) 1912-13 *Totem und Tabu*. G.S. X, 1-194; G.W. IX, 1-194.
Totem and Taboo. Trans. A. A. Brill. N.Y., New Republic, 1931; L., Routledge, 1919; L. and N.Y., Penguin Books, 1938. Included in *Basic Writings of S. Freud*, N.Y., Modern Library, 1938.
- (53) 1913 Geleitwort zu Pfister, *Die Psychoanalytische Methode*. G.S. XI, 244-246; G.W. X, 448-450.
 Introduction to O. Pfister's *The Psychoanalytic Method*. N.Y., Moffat, Yard, 1917; L., Kegan Paul, 1917.
- (54) 1913 'Weitere Ratschläge zur Technik der Psychoanalyse: Zur Einleitung der Behandlung'. G.S. VI, 84-108; G.W. VIII, 454-478.
 'Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psycho-Analysis: On Beginning the Treatment'. C.P. II, 342-365.
- (55) 1913 'Ein Traum als Beweismittel'. G.S. III, 267-277; (G.W. X, 12-23).
 'A Dream which bore Testimony'. C.P. II, 133-143.
- (56) 1913 'Märchenstoffe in Träumen'. G.S. III, 259-266; (G.W. X, 2-11).
 'The Occurrence in Dreams of Material from Fairy-Tales'. C.P. IV, 236-243.
- (57) 1913 'Das Motiv der Kästchenwahl'. G.S. X, 243-256; (G.W. X, 24-39).
 'The Theme of the Three Caskets'. C.P. IV, 244-256.
- (58) 1913 'Zwei Kinderlügen'. G.S. V, 238-243; G.W. VIII, 422-427.
 'Infantile Mental Life: Two Lies told by Children'. C.P. II, 144-149.
- (59) 1913 'Die Disposition zur Zwangsneurose'. G.S. V, 277-287; G.W. VIII, 442-452.
 'The Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis'. C.P. II, 122-132.

- (60) 1914 'Über fausse reconnaissance ("déjà raconté") während der psychoanalytischen Arbeit'. G.S. VI, 76-83; (G.W. X, 116-125).
'Fausse Reconnaissance ("déjà raconté") in Psycho-Analytic Treatment'. C.P. II, 334-341.
- (61) 1914 'Zur Einführung des Narzissmus'. G.S. VI, 155-187; (G.W. X, 138-170).
'On Narcissism: an Introduction'. C.P. IV, 30-59.
- (62) 1914 'Der Moses des Michelangelo'. G.S. X, 257-286; (G.W. X, 172-203).
'The Moses of Michelangelo'. C.P. IV, 257-287.
- (63) 1914 'Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung'. G.S. IV, 407-480; (G.W. X, 43-115).
(a) *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*. Trans. A. A. Brill. N.Y., Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1917. Included in *Basic Writings of S. Freud*, N.Y., Modern Library, 1938.
(b) 'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement'. Trans. Joan Riviere. C.P. I, 287-359.
- (64) 1914 'Weitere Ratschläge zur Technik der Psychoanalyse: Erinnern, Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten'. G.S. VI, 109-119; (G.W. X, 126-137).
'Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psycho-Analysis: Recollection, Repetition and Working Through'. C.P. II, 366-376.
- (65) 1915 'Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod'. G.S. 315-346; (G.W. X, 324-357).
(a) *Reflections on War and Death*. N.Y., Moffat, Yard, 1918.
(b) 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death'. C.P. IV, 288-317.
- (66) 1915 'Weitere Ratschläge zur Technik der Psychoanalyse: Bemerkungen über die Übertragungsliebe'. G.S. VI, 120-135; (G.W. X, 306-323).
'Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psycho-Analysis: Observations on Transference-Love'. C.P. II, 377-391.
- (67) 1915 'Triebe und Tribschicksale'. G.S. V, 443-465; (G.W. X, 210-233).
'Instincts and their Vicissitudes'. C.P. IV, 60-83.
- (68) 1915 'Die Verdrängung'. G.S. V, 466-479; (G.W. X, 248-263).
'Repression'. C.P. IV, 84-97.
- (69) 1915 'Das Unbewusste'. G.S. V, 480-519; (G.W. X, 264-305).
'The Unconscious'. C.P. IV, 98-136.
- (70) 1915 'Mitteilung eines der psychoanalytischen Theorie widersprechenden Falles von Paranoia'. G.S. V, 288-300; (G.W. X, 234-247).
'A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psycho-Analytical Theory of the Disease'. C.P. II, 150-161.
- (71) 1915 Brief an Frau Dr. H. von Hug-Hellmuth. G.S. XI, 261; (G.W. X, 456).
Letter quoted in Preface to *A Young Girl's Diary*. L., Allen & Unwin, 1921; N.Y., Seltzer, 1921.
- (72) 1915 'Vergänglichkeit'. G.S. XI, 291-294; (G.W. X, 358-363).
'On Transience'. I.J.P.A. 23 (1942), 84-85.
- (73) 1915 'Einige Charaktertypen aus der psychoanalytischen Arbeit'. G.S. X, 287-314; (G.W. X, 364-393).
'Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work'. C.P. IV, 318-344.
- (74) 1916 'Mythologische Parallelen zu einer plastischen Zwangsvorstellung'. G.S. X, 240-242; (G.W. X, 398-401).
'A Mythological Parallel to a Visual Obsession'. C.P. IV, 345-346.
- (75) 1916 'Eine Beziehung zwischen einem Symbol und einem Symptom'. G.S. V, 310-311; (G.W. X, 394-397).
'A Connection between a Symbol and a Symptom'. C.P. II, 162-163.
- (76) 1916 'Über Triebumsetzungen, insbesondere der Analerotik'. G.S. V, 268-276; (G.W. X, 402-411).
'On the Transformation of Instincts with Special Reference to Anal Erotism'. C.P. II, 164-171.
- (77) 1916-17 *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*. G.S. VII, 1-483; G.W. XI, 1-483.
(a) *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*. Trans. unspecified. N.Y., Boni & Liveright, 1920.
(b) *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*. Trans. Joan Riviere. Revised ed., L., Allen & Unwin, 1929; N.Y. (but under title *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*), Liveright, 1935 and Garden City Publ. Co., 1943.

- (78) 1917 'Metapsychologische Ergänzung zur Traumlehre'. G.S. V, 520-534; (G.W. X, 412-427).
'Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams'. C.P. IV, 137-151.
- (79) 1917 'Trauer und Melancholie'. G.S. V, 535-553; (G.W. X, 428-447).
'Mourning and Melancholia'. C.P. IV, 152-170.
- (80) 1917 'Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse'. G.S. X, 347-356; (G.W. XII, 2-11).
'One of the Difficulties of Psycho-Analysis'. C.P. IV, 347-356.
- (81) 1917 'Eine Kindheitserinnerung aus "Dichtung und Wahrheit"'. G.S. X, 357-368; (G.W. XII, 14-25).
'A Childhood Recollection from "Dichtung und Wahrheit"'. C.P. IV, 357-367.
- (82) 1918 'Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens: (iii) Das Tabu der Virginität'. G.S. V, 212-231; (G.W. XII, 168-187).
'Contributions to the Psychology of Love: (iii) The Taboo of Virginity'. C.P. IV, 217-235.
- (83) 1918 'Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose'. G.S. VIII, 437-567; (G.W. XII, 28-166).
'From the History of an Infantile Neurosis'. C.P. III, 473-605.
- (84) 1918 'Wege der psychoanalytischen Therapie'. G.S. VI, 136-147; (G.W. XII, 190-201).
'Turnings in the Ways of Psycho-Analytic Therapy'. C.P. II, 392-402.
- (85) 1919 '"Ein Kind wird geschlagen"'. G.S. V, 344-373; (G.W. XII, 204-234).
'"A Child is Being Beaten"'. C.P. II, 172-201.
- (86) 1919 'Das Unheimliche'. G.S. X, 369-408; (G.W. XII, 236-275).
'The Uncanny'. C.P. IV, 368-407.
- (87) 1919 Einleitung zu *Zur Psychoanalyse der Kriegsneurosen*. G.S. XI, 252-255; (G.W. XII, 327-330).
Introduction to *Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses*. L., Hogarth Press, 1921.
- (88) 1919 Vorrede zu Reik, *Probleme der Religionspsychologie*. G.S. XI, 256-260; (G.W. XII, 331-335).
Preface to Theodor Reik's *Ritual*. L., Hogarth Press, 1931; N.Y., Norton, 1931.
- (89) 1920 *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*. G.S. VI, 189-257; G.W. XIII, 3-69.
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Trans. C. J. M. Hubback. L., Hogarth Press, 1922; N.Y., Boni & Liveright, 1922.
- (90) 1920 'Über die Psychogenese eines Falles von weiblicher Homosexualität'. G.S. V, 312-343; (G.W. XII, 278-311).
'The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman'. C.P. II, 202-231.
- (91) 1921 Preface to J. J. Putnam's *Addresses on Psycho-Analysis*. Original in English. G.S. XI, 262-263; G.W. XIII, 437-438. L., Hogarth Press, 1921.
- (92) 1921 *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*. G.S. VI, 259-349; G.W. XIII, 73-161.
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Trans. James Strachey. L., Hogarth Press, 1922; N.Y., Liveright, 1940.
- (93) 1921 Geleitwort zu Varendonck, *Über das vorbewusste phantasierende Denken*. G.S. XI, 264; G.W. XIII, 439-440.
Introduction to J. Varendonck's *The Psychology of Day-Dreams*. L., Allen & Unwin, 1921.
- (94) 1922 'Psychoanalyse'; 'Libidotheorie'. G.S. XI, 201-223; G.W. XIII, 211-233.
'Two Encyclopædia Articles'. I.J.P.A. 23 (1942), 97-107.
- (95) 1922 'Das Medusenhaupt'. I.Z.P. 25 (1940), 105-106; G.W. XVII, 47-48.
'Medusa's Head'. I.J.P.A. 22 (1941), 69-70.
- (96) 1922 'Traum und Telepathie'. G.S. III, 278-304; G.W. XIII, 165-191.
'Dreams and Telepathy'. C.P. IV, 408-435.
- (97) 1922 'Über einige neurotische Mechanismen bei Eifersucht, Paranoia und Homosexualität'. G.S. V, 387-399; G.W. XIII, 195-207.
'Certain Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality'. C.P. II, 232-243.
- (98) 1922 'Nachschrift zur Analyse des kleinen Hans'. G.S. VIII, 264-265; G.W. XIII, 431-432. See No. 34.
'Postscript, 1922' (to 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy'). C.P. III, 288-289. See No. 34.
- (99) 1923 'Eine Teufelsneurose im siebzehnten Jahrhundert'. G.S. X, 409-445; G.W. XIII, 316-353.
'A Neurosis of Demoniocal Possession in the Seventeenth Century'. C.P. IV, 436-472.

- (100) 1923 'Bemerkungen zur Theorie und Praxis der Traumdeutung'. G.S. III, 305-318; G.W. XIII, 301-314.
'Remarks upon the Theory and Practice of Dream-Interpretation'. I.J.P.A. 24 (1943), 66-71.
- (101) 1923 'Die infantile Genitalorganisation'. G.S. V, 232-237; G.W. XIII, 293-298.
'The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido'. C.P. II, 244-249.
- (102) 1923 *Das Ich und das Es*. G.S. VI, 351-405; G.W. XIII, 237-289.
The Ego and the Id. Trans. Joan Riviere. L., Hogarth Press, 1927.
- (103) 1924 'Neurose und Psychose'. G.S. V, 418-422; G.W. XIII, 387-391.
'Neurosis and Psychosis'. C.P. II, 250-254.
- (104) 1924 'Das ökonomische Problem des Masochismus'. G.S. V, 374-386; G.W. XIII, 371-383.
'The Economic Problem in Masochism'. C.P. II, 255-268.
- (105) 1924 'Der Untergang des Ödipuskomplexes'. G.S. V, 423-430; G.W. XIII, 395-402.
'The Passing of the Oedipus-Complex'. C.P. II, 269-276.
- (106) 1924 'Der Realitätsverlust bei Neurose und Psychose'. G.S. VI, 409-414; G.W. XIII, 363-368.
'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis'. C.P. II, 277-282.
- (107) 1924 'Kurzer Abriss der Psychoanalyse'. G.S. XI, 183-200; G.W. XIII, 405-427.
'Psychoanalysis: Exploring the Hidden Recesses of the Mind'. Vol. II, Chap. 73 of *These Eventful Years*. L. and N.Y., Encyclopædia Britannica Co., 1924.
- (108) 1925 'Einige Nachträge zum Ganzen der Traumdeutung'. G.S. III, 172-184; (G.W. XIV).
'Some Additional Notes upon Dream-Interpretation as a Whole'. I.J.P.A. 24 (1943), 71-75.
- (109) 1925 Notiz über den "Wunderblock". G.S. VI, 415-420; (G.W. XIV).
'A Note upon the "Mystic Writing-Pad"'. I.J.P.A. 21 (1940), 469-474.
- (110) 1925 'Die Verneinung'. G.S. XI, 3-7; (G.W. XIV).
'Negation'. I.J.P.A. 6 (1925), 367-371.
- (111) 1925 'Einige psychische Folgen des anatomischen Geschlechtsunterschieds'. G.S. XI, 8-19; (G.W. XIV).
'Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes'. I.J.P.A. 8 (1927), 133-142.
- (112) 1925 *Selbstdarstellung*. G.S. XI, 117-182; (G.W. XIV). See No. 138.
An Autobiographical Study. Trans. James Strachey. 1st ed. included in *The Problem of Lay Analyses*, No. 119. Revised ed. (including 'Postscript, 1935'; see No. 138), L., Hogarth Press, 1935; N.Y. (under title *Autobiography*), Norton, 1935.
- (113) 1925 Geleitwort zu Aichhorn, *Verwahrloste Jugend*. G.S. XI, 267-269; (G.W. XIV).
Foreword to A. Aichhorn's *Wayward Youth*. N.Y., Viking Press, 1935; L., Putnam, 1936.
- (114) 1925 'Josef Breuer'. G.S. XI, 281-283; (G.W. XIV).
'Josef Breuer'. I.J.P.A. 6 (1925), 459-460.
- (115) 1925 'To the Opening of the Hebrew University'. Original in English. G.S. XI, 298-299; (G.W. XIV).
- (116) 1926 Introductory Note to Pickworth Farrow's 'Eine Kindheitserinnerung aus dem 6. Lebensmonat'. I.Z.P. 12 (1926), 79.
Foreword to Pickworth Farrow's *A Practical Method of Self-Analysis*. L., Allen & Unwin, 1942.
- (117) 1926 *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. G.S. XI, 21-115; (G.W. XIV).
(a) *Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety*. Trans. unspecified. Stamford, Conn., Psychoanalytic Institute, 1927.
(b) *The Problem of Anxiety*. Trans. H. A. Bunker. N.Y., Norton, 1936.
(c) *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*. Trans. Alix Strachey. L., Hogarth Press, 1936.
- (118) 1926 'Karl Abraham'. G.S. XI, 283-284; (G.W. XIV).
'Karl Abraham'. I.J.P.A. 7 (1926), 1.
- (119) 1926 *Die Frage der Laienanalyse*. G.S. XI, 307-384; (G.W. XIV).
The Problem of Lay Analyses. Trans. A. P. Maerker-Branden. N.Y., Brentano, 1927.
Includes 1st ed. of *An Autobiographical Study*, No. 112.
- (120) 1926 'Psycho-Analysis'. G.S. XII, 372-380; (G.W. XIV).
'Psychoanalysis: Freudian School'. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 13th ed., 1926, New Vol. III, 253-255; also 14th ed., 1929, Vol. XVIII, 672-674.

- (121) 1926 Letter to M. D. Eder. Original unpublished. In *David Eder* (ed. Hobman), L., Gollancz, 1945, 20-21.
- (122) 1927 'Nachwort zur "Frage der Laienanalyse"'. G.S. XI, 385-394; (G.W. XIV).
'Concluding Remarks on the Question of Lay Analysis'. I.J.P.A. 8 (1927), 392-398.
- (123) 1927 'Fetischismus'. G.S. XI, 395-401; (G.W. XIV).
'Fetishism'. I.J.P.A. 9 (1928), 161-166.
- (124) 1927 *Die Zukunft einer Illusion*. G.S. XI, 411-466; (G.W. XIV).
The Future of an Illusion. Trans. W. D. Robson-Scott. L., Hogarth Press, 1928; N.Y., Liveright, 1928.
- (125) 1928 'Der Humor'. G.S. XI, 402-408; (G.W. XIV).
'Humour'. I.J.P.A. 9 (1928), 1-6.
- (126) 1928 'Ein religiöses Erlebnis'. G.S. XI, 467-470; (G.W. XIV).
'A Religious Experience'. I.J.P.A. 10 (1929), 1-4.
- (127) 1928 'Dostojewski und die Vätertötung'. G.S. XII, 7-26; (G.W. XIV).
'Dostoevsky and Parricide'. I.J.P.A. 26 (1945), 1-8.
- (128) 1929 'Ernest Jones zum 50 Geburtstag'. G.S. XII, 395-396; (G.W. XIV).
'To Ernest Jones on the Occasion of his Fiftieth Birthday'. I.J.P.A. 10 (1929), 123-124.
- (129) 1930 *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*. G.S. XII, 27-114; (G.W. XIV).
Civilization and its Discontents. Trans. Joan Riviere. L., Hogarth Press, 1930; N.Y., Cape & Smith, 1930.
- (130) 1930 Geleitwort zu *Medical Review of Reviews*, Vol. XXXVI. (Title and reference incorrect in G.S.) G.S. XII, 386-387; (G.W. XIV).
Preface to Psychopathology Number, *Medical Review of Reviews*, N.Y., 36 (1930), 103-104.
- (131) 1931 'Über libidinöse Typen'. G.S. XII, 115-119; (G.W. XIV).
(a) 'Libidinal Types'. I.J.P.A. 13 (1932), 277-280.
(b) 'Libidinal Types'. P.Q. 1 (1932), 3-6.
- (132) 1931 'Über die weibliche Sexualität'. G.S. XII, 120-140; (G.W. XIV).
(a) 'Female Sexuality'. I.J.P.A. 13 (1932), 281-297.
(b) 'Concerning the Sexuality of Woman'. P.Q. 1 (1932), 191-209.
- (133) 1932 *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*. G.S. XII, 149-345; G.W. XV, 1-197.
New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. Trans. W. J. H. Sprott. L., Hogarth Press, 1933; N.Y., Norton, 1933.
- (134) 1932 'Zur Gewinnung des Feuers'. G.S. XII, 141-147; (G.W. XVI).
(a) 'The Acquisition of Power over Fire'. I.J.P.A. 13 (1932), 405-410.
(b) 'The Acquisition of Fire'. P.Q. 1 (1932), 210-215.
- (135) 1932 *Warum Krieg?* (With Einstein.) Paris, Internationales Institut für geistige Zusammenarbeit (Völkerbund), 1933; G.S. XII, 347-363; (G.W. XVI). The two latter omit Einstein's contribution.
Why War? (With Einstein.) Trans. Stuart Gilbert. Paris, International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (League of Nations), 1933; L., Peace Pledge Union, 1939. These two include Einstein's contribution. Freud's contribution alone is reprinted in *Civilization, War and Death* (ed. Rickman), L., Hogarth Press, 1939, 82-97.
- (136) 1932 'Meine Berührung mit Josef Popper-Lynkeus'. G.S. XII, 415-420; (G.W. XVI).
'My Contact with Josef Popper-Lynkeus'. I.J.P.A. 23 (1942), 85-87.
- (137) 1933 'Sándor Ferenczi'. G.S. XII, 397-399; (G.W. XVI).
'Sándor Ferenczi'. I.J.P.A. 14 (1933), 297-299.
- (138) 1935 'Nachschrift 1935 (Nachtrag zur Selbstdarstellung)'. Vienna, *Almanach der Psychoanalyse 1936*, 9-14; (G.W. XVI). See No. 112.
'Postscript, 1935'. Included in revised ed. of *An Autobiographical Study*, No. 112.
- (139) 1936 'Brief an Romain Rolland (Eine Erinnerungsstörung auf der Akropolis)'. Vienna, *Almanach der Psychoanalyse 1937*, 9-21; (G.W. XVI).
'A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis'. I.J.P.A. 22 (1941), 93-101.
- (140) 1936 Letter to Barbara Low. Original unpublished. In *David Eder* (ed. Hobman), L., Gollancz, 1945, 21.
- (141) 1937 'Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse'. I.Z.P. 23 (1937), 209-240; (G.W. XVI).
'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'. I.J.P.A. 18 (1937), 373-405.

- (142) 1938 'Konstruktionen in der Analyse'. I.Z.P. 23 (1937), 459-469; (G.W. XVI).
'Constructions in Analysis'. I.J.P.A. 19 (1938), 377-387.
- (143) 1938 'Die Ichspaltung im Abwehrvorgang'. I.Z.P. 25 (1940), 241-244; G.W. XVII, 59-62.
'Splitting of the Ego in the Defensive Process'. I.J.P.A. 22 (1941), 65-68.
- (144) 1938 'Abriss der Psychoanalyse'. I.Z.P. 25 (1940), 7-67; G.W. XVII, 67-138.
'An Outline of Psycho-Analysis'. I.J.P.A. 21 (1940), 27-84.
- (145) 1939 Prefatory Letter to Charles Berg's *War in the Mind*. Original in English. L., Macaulay Press, 1941.
- (146) 1939 Foreword to J. B. Hobman's *David Eder*. Original unpublished. L., Gollancz, 1945.
- (147) 1939 *Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion*. Amsterdam, Allert de Lange, 1939; (G.W. XVI).
Moses and Monotheism. Trans. Katherine Jones. L., Hogarth Press, 1939; N.Y., Knopf, 1939.

APPENDIX: EXTRACTS, ABRIDGEMENTS, ETC.

- (A) 1921 *Dream Psychology*. Ed. A. Tridon. (Unauthorized.) N.Y., McCann Co. Extracts from Nos. 14 and 15.
- (B) 1931 *Modern Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness*. Ed. W. J. Robinson. (Unauthorized.) N.Y., Eugenics Publishing Co. Extracts from No. 28.
- (C) 1937 *A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud*. Ed. J. Rickman. (Authorized.) L., Hogarth Press. Extracts from Nos. 9, 37, 44, 48, 51, 61, 67, 68, 73, 79, 89, 92, 102, 110 and 117 (c).
- (D) 1939 *Civilization, War and Death*. Ed. J. Rickman. (Authorized.) L., Hogarth Press. No. 135 and extracts from Nos. 65 (b) and 129.
- (E) 1941 *The Living Thoughts of Freud*. Ed. R. Waelder. (Unauthorized.) N.Y., Longmans; L., Cassell (withdrawn). Extracts from Nos. 77 (b), 80, 112, 119, 133, 144 and 147.

BOOK REVIEWS

Freud: Master and Friend. By Hanns Sachs. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.; Humphrey Milford, London, 1944. Pp. ix + 195. Price, \$2.50; 15s.)

This book is an important contribution to psycho-analytical literature. In it are recorded observations on the personality of Professor Freud by one of his most intimate colleagues, Dr. Hanns Sachs, who is himself a psycho-analyst of outstanding ability and experience.

In keeping with the value placed on uncensored observations by the originator of the psycho-analytical method, Dr. Sachs offers to the public a description of his own relationship to the Professor: at first in the rôle of a student of psycho-analysis and later as a colleague and friend who retained to the end homage and admiration for a great and unique personality without a trace of the type of criticism which a man of smaller calibre than that of Sachs might have recorded.

The author's knowledge and skill in the arts of literature and poetry equip him in a special way to create a book of this character. He has written a drama. The story of a great dynamic but isolated figure; isolated because of the nature of the discoveries that he had made, which, as in the case of Galileo, made him appear at first to be an enemy of mankind. The background of the drama is Vienna, the gay frivolous Vienna which existed

before the first great war. The description which Sachs gives of Vienna reproduces an atmosphere of pleasure-loving wit and delicate and perhaps decadent culture contrasting with the figure of Freud who, the author says, 'walked intuitively and unknowingly in the footsteps of his ancestors and followed one of the oldest Jewish traditions: this is the belief that all Jews, born and unborn alike, were present at Mount Sinai and have there taken on themselves "the yoke of the Law".'

The devotion to psycho-analysis of Freud's original group of colleagues was determined not only by the magnetism of his great personality but also by the fact that the door which he opened to the study of the mind by his recognition and formulation of the dynamics of the unconscious released a flood of scientific interest which had been stagnating in the obscurities of pre-psycho-analytical psychiatry. Sachs shows how the common interest in the face of narrow professional criticism created a fellowship between the first group of scientists gathered round Freud.

The story takes us also into the Professor's home and tells us something of his everyday life and family, of Frau Professor Freud and her sister and his daughter Anna, who is the member of his family to carry on his work. Finally the tragedy of his long illness and forcible exile from Vienna to London leads to his death in London in 1939.

The reader is struck by the drama but not by the tragedy because external catastrophes had only limited power to influence or to diminish Freud's capacity to work when he was alive, and after his death his discoveries remain, and the most fundamental of them are accepted by the leading scientists of the present day.

S. M. Payne.

David Eder: Memoirs of a Modern Pioneer. Edited by J. B. Hobman. (Victor Gollancz, London, 1945. Pp. 215. Price, 8s. 6d.)

Several outstanding circumstances have combined to give David Eder a unique position among British psycho-analysts. In the first place, he was among the very earliest in this country to become interested in Freud's teachings and to take an active part in applying and disseminating them. In the second place, unlike most of his colleagues in this field, who have found in the theory and practice of psycho-analysis a sufficient occupation, he was also an ardent social worker and reformer. Thirdly, he had certain personality characteristics that distinguished him from others—above all that rare combination of strength with tolerance and kindness which made him fit so supremely well the archetypal picture of the 'good father'. Lastly, again unlike most psycho-analysts, he had travelled widely in the remoter parts of the earth and had been able to study life on the fringes as well as in the great centres of Western civilization.

It was perhaps especially the unusual combination of psycho-analysis with Zionism and with an active participation in political and social movements that made it difficult for any one writer to give a full-length portrait of the man Eder in all his varied interests and activities. The present work, edited by J. B. Hobman, with a foreword by Freud and with contributions by Edward Glover, Harry Roberts, Leonard Stein and Sir Wyndham Deedes, will no doubt prove interesting reading to the very many who have known Eder in one or other aspect of his work and who will learn, perhaps for the first time, how active he was in ways of which they themselves had little or no inkling—for Eder was usually much too busy helping others to spend time on reminiscences of his own varied and eventful life. Nevertheless a book by several hands is only too often something of a patchwork and what it may gain in completeness it may lose in unity, conciseness and continuity. These drawbacks are indeed to be found to some extent in the present volume. In spite of the diversity of the fields dealt with by the various contributors (among whom the editor himself occupies an important place) there is, perhaps inevitably, a certain amount of repetition; and repeated panegyrics in particular are apt to grow at first, dull, and then positively irritating. One feels that the object of these praises would have blue-pencilled much of this repetition in the kindly, humorous

and yet authoritative way with which he could deal with what seemed to him irrelevancies or excesses.

Nor is there always strict consistency. Thus on p. 77 it would appear that in 1914 Eder read a paper to the North of England Education Conference on 'The Unconscious Mind of the Child', and that this paper so shocked the official mind that the issue containing it was withdrawn and destroyed, but that 'another paper on the same subject was read before the Child Life Society and reprinted'. From p. 99 (in Dr. Glover's contribution) it would seem that it was the same paper that had been read at the Conference that was subsequently printed in *Child Study*, the organ of the Child Study Association, and withdrawn, though subsequently published by Eder and his wife in pamphlet form. It is this account that appears to give the correct version.

The event just referred to was not the only rebuff that Eder had to suffer because of his espousal of psycho-analysis. As Dr. Glover relates, Eder's first contribution to the subject was made at the Annual General Meeting of the British Medical Association in 1911 and on this occasion the chairman and the entire audience indicated their disapproval by stalking out of the room immediately on the conclusion of the paper. Truly things have much changed since that day.

Eder's pioneering efforts in psychology and medicine were, however, not confined to psycho-analysis. It is perhaps less well known that he took part in the foundation of the very first school clinic, established in Bow in 1908, one which when subsequently transferred to Deptford became the centre of Margaret Macmillan's health and nursery school experiment, ultimately to blossom out as the State School Medical Service; while at about the same time, in collaboration with Dr. James Kerr, he founded the magazine *School Hygiene* and published in it the first account in this country of Binet's and Simon's work in intelligence testing.

Psychology in all its aspects interested Eder from his early years. As a young student he had found Ward's famous *Encyclopædia Britannica* article 'the most attractive branch of his then rather reluctant studies'. Indeed he would seem to have been rather optimistic as regards the possible practical applications of the kind of psychology there expounded, as when he felt that 'with this key (he) was prepared to unlock any woman's heart'. Some disappointment after these high expectations was perhaps inevitable, and Ward's article was subsequently discarded 'as having as little bearing on human affairs as dry bones'. With the discovery of psycho-analysis, however, he found something which seemed to promise greater enlightenment and was more in accordance with his own needs and method of approach. Indeed it is remarkable how well his own previous thinking and reading had prepared

him for acceptance of many psycho-analytic findings that are usually found difficult or repulsive. Thus as early as 1901, during his travels in the Andes, he had come up against the problem of cannibalism, as when, on the basis of his own experience, he expresses his agreement with the views of Morley Roberts and Robertson Smith and adds: 'a violent repulsion to certain kinds of food may be a reaction to something of the cannibal still lurking within us, some vestigial mental trait, as when the doting mother exclaims "I could eat you all up, you little darling", and proceeds to put baby's pinkiest toes into her mouth with a pretence of biting; the doting mother may be speaking more literally than she would ever be made to believe.'

A full account of Eder's rôle in the psycho-analytic movement is given in Dr. Glover's contribution, which to readers of this *Journal* will doubtless prove the most interesting section of the book. Eder's active participation in the movement falls into two main parts, broken in the middle by a period of psychiatric war service followed by several years during which his main energies were devoted to Zionism, though the great impression made on him by Jung's work would seem also to have played some part in his abstention from active co-operation with psycho-analysts during this time. Glover indulges in some very interesting reflections on the motives that may have determined Eder's attitude to psycho-analysis and to the other causes with which he was associated, reflections in the course of which much that is significant is said with regard both to the general nature of the satisfactions to be found in psycho-analytic work and to the place which these satisfactions took in the structure and function of Eder's own personality. One conclusion at which he arrives is perhaps of special importance for an understanding of that impression of benevolent paternalism which Eder everywhere created. 'The ramparts of his character', says Dr. Glover, "'held" right up to the purely private confines of his self-consciousness.' This 'holding' of the ramparts may have had much to do with that sense of security which Eder could provide, while at the same time his unusual freedom from the tendency to impute blame or guilt to others ('I have never heard him speak a censorious word' says Mr. Hobman), however much he might criticize or disapprove of them, endowed him with a kindliness and constructive helpfulness that matched his 'massive' strength.

The last section of the book consists of a reprint of Eder's own article on 'The Myth of Progress', an address he delivered as Chairman of the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society. Without in any way wishing to detract from the high value and significance of this paper (which in its general tone and outlook reminds us irresistibly of some of Freud's later writings) it seems to the

present reviewer that the space might, in a volume of this kind, have been more usefully devoted to a complete bibliography of Eder's published works, scattered as these are in many different books and periodicals.

J. C. Flugel.

Infants Without Families. By Dorothy Burlingham and Anna Freud. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1943. Pp. 108. Price, 3s. 6d.)

Does the institution child develop differently from the child brought up in a family? If so, why? The former question is answered affirmatively, and the latter as certainly as experience gained in two residential nurseries (housing about 90 children) enables the authors to answer it. The results of a piece of careful research are set forth in this readable little book with a clarity which one has learned to associate with Anna Freud's work.

To quote, apropos of institution children, from the first chapter: 'Superficial observation of children of this kind leaves a conflicting picture. They resemble, so far as outward appearances are concerned, children of middle-class families: they are well developed physically, properly nourished, decently dressed, have acquired clean habits and decent table manners, and can adapt themselves to rules and regulations. So far as character development is concerned, they often prove . . . not far above the standard of destitute or neglected children'. (P. 9.)

The authors then turn to conclusions drawn from their own investigations and find that 'Babies between birth and about five months of age, when not breast-fed under either condition, develop better in our nursery than in the average proletarian household.' (P. 10.) 'In the second half of the first year the picture changes definitely to our disadvantage.' (P. 10.) 'With the beginning of the second year the scales turn again in our favour.' (P. 12.)

The reasons for these variations are examined in the light of opportunities for development in the family as compared with those in residential nurseries under the headings 'Muscular Control', 'Speech Development', 'Habit Training' and 'Feeding', and are summarized thus:—

'The institutional child in the first two years has advantages in all those spheres of his life which are independent of the emotional side of his nature; he is at a disadvantage whenever the emotional tie to the mother or to the family is the mainspring of development.' (P. 21.) 'Muscular control and good eating habits develop more quickly and easily in institutions, speech and habit training are delayed when the mother's influence is missing.' (P. 22.)

The relationship of the infants to one another comes under consideration in Chapter II, and here the results are even more interesting, partly, per-

haps, because more unexpected and because the effects of institution life *might* be more far-reaching socially in this respect than in others, though the authors do not suggest this possibility.

On p. 23 we read: 'These institutional children do not start out to meet a world of contemporaries, secure in the feeling that they are firmly attached to one "mother person" to whom they can revert. They live in an "age group" that is, in a dangerous world, peopled by individuals who are as unsocial and unrestrained as they are themselves. In a family they would, at the age of 18 months, be the "little ones" whom the elder brothers and sisters are ready to protect and consider. In a crowd of other toddlers they have to learn unduly early to defend themselves and their property, to stand up for their own rights, and even to consider the rights of others. This means that they have to become social at an age when it is normal to be asocial. Under pressure of these circumstances they develop a surprising range of reactions: love, hate, jealousy, rivalry, competition, protectiveness, pity, generosity, sympathy and even understanding.'

Chapters III and IV deal with the absence of the mother and the formation of artificial families under a substitute 'mother', and the interplay of instinctual satisfaction and frustration in family, as compared with nursery, life. The findings are interspersed with simple expositions of certain postulates and (as in Chapter II) with illustrative examples from the behaviour of the children in the nurseries.

The least satisfying part of these chapters, as indeed of the whole book, is where (pp. 54-56) the authors attempt to explain some of these very interesting examples without stressing sufficiently, for the average reader, the difference between explanations based on theory and conclusions drawn from observed facts. Up to this point the actual behaviour of the children has been studied and noted, but here we suddenly come upon a series of activities seen in the light of pre-conceived ideas.

It is not so much a question in a book of this kind as to whether the conclusions drawn about the causes of behaviour are scientifically accurate (the billeting officer will not be so much influenced by processes of identification with the mother as by the child's need for her, and this need is made amply clear) as whether, in any book, deductions based on that which is hypothetical can rank with direct observations. Who can *know* to what extent the infant feels identified with his environment? We can only surmise until we get incontrovertible evidence.

For instance, in Example I (p. 54) the child's delight, at 8 months, in a nurse's hand placed on its cot might equally well be seen as due to joy at the recovery of something from the external world for which her own hands had failed to prove a satisfactory or lasting substitute as to a revival of interest in hands as such and a failure to dis-

tinguish the nurse's hand from her own. (My suggestion is also based on assumption, and I am not, of course, claiming validity for it.)

Again, Example 6 (p. 56) might suggest a number of motives in the child of 2-2½ years for feeding his 'mother' other than that of his failure to distinguish between himself and his mother and the wish to give himself (in the person of the mother) pleasure, however true this interpretation might be in any particular case. Incidentally, this reading of such behaviour in *every* case would not tally with the authors' own findings (see p. 23 quoted above) that even children of 18 months can develop feelings of generosity and sympathy, and, one might add, fear.

In contrast, when the children treat each other as if they were toys (p. 24), *whether they themselves are aware of so doing or not*, this fact can be noted and stated definitely as part of the early relationship between residential infants.

In Chapter V the father (found, under institution conditions, and especially in war-time, to be mainly a phantasy father) is introduced. His absence cannot fail to produce disturbances in normal development. 'To become a social member of the human community the child has to curb and to transform its sexual and aggressive wishes. What the mother does in this respect in . . . criticizing, praising and guiding, the father normally reinforces by his very presence.' ' . . . his influence . . . acts strongly in the direction of repressions and transformation of instinctive wishes ' (p. 87). 'Far from being of minor importance, the father, where he is present, is one of the main determining influences in the child's life.' (P. 88.)

The growth of the child's personality by means of imitation and identification is discussed in Chapter VI, and here the 'family-mother', the mother of the artificial family who makes a very fair parent substitute in the matter of super-ego formation, plays an important part. This grouping of a few children round a 'mother' seems to have turned out as nearly an ideal arrangement for emotional and character development as can be had within the life of an institution where the numbers exceed those of a large family.

The conclusions reached by the authors, and the evidence for these, can only be fully weighed and appreciated if the book itself is read. They give much food for thought to all those interested in the fate of the homeless child, and it is to be hoped that authorities responsible for settling the destinies of orphan children will take into consideration the modest claims the authors make for the knowledge resulting from their pioneer work.

H. Sheehan-Dare.

The Origin and Function of Culture. By Géza Róheim. (Nervous and Mental Disease Mono-

graphs, New York, 1943. Pp. viii + 107. Price, \$2.50.)

In *The Riddle of the Sphinx* and other publications, Róheim has elaborated the theory that man's delayed infancy, in which sexuality is less retarded than the ego in development, is responsible for culture in general; and that specific variations in the infancy situation are in the main responsible for specific variations in culture. In the present work he begins by returning to the same theme, which he illustrates by examples from several different primitive societies. He then continues with a psychological analysis of the principal professions and occupations of mankind.

The earliest, and to our view the least rational, profession is that of medicine man. The basic theory of primitive medicine is that 'disease is caused by a foreign substance which has been "shot" into the body of the patient by another medicine man or spirit and which the medicine man has to remove by the aid of suction' (p. 43). In Central Australia such foreign substances are *nankara*-stones and pointing bones, and their significance is perfectly clear from the actual dreams of a famous sorcerer. They are his testicles and penis. In one of his dreams he uses them to kill two unborn children in a hollow tree. In another, his initiation dream, he himself suffers the same kind of attack: pointing bones penetrate his body, which is also opened up so that his lungs and liver can be taken out. He is then provided with new internal organs and with the quartz crystals (the excrement of the sky god) from which he derives his magic power to kill or cure. If we may generalize from this example, and Róheim quotes others in its support, primitive medicine may be interpreted as the end-product of a series of reaction formations against the infantile phantasies of the destruction of the body, the ubiquity and importance of which have been stressed by Mrs. Klein. 'The first formula is abreaction in phantasy (my inside has already been destroyed) followed by reaction-formation (my inside is not something corruptible and full of faeces, but incorruptible, full of quartz-crystals). The second is projection: "It is not I who am trying to penetrate into the body but foreign sorcerers who shoot disease-substances (penis, faeces, child symbols) into people." The third formula is restitution: "I am not trying to destroy people's insides, I am healing them." At the same time, however, the original phantasy element of the valuable body contents torn out of the mother returns in the healing technique: to suck, to pull, to rub something out of the patient' (p. 50).

Thus, the first profession, the nucleus of all primitive society, 'is evolved on the basis of the infantile situation; . . . all . . . have evolved this system of body destruction phantasies and anxieties. Some of them are more infantile than others. . . . If these individuals manage to find

substitutes for the mother's body not in their own bodies, but in others', they will become medicine men. They are now playing their infantile game based on the system of body destruction phantasies with others who have the same phantasies only not in the same degree. They are the leaders in this game and the lightning-conductors of common anxiety. They fight the demons so that others can hunt the prey and in general fight reality' (p. 51).

From the medicine man to the trader may appear a big advance in rationality; but in primitive societies 'it is but a step'. In the cultural area of Dobu and Normanby, for example, trade is a ceremonial affair interwoven with magic. The successful trader is a hero who must be a magician. For only by the skilful exercise of magic can he both protect himself, on the dangerous voyage, against the witches, called 'our mothers', who may send sharks to devour him, and, when he arrives, persuade his distant trading-partner to give him what he wants. His string of shells called *bagi* and used as currency is, too, at least a semi-magical substance, of which the mythical prototype was found in a pig's intestines. Thus primitive trade looks like another reaction formation in which the original body destruction phantasies are replaced by a friendly exchange of 'good' body contents (pp. 52-53).

Turning from trade to horticulture, we find that yams, the staple food of the same cultural area, are mythologically equated with such body contents as semen, tears, blood, children and excrements. In a game they are represented as stolen children, and in a myth the double yam is derived from a woman cut in halves. All this rather forcibly suggests 'that the unconscious meaning of taking roots out of the ground was originally the body destruction phantasy of pulling "good body contents" out of the mother's body and that the restitution phase of this phantasy led, by chance, to the origin of the cultivation of these plants' (p. 59). That this restitution phase also reaches a genital level of development may be inferred from the technique of working with the digging-stick, which is used with a caressing movement, as well as from the presence of semen in the list of body contents equated with the yams.

In agriculture, as opposed to horticulture, genital elements are still more apparent. That, to the inventors of agriculture, ploughing was equated with intercourse has long been familiar to anthropologists. But since the earth is the mother, it is an incestuous intercourse, which is likely to be punished by castration. Osiris, who introduced agriculture to Egypt, was a castrated god, and therefore in a sense a scapegoat; and we may reasonably infer that the same desire to find a scapegoat, rather than practical convenience, was the original motive for the castration of the animal, the ox, which draws the plough. Thus 'the type of agriculture which forms the basis of our own

civilization, with the plough and the ox, was evolved on the genital level, on the basis of the Oedipus attitude and the castration complex' (p. 62).

The domestication of animals was no more utilitarian in origin than other economic occupations. When the Central Australians succeed in killing a pair of wild dogs, they bring the puppies to the camp. There they are suckled by the women, treated in every way like children, kept solely as pets and not even used for hunting (pp. 62-64). Similarly cattle-keeping tribes are primarily cattle-loving tribes. But while dogs seem to be identified more with children, the larger animals, such as cattle and horses are rather symbols of the parents. But 'whether man adopted domestic animals as children (dog) or acquired them by identifying them unconsciously with the father and mother (cattle, horse) we find that activities which are originally due to id causes acquire a secondary ego function in the course of human history' (p. 71).

Many other arts and crafts, which now seem wholly utilitarian, were originally 'derived from the efforts made to preserve the post-mortem integrity of the body . . . mummification or body preservation is but the reverse aspect of body-destruction phantasies. . . . Osiris, mutilated and dismembered by Seth and his followers (and then restored) is the prototype of all dead mortals' (pp. 86-87).

These examples should be sufficient to correct the materialist view that culture is a rational adjustment to environment. The rational ego-syntonic element of course exists and acquires immense importance, but is always secondary in development. Since culture is not primarily rational, Róheim first regarded it as a neurosis, then with greater precision as a reaction formation, and in the present book (which is in part an answer to his critics) as a reaction formation that has become a sublimation (pp. 81-82).

In arriving at this synthetic standpoint, he applies an idea of Imre Hermann's that in the course of individual development 'libido becomes bi-polarized with a "grasping" "seeking" antithesis—that is, a trend back towards the mother and an opposite trend of finding new mother substitutes.' Moreover, the 'libido in suspense between the archaic and the new object . . . is re-invested in the ego, re-transformed into narcissistic libido' (p. 75). In Róheim's view, a cultural object or a sublimation has both a narcissistic and an object-erotic cathexis and so forms 'a stabilization point for the oscillation of libido' (p. 77). On this basis he reconstructs the development of a cultural activity in four stages: (1) The formation of an infantile anxiety system (2) and endopsychic "healing", i.e. object-loving tendency. (3) The formation of a substitute object half-way between the narcissistic and the object-erotic trends; *oscillation is stabilized*. (4) Re-elaboration of this

object on a level sufficiently remote from the original to make group formation possible' (p. 79). Thus Róheim is enabled to agree with his critics that culture consists of sublimations without relinquishing his former view that it began like a neurosis.

As to the general impression left by this book, it must be confessed that it is not easy to read. Róheim is an outstanding pioneer in the new and vitally important science of psycho-analytical anthropology. But, as a cicerone, he is so agile and discursive that it is often difficult to follow him or to comprehend, at each stage of the journey, exactly where he has arrived or how he got there. Thus the form of his work imposes a high degree of concentration on the reader; but the content is so full of fruitful and original ideas that no serious student can afford to leave it unread.

R. E. Money-Kyrle.

Behavior and Neurosis. By Jules H. Masserman. (University of Chicago Press; Cambridge University Press, London, 1943. Pp. xv + 269. Price, \$3.00; 18s.)

This book is a valuable and important effort to bridge some of the gaps between animal and human psychology, psychopathology and physiology. It is especially to be welcomed that a psycho-analytically orientated investigator should be working in a field for so long cultivated only by reflexologists and behaviourists. The main aim of the book, indeed, is to show that the facts of 'conditioning' and the production and cure of experimental neuroses in animals can be satisfactorily understood only in terms of fundamental psycho-analytic and psychobiological principles, and that the theories of Pavlov and his followers are inadequate to explain the facts.

Masserman lays down four cardinal dynamic principles of behaviour, derived from Freud. First, behaviour is fundamentally motivated by the needs of the organism; second, it is contingent on the demands of the milieu, external and internal, in so far as this is imbued with a configuration of meanings for the individual; third, behaviour is not always a simple and direct fulfilment of elementary needs, but is in large part symbolic and substitutive; and fourth, the motivations of behaviour may become 'conflictful' either through conflict between inner needs or through difficulty in adjustment to complex and contradictory external symbolisms, and this may lead to 'neurotic' or 'psychotic' behaviour.

For Pavlov, behaviour was built up from reflexes. He conceived a reflex as a unitary, stereotyped reaction mediated by a definite sensorimotor engram, and he actively discouraged any mention of the part played by motivation in establishing 'conditioning'. Masserman's work gives first place to the rôle of biological needs; and, in contrast to Pavlov who tried to isolate a 'pure',

simple response (salivation), Masserman attempts to record the total response of the animal so far as possible, using motion pictures as an additional help. Unlike Pavlov, too, he makes a central issue of the part played by symbols or substitutive stimuli. An example of such substitutive behaviour is the case of one of Pavlov's dogs, who would lick the lamp that gave him the food signal.

Masserman's concept of experimental neurosis also differs from Pavlov's. For the latter it is a matter of 'external' stimuli producing incompatible reactions of excitation and inhibition at the same time in the cortex; for Masserman it is an inability to react in a directly adaptive way to a situation of two incompatible needs, e.g. of hunger and flight.

The experimental animal was in nearly every case the cat. Ingenious apparatus was used to deliver stimuli and food automatically in any desired pre-arranged manner, leaving the observer free to record results. The cats were first trained to get food from a box after a sound or light signal. When external frustration was applied by preventing the cat from obtaining the food, this led merely to the extinction of the previously learned response, not to 'neurosis'. In striking contrast to this, when the animal was subjected to a motivational conflict by applying a blast of air or an electric shock at the moment of going to feed, it showed the following 'neurotic' manifestations: (1) changes in spontaneous activity, an active cat becoming passive or *vice versa*; (2) 'phobic' responses to feeding signals, i.e. the feeding signal produced signs of anxiety; the cats also showed severe inhibition of normal feeding; (3) 'counter-phobic' behaviour, i.e. stereotyped reactions (such as putting the head in the food-box without touching the food) which, although useless, diminished the animal's tension; (4) 'regressive' behaviour, i.e. a return to a pattern which had been successful before, though, it is interesting to note, not necessarily a more primitive one.

A number of techniques were found to alleviate the experimental neurosis in varying degree. Simple rest from the experimental situation had little success. A better method was to reduce one of the conflicting drives, e.g. hunger by feeding. 'Re-assurance' and 'persuasion' techniques of petting and coaxing the animal to feed between signals had also some success, but depended on the continued presence of the experimenter's hand. Occasional good results were obtained by putting a normal cat in the cage with the neurotic animal, who sometimes imitated the normal behaviour of the other, but this was the least reliable method. The normal cat was never made neurotic in this way.

The best methods were found to be (1) a 'forced' solution of the motivational conflict by environmental manipulation, e.g. increasing the urgency of the hunger drive by forcing the animal to

perceive the food and come up close to it, which led to a sudden breaking down of the feeding inhibition; and (2) arranging for the animal partially to control the situation, in that it was taught to manipulate the switch actuating the feeding signal. After the conflict situation had been set up, the cat at first ignored or avoided the switch it had learned to operate, but gradually began to manipulate it, and then neurotic gave way to normal behaviour. There are obvious parallels between these observations and certain well-known principles of human psychotherapy.

There is an interesting chapter, important in itself but not directly related to the rest of the book, on the part played by the hypothalamus in emotion. This adds weighty evidence to that which has been brought forward by a number of other authors to show that the hypothalamus reinforces and co-ordinates the mechanisms by which emotion is expressed, but that a direct relationship between hypothalamic function and affective experience probably does not exist.

Some 100 pages are devoted to a discussion of the literature on experimental studies of behaviour and neurosis. This covers a much wider field, of course, than the author's own work, and provides an interesting background to it. There is an enormous bibliography of 38 pages, some of which is related only remotely to the theme of the book.

A brief final section of 13 pages deals with the applications of animal work to psychiatry and psychotherapy. It is to be hoped that in a later edition the author will find time to discuss in a more detailed way the relations of his work to psycho-analysis. Masserman deplores the tendency of many psycho-analysts to follow Freud's lead in isolating psycho-analysis from comparative neurophysiology, other forms of psychology, and clinical psychiatry. His own work is a welcome breakaway from this tradition, and one hopes it may stimulate further investigations of a similar kind. The work here recorded is highly interesting and stimulating, but the experiments seem not yet sufficiently extensive or crucial to obviate the need for further research along these lines.

W. H. Gillespie.

An Introduction to Physical Methods of Treatment in Psychiatry. By William Sargant and Eliot Slater. (E. & S. Livingstone, Edinburgh, 1944. Pp. xii + 171. Price, 8s. 6d.)

This book can be recommended to readers of the *Journal* interested in recent developments in physical methods of treatment. The subject is covered more comprehensively than in any other book with which the reviewer is acquainted, and chapters are included on the insulin treatment of schizophrenia, modified insulin therapy, electrical convulsion therapy, continuous narcosis, prefrontal leucotomy, and numerous other topics. The book is written in an easy, lucid style, and includes full practical instructions about the details of tech-

nique. It does what it sets out to do with remarkable efficiency, but it must be realized that it does not aim at presenting a balanced argument of the pros and cons of these methods, nor to meet in detail the criticisms that have been made of them; it simply states the point of view of the authors, at times in somewhat polemical style. In consonance with this policy, there are practically no references to the literature. These points are mentioned not as adverse criticism, but merely to warn the reader that this is a practical manual rather than a theoretical treatise. As the former, it deserves high praise.

W. H. Gillespie.

Narco-Analysis. By J. Stephen Horsley. (Humphrey Milford, London, 1943. Pp. vii + 134. Price, 8s. 6d.)

This little book gives a useful practical account of the technique now so commonly employed of using intravenous barbiturates for the purpose of overcoming resistances. The author is well known as a pioneer in the popularization of this form of psychotherapy, and he naturally shows more enthusiasm and makes larger claims for its usefulness than many others who have experience of the method. He observes that 'Freud originally used hypnosis as the shortest and readiest route to the unconscious; but this short cut was balked by the fact that many patients could not be hypnotized.' This statement overlooks the other grave disadvantages which Freud pointed out in a method which seeks to short-circuit the ego. Dr. Horsley, however, is evidently aware that abreaction is not enough, and he discusses the need for analysis and synthesis, and even the transference phenomenon. There are 75 references, but the historical aspect of the subject is dealt with in a summary manner.

W. H. Gillespie.

Case Studies in the Psychopathology of Crime. (Volume II.) By Ben Karpman. (Medical Science Press, Washington, D.C. Pp. 738.)

This is the second volume of case studies collected by Dr. Karpman. They consist of the records of criminals convicted for various crimes, such as theft of United States mail, the violation

of the Mann Act and train robbery. They are largely the autobiographies of the criminals—the first case covering nearly three hundred and fifty pages. As such these accounts are interesting personal records. In the preface Dr. Karpman states that 'some of the cases were studied entirely by psychoanalysis', but the interpretative comments on the minute autobiographical material are meagre and most of the patients' dreams are reported without associations or interpretations. The value of these cases is therefore greater from the descriptive than from the interpretative aspect.

C. P. Oberndorf.

A New German-English Psycho-Analytical Vocabulary. By Alix Strachey. (Ballière, Tindall and Cox, London, 1943. Pp. viii + 84. Price, 7s. 6d.)

Although most readers of this *Journal* are no doubt already familiar with this excellent Vocabulary, there may be some who have not yet seen it. It is much more extensive than the 1924 Glossary, which it replaces, and it is to be welcomed as a careful, comprehensive piece of work which can be confidently recommended to anyone undertaking psycho-analytical translation, or merely reading the German literature. It is much to be hoped that translators will consult it freely, with a view to a greater degree of standardization than that hitherto achieved.

W. H. Gillespie.

War in the Mind: the Case Book of a Medical Psychologist. By Charles Berg. (The Macaulay Press, London. Second Edition, 1944. Pp. 260. Price, 10s. 6d.)

The first edition of this book (1941) was reviewed in this *Journal*, 23 (1942), 182. In the second edition, there are a number of additions, including an index, and improvements, especially in the theoretical sections. The treatment of the case of war neurosis is described in a more systematic and less episodic way. Dr. Berg is to be congratulated on the deserved popular success which has evidently been achieved by this attractively written book.

W. H. Gillespie.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

[Appearance in this list does not preclude subsequent notice.]

A. BOOKS

Active Psychotherapy. By Alexander Herzberg. (London: Research Books Ltd., 1945. Pp. 152. Price, 12s. 6d.)

Man, Morals and Society. By J. C. Flugel. (London: Duckworth, 1945. Pp. 328. Price, 21s.)

B. PERIODICALS

Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry (Chicago).

Arquivos da Polícia (São Paulo).

British Medical Journal (London).

Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic (Topeka).

Man (London).

Medical Press and Circular (London).

Medical Record (New York).

Mental Hygiene (New York).

Neurobiologia (Pernambuco).

Psychiatry (Washington).

Psychological Abstracts (Lancaster, Pa.).
Revista de Neurologia e Psiquiatria (São Paulo).
Revista de Neuro-Psiquiatria (Lima).
The British Journal of Medical Psychology
 (London).

The Egyptian Journal of Psychology (Cairo).
The Journal of the American Medical Association
 (Chicago).
The Psychoanalytic Quarterly (New York).
The Psychoanalytic Review (New York).

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY

ANNA FREUD, GENERAL SECRETARY

After the long break in the relations between the International Association and the Branch Societies on the Continent of Europe, the first reports of psycho-analytic activity in German-occupied territory have arrived from the French Psycho-Analytical Society. A fuller report has also been received from the Swedish Psycho-Analytical Society, with which communication had been very sporadic during the years of war, as well as a report surveying the first two years of the activity of the recently founded Argentine Psycho-Analytical Society.

FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY *Activities of the French Psycho-Analytical Society during the German Occupation*

Immediately upon the occupation of Paris by the Germans the membership of our Society dropped to two members, Madame Dolto (formerly Mlle. Murette) and Dr. Leuba. Fourteen members out of twenty-four had been called up and were serving with the armed forces. Dr. R. Spitz, with premonition of the coming catastrophe, had gone to America and Dr. H. Hartmann had reached Switzerland. During the hard winter of 1939-40 we had the misfortune to lose Dr. Edouard Pichon. Mme. Morgenstern did not survive the German entry into Paris. Mme. Codet, who had just lost her husband in a terrible accident, took up work in a mental hospital a long way from Paris. To this sad picture of irreparable losses has to be added the name of Dr. Allendy, who died in the country after his demobilization. Mme. Marie Bonaparte succeeded in reaching Greece to join her son. Our Jewish colleagues had either joined the armed forces or had had to go underground. There were thus, from the occupation onwards, only two members left to carry on.

Gradually some of the doctors released by the army returned to Paris, and we were able to form a small centre of activity where our thoughts could once more go beyond mere survival; but there was no question of meeting again as a society, since all societies and all group activity, whatever they were and whatever their professed aim, had been dissolved and banned.

Despite these precarious conditions, despite the dangers which threatened us, the tiny nucleus con-

sisting of Drs. Parcheminey, Schlumberger, Dolto and Leuba did something more than merely continue to exist. On his return Dr. Parcheminey was immediately called upon by Professor Laignel-Lavastine to reorganize the psycho-analytical department at the Hôpital Ste. Anne, where he was already working. This department is a branch of the Neuro-psychiatric Clinic of the Medical School. He appointed first Dr. Leuba, then Dr. Schlumberger. Mention should also be made of Dr. Lacan who had already done some work in the same department, and of Dr. Ph. Murette, who shortly after retired together with Professor Laignel-Lavastine. After Professor Laignel-Lavastine's resignation we were taken over without hesitation by his successor, Professor Jean Delay, to whom we are profoundly grateful for having kept us on in the face of German disapproval.

In this training institution, where two psychoanalysts were in direct contact every day with the senior students and the heads of the Clinic, we had a deep formative effect on the young psychiatrists. This direct influence was noticeable not only in the interest they manifested and in their appeals to our insight in dealing with difficult cases, but also in the eloquent proof they gave of the vistas we had opened up to them. Thus, one of the heads of the Clinic one day remarked to one of us: 'I cannot see how it is possible to practise psychiatry without the help of psycho-analysis.' To our greater satisfaction still, several of the house physicians and the heads of the Clinic developed a wish to undergo a training analysis. Dr. Parcheminey and Dr. Leuba between them undertook six training analyses, of which four are still in progress and two nearing their end. In addition, we were asked to give lectures on psycho-analytic subjects. Dr. Parcheminey gave one lecture of a general character to students in training. (It is gratifying to note, *à propos* of this, that the lecture was included in one of the official courses of the school.) In between the courses we held a series of lectures for the benefit of resident physicians, heads of the Clinic and students who were interested. All these lectures were regularly attended.

These activities, which were purely honorary, in no way interfered with our private work which made big demands on us. There are not enough of

us for the very large number of patients seeking treatment. Further, Mme. Dolto is doing excellent work in treating children at the Hôpital Trousseau, where she is very successful in making her medical colleagues familiar with psycho-analytic ideas. We may further mention the excellent work of two new workers in the field who are not yet members of the Society, Mlle. Boutonier, M.D. and lecturer in philosophy, and M. André Berge, who has just taken his medical degree. Dr. Berge does excellent propaganda work in Professor Heuyer's department. Mme. Codet and Dr. Lacan continued their private practice. We are also indebted to Dr. Lacan for the courses which he is giving for us.

For obvious reasons there are no publications to be mentioned, since all publishing was banned during the occupation. However, Dr. Leuba succeeded in having a short article on 'Le mythe du bromure dans le pinard' ['The Myth of the Bromide in the Wine Ration'] published in the *Journal de médecine et de chirurgie pratiques*. Dr. Parcheminey managed to get an article on the problem of hypnotism into a Swiss magazine. Besides these few publications papers on psycho-analytic subjects were read by several members.

Dr. Parcheminey as member of the Société de Psychologie at the Sorbonne read two papers before that society. More recently a psychiatric study group has been formed at the Salpêtrière comprising physicians, heads of the Clinic and senior students of the hospital. Dr. Parcheminey has been asked to represent psycho-analysis.

In the provinces, Dr. Lagache, head of the Faculty of Psychology at the University of Strasbourg, which was evacuated to Clermont-Ferrand, has by his teaching contributed largely to the spread of psycho-analysis.

Dr. Leuba has given several lectures for Medical Officers of Health as a result of which he has been invited to become a member of the 'Société Médicale du XVI^e'. The aim is that he should give lectures there and familiarize medical practitioners with the idea, of which people are too generally unaware, of the dynamic effect of the psyche on somatic functions.

On the whole it can be said that during the terrible years of occupation the psycho-analytic movement has not lost ground, but has actually gained in vitality, even though this has not been publicly demonstrated by teaching at the Institute of Psycho-Analysis or the circulation of our *Revue*. We receive continual proof that psycho-analytic conceptions are penetrating more and more widely into medical circles and that we are arousing a growing interest which is gradually becoming less tinged with hostility. Moreover, the frequency with which we are consulted with regard to treatment also shows that the therapeutic possibilities of psycho-analysis are becoming increasingly recognized and demanded by the public.

We are already preparing for the immediate

future. There are at the moment only eight members in Paris and we have before us the task of reorganizing the Society and of collecting as many members as possible. Before the autumn we shall, I trust, have resumed our official existence as a Society. When that time comes we hope that the shortage of paper, which prevents the publication of our papers, a substantial number of which are ready for the printer, will have been remedied.

Paris, February 12, 1945. Dr. John Leuba.

Report on the Psycho-Analytical Activities of the Institute of Psychology of the University of Strasbourg, moved to Clermont-Ferrand, from November, 1940 to December, 1944

Among the difficulties which confronted the continuation of psycho-analytical activities may be mentioned the almost total absence of books and periodicals—it is probable that most of the psycho-analytical books belonging to the Institute Library have been carried away by the Germans—the impossibility of getting books published and the growing difficulty of proceeding with a case with any continuity, since sometimes the analyst and sometimes the patient was forced to 'disappear'. The situation became so precarious in 1944 that Dr. Lagache himself was only able to keep on a single patient and had to give up taking any new cases.

At the lectures on theory at the Faculty, psycho-analytical conceptions continued to fill a large place in the teaching of general psychology, of child psychology, and of psychopathology, and a favoured place in the technique of human psychology. We could never resign ourselves to hiding the name of Freud, and psycho-analysis continued to arouse the keenest interest among students.

Various educational and practical needs having led us to use tests, especially tests of adaptation to reality and the Rorschach test, we reviewed the interpretation of them in the light of our psycho-analytical experience and, in particular, of the psycho-analysis of the ego and the mechanisms of adaptation and defence. We have thus elaborated a method of study of the total personality and of character diagnosis which we have applied to various problems of orientation and selection in pathological and criminological psychology. We also had the idea of using this method in the study of the indications and counter-indications for analysis: the co-efficient of adaptation to reality, the capacity for discharge and the early detection of resistances. The results have surpassed our expectations and we hope to have achieved a method of the greatest technical interest.

Another favourable circumstance has been the creation at Clermont-Ferrand in February, 1941 of a psychological advisory centre for children and adolescents. A large section of our clientèle was composed of character cases and delinquents. In

the absence of adequate facilities, we were led to enlarge the rôle of 'la cure libre' and consequently of psychotherapy. It was in this way that our medical assistant, Dr. Marianne Hossenlopp, was initiated and trained in psycho-analysis, and in 1944 we were able to engage a psycho-analyst, Mlle. Pericaut, a former pupil of Dr. Repond of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis in Paris. We were thus able to acquire new ideas on the psychology of maladjusted young people, and especially delinquents. From the point of view of technique, we have been forced, for want of time, to resort in many cases to an analytic psychotherapy rather than an orthodox analysis. For the pre-puberty child, we employed on a large scale Mlle. Rambert's puppet-show technique.

Around this nucleus of three analysts, sympathizers grouped themselves. We were thus able to widen the scope of our seminars, during the course of which we studied, in 1942, Freud's *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, and, in 1943-44, Anna Freud's *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, both of them from the English translations which remained in our possession. In 1944 ten students followed this part of our teaching. We are proposing this year to study the works of Abraham on character.

In official contacts (technical advice on children who are mentally deficient and morally in danger) we supported and showed the value and place of psycho-analysis both as a method of diagnosis and as treatment.

As regards research, we have published some works on the intelligibility of mental life, the part played by the concept of causality in depth psychology, and the relationship of psycho-analysis and phenomenology; the manuscript of the first volume of a work on erotic jealousy, *Phénoménologie de la Jalousie*, is in the hands of the typist; the second, devoted to the psycho-analysis of jealousy, is well advanced. Finally, we have made a number of studies of the functional significance and the psycho-analytical interpretation of delinquency.

Among the work of our students we should like to mention *Les idées modernes sur la psychologie de l'anxiété* [Modern Ideas on the Psychology of Anxiety] by J. Rudrauf and *Essai sur la psychologie des bandes des jeunes voleurs* [Essay on the Psychology of Gangs of Young Thieves] by Marianne Hossenlopp. For his thesis for 'doctorat ès-lettres', our pupil Salem Shentob wrote on *Les mécanismes inconscients dans la psychologie collective* [Unconscious Mechanisms in Group Psychology].

Altogether, during these four years, the Institute of Psychology of the University of Strasbourg has been, in its triple plan for practical work, teaching and research, a vital centre of psycho-analytical initiation and activity. It has been, if I may say so, a 'psycho-analytic resistance movement', a centre of freedom of ideas and of confidence in the

future. The reorganization of the University of Strasbourg will, in a few months' time, allow us to give psycho-analysis a place it has never had until now.

Dr. D. Lagache.

Clermont-Ferrand, February 6, 1945.

Bibliography

Lagache: 'La causalité et la psychologie en profondeur'. *Bull. de la Fac. des Lettres de Strasbourg*, January, 1942.

Lagache: 'Le diagnostic du caractère et l'emploi clinique des tests'. *Bull. de la Fac. des Lettres de Strasbourg*, April 1942.

Lagache: 'L'Imaginaire', de J. P. Sartre. *Bull. de la Fac. des Lettres de Strasbourg*, June 1941.

Lagache: 'Les possibilités de la consultation médico-psychologique dans l'examen et le traitement des jeunes délinquants'. *Revue médicale de France*, 1943.

Hossenlopp: 'Essai psychologique sur les bandes de jeunes voleurs'. *Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg*, 1944.

SWEDISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

The following report has been received from the President of the Swedish Psycho-Analytical Society.

'Our Society now has two Honorary Members, eight Members and two Associate Members. We have elected Dr. René de Monchy and Dr. Vera de Monchy, as well as Lector Tore Ekman to Membership. Both Dr. Vera de Monchy (formerly Vera Palmstierna) and Lector Ekman had been members of our Society before. For some years Lector Ekman was a member of the German Psycho-Analytical Society, but, after all his belongings had been destroyed in the course of the war, he returned to Sweden. Drs. René and Vera de Monchy were members of the Dutch Psycho-Analytical Society but are now resident in Sweden. As reported before, Dr. Kulovesi died. He was worn out by work at war hospitals during two successive wars. Dr. Nils Nielsen has resigned. Three Norwegian analysts are resident here: viz. Dr. Lotte Liebeck-Bernstein, Mrs. Pedersen, Mrs. Magli Elster, who attend our meetings as guests. We hold regular meetings and discussion evenings and are trying to establish a psycho-analytical clinic.

'We have, of course, been at peace all the time, but have had many difficulties and have been isolated from the world.'

Supplementary Addresses of Members Honorary Members

Antoni, Professor Nils, Ostermalmsg. 45, Stockholm.

Tegen, Professor Einar, Norrskogsv. 3, Stora Essingen.

Members

De Monchy, Dr. René, Linnégatan 93, Stockholm.
De Monchy, Dr. Vera, Linnégatan, 93, Stockholm.
Dr. Alfhild Tamm.

ARGENTINE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

We have received the following report, which gives a full list of papers read at meetings. Since this Branch Society was only recently founded, the full report is published in its original form.

Our activities during the years 1943 and 1944 have consisted of papers read at meetings, courses of lectures and seminars, publications and the establishment of the Muñoz Foundation. The statutes of the Society were published in the *Revista de Psicoanálisis*, the official organ of our Society, Vol. I, Part 4.

Papers Read

1943

- (1) Dr. Angel Garma : 'The Genesis of Reality Testing.'
- (2) Dr. Enrique Pichon Riviere : 'Contribution to a Psycho-Analytical Theory of Schizophrenia.'
- (3) Dr. Celes Ernesto Cárcamo : 'Impotence and Actual Neuroses.'
- (4) Dr. Arnaldo Rascovsky : 'Psychosomatic Considerations on the Sexual Development of Children.'
- (5) Dr. Marie Langer : 'Analysis of a Case of Female Homosexuality.'
- (6) Dr. Celes Ernesto Cárcamo : 'Picture of the World in American Aborigines.'
- (7) Dr. Enrique Pichon Riviere : 'The Dynamics of Epilepsy.'
- (8) Dr. Luis Rascovsky : 'Analysis of a Case of Fugue.'
- (9) Dr. Guillermo Ferrari Hardoy : 'Psychosomatic Investigation of Coryza.'
- (10) Dr. Angel Garma : 'External Reality and the Instincts in Schizophrenia.'

1944

- (11) Professor Enrique Loedel Palumbo (by invitation) : 'Psycho-Analysis of some Metaphysical Terms.'
- (12) Dr. Luis Rascovsky : 'Analysis of a Case of Obsessional Neurosis.'
- (13) Mrs. Arminda A. de Pichon Riviere : 'Analysis of an Eleven-Year-Old by the Use of Melanie Klein's Play Technique.'

Training Activities

Number of Candidates : There are ten candidates in training, three of whom are training in child analysis.

Lectures and Seminars : 1943. Dr. A. Garma : Theoretical Seminar.—Dr. E. P. Riviere : Lectures

on Psycho-Analytical Psychiatry (held at the Hospicio de las Mercedes (Mental Hospital)).—Dr. A. Rascovsky : Introduction to Psychosomatic Medicine (held at the Hospital de Niños (Children's Hospital)).

1944. Dr. A. Garma : Theoretical Seminar.—Dr. L. Rascovsky : Theoretical Seminar.—Dr. C. E. Cárcamo : Seminar on Psycho-Analytical Technique.—Dr. E. P. Riviere : Lectures on Psycho-Analytical Psychiatry (held at the Hospicio de las Mercedes).—Dr. A. Rascovsky : Lectures on Psychosomatic Medicine (held at the Hospital de Niños).

Publications

Revista de Psicoanálisis, published quarterly. Vols. I and II have been completed.

Psychogenic Factors in Bronchial Asthma, by French and Alexander. Spanish translation by Dr. A. Rascovsky.

Sadism and Masochism in Behaviour by Dr. A. Garma. In Spanish.

The Unknown Murderer by T. Reik. Spanish translation by Simón Wencelblat.

The Sexual Cycle in Woman by T. Benedek and Rubinstein. Spanish translation by Dr. A. Rascovsky (printing).

Institute

On December 7, 1943, the headquarters of the Argentine Psycho-Analytical Society were inaugurated. They house the library and the offices of the Editors of the *Revista de Psicoanálisis*. Courses and lectures are held there. In opening the Institute Dr. A. Garma, the Society's President at the time, reviewed the work done in an address later published in Vol. I, Part 3 of the *Revista*.

Members

Cárcamo, Dr. Celes Ernesto, Callao 1565. 6° P. Dto. B.

Hardoy, Dr. Guillermo Ferrari, Rodriguez Peña 518.

Garma, Dr. Angel, Santa Fe 911. 4° P.

Langer, Dr. Marie, Arenales 3583. 2° P. Dto. B.

Riviere, Dr. Enrique Pichon, Santa Fe 1379. 9° P.

Rascovsky, Dr. Arnaldo, Santa Fe 2982. 4° P. Dto. G.

Associate Member

Rascovsky, Dr. Luis, Larrea 934. 5° P.

Participation in the First Congress of the Society of Neurology and Psychiatry of Buenos Aires

The Congress was held from November 12 to 20 and delegates from Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and from the city of Buenos Aires, as well as from other cities in the interior of the Argentine Republic, participated. At the opening meeting Dr. Pichon Riviere introduced the Argentine Psycho-Analytical Society and stated the views

of psycho-analysis on the different medical disciplines. His address was published in the *Rivista*, Vol. II, Part 3. Papers on psycho-analytical subjects read at the Congress were as follows.

Dr. E. P. Riviere: 'Clinical Elements in the Prognosis of Schizophrenia.' Dr. C. E. Cárcamo: 'The Contribution of Psycho-Analysis to the Knowledge of Migraine.' Dr. G. F. Hardoy: 'Psychodynamics of Stammering.' Dr. A. Garma: 'Psychogenesis of Peptic Ulcer.' Dr. Valentin Perez Pastorini (Uruguay): 'On the Value of Associative Anamnesis in Psychosomatic Medicine.' Dr. E. P. Riviere: 'Pathogenesis and Dynamics of Epilepsy.' Drs. A. and L. Rascovsky: 'Psycho-Analytical Considerations on the Precipitating Factor in 100 Cases of Child Epilepsy.'

Muñoz Foundation

The Muñoz Foundation was instituted by Señor Francisco Muñoz with the object of contributing to the advancement of psycho-analysis. Its funds are used to subsidize the *Rivista de Psicoanálisis* and the publication of books. Training loans are

granted to a few candidates to enable them to complete their didactic analyses.'

Dr. E. Pichon Riviere,
Secretary.

OBITUARY

Dr. Ernst Paul Hoffmann (former Member of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society) died in Basle on December 23, 1944, after living in a French internment camp for three years (under the German-controlled Vichy Government).

ERRATUM

The address of Dr. Tibor Agoston (Member of the New York Psycho-Analytical Society) was printed erroneously in this *Journal*, Vol. XXV, Parts 3 and 4, p. 194, and should read: Agoston, Dr. Tibor, 35 East 84th Street, New York, N.Y.

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

The address of Mr. and Mrs. James Strachey is now: 41 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

203

The
**International Journal
of Psycho-Analysis**

Complete Volumes Bound in Half Leather
From 40s. each, plus postage

COMPLETE INDEX TO VOLUMES I-X

By DOUGLAS BRYAN. 118 pages, containing nearly 6,000 entries. Price 7/6, paper cover (postage 6d.); or bound uniform with volumes, price 12/6 (postage 4d.).

RESEARCH SUPPLEMENTS

to the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS.

Recently published

No. 1. A NEW GERMAN-ENGLISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL VOCABULARY.

By ALIX STRACHEY. Price 10/6 (postage 4d.) This replaces the GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS now out of print.

No. 2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL THEORY OF THE PSYCHOSES OF 1893-1926

By JOHN RICKMAN, M.A., M.D. Now out of print.

No. 3. THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

By EDWARD GLOVER, M.D. Now out of print.

No. 4. AN INVESTIGATION OF THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Edited by EDWARD GLOVER, M.D., with the assistance of MARJORIE BRIERLEY, M.B., B.Sc. Price, cloth bound, 10s. 6d.

Published for the Institute of Psycho-Analysis by
BAILLIÈRE, TINDALL AND COX,
7 & 8 HENRIETTA ST., LONDON, W.C.2.

CONTENTS

ORIGINAL PAPERS

	PAGE
SIGMUND FREUD. DOSTOEVSKY AND PARRICIDE (1928)	1
ERNEST JONES. REMINISCENT NOTES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES.....	8
MELANIE KLEIN. THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN THE LIGHT OF EARLY ANXIETIES	11
OTTO FENICHEL. THE CONCEPT OF TRAUMA IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL THEORY.....	33
J. O. WISDOM. THE UNCONSCIOUS ORIGIN OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILLO- SOPHY	44
ADRIAN STEPHEN. TWO SHORT COMMUNICATIONS:	
(1) RUMINATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC SECRETARY.....	52
(2) A NOTE ON AMBIVALENCE.....	55
SUSAN ISAACS. 'NOTES ON METAPSYCHOLOGY AS PROCESS THEORY': SOME COMMENTS.....	58
TIBOR AGOSTON. SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PROSTITUTION: THE PSEUDO-PERSONALITY.....	62

BIBLIOGRAPHY

JAMES STRACHEY. LIST OF ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF FREUD'S WORKS...	67
--	----

BOOK REVIEWS

FREUD: MASTER AND FRIEND, by Hanns Sachs. (S. M. Payne).....	76
DAVID EDER: MEMOIRS OF A MODERN PIONEER, edited by J. B. Hobman. (J. C. Flugel).....	77
INFANTS WITHOUT FAMILIES, by Dorothy Burlingham and Anna Freud. (H. Sheehan-Dare).....	78
THE ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF CULTURE, by Géza Róheim. (R. E. Money-Kyrle)	79
BEHAVIOR AND NEUROSIS, by Jules H. Masserman. (W. H. Gillespie)...	81
AN INTRODUCTION TO PHYSICAL METHODS OF TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY, by William Sargant and Eliot Slater. (W. H. Gillespie)	82
NARCO-ANALYSIS, by J. Stephen Horsley. (W. H. Gillespie).....	83
CASE STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME (Vol. II), by Ben Karpman. (C. P. Oberndorf).....	83
A NEW GERMAN-ENGLISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL VOCABULARY, by Alix Strachey. (W. H. Gillespie).....	83
WAR IN THE MIND: THE CASE BOOK OF A MEDICAL PSYCHOLO- GIST, by Charles Berg. (W. H. Gillespie).....	83

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED..... 83

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY.....	84
SWEDISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY.....	86
ARGENTINE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY.....	87
OBITUARY	88
ERRATUM	88
CHANGE OF ADDRESS.....	88